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ABSTRACT PAGE 
This dissertation describes a technique for formally analyzing a firewall security policy using a 
quasi-reduced multiway decision diagram model. The analysis allows a system administrator to 
detect and repair errors in the configuration of the firewall without a tedious manual inspection 
of the firewall rules. 
We present four major contributions. First, we describe a set of algorithms for representing a 
firewall rule set as a multi-way decision diagram and for solving logical queries against that 
model. We demonstrate the application of these techniques in a tool for analyzing iptables 
firewalls. Second, we present an extension of our work that enables analysis of systems of 
connected firewalls and firewalls that use network address translation and other packet 
mangling rules. Third, we demonstrate a technique for decomposing a network into classes of 
equivalent hosts. These classes can be used to detect errors in a firewall policy without apriori 
knowledge of potential vulnerabilities. They can also be used with other firewall testing 
techniques to ensure comprehensive coverage of the test space. Fourth, we discuss a 
strategy for partially automating repair of the firewall policy through the use of 
counterexamples and rule history. 
Using these techniques, a system administrator can detect and repair common firewall errors, 
such as typos, out-of-order rules, and shadowed rules. She can also develop a specification of 
the behaviors of the firewall and validate the firewall policy against that specification. 
This dissertation is dedicated to Mrs. Sharon Lust, my junior high reading teacher. Mrs. 
Lust is an exemplary teacher. In the classroom she is a brilliant and engaging instructor. 
Her reading class made a lasting impact on me. She demands excellence from her 
students, but helps them to develop the skills they need to meet her expectations. Outside 
the classroom she is her students' strongest advocate. For years after I finished her class 
she opened doors for me and other students by recommending us for contests, journals, 
and other academic opportunities. She is a model of everything I hope to be as a teacher 
and scholar. 
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FORMAL ANALYSIS OF FIREWALL POLICIES 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
System administrators rely very heavily on firewalls for protection against external and 
internal threats to the network. This reliance has led to the development of sophisticated 
and powerful filtering software for enforcing a security policy on the packets that enter 
a network. Features such as stateful inspection and network address translation (NAT) 
greatly enhance the power and flexibility of these filtering tools. Unfortunately, a packet 
filter only provides adequate protection if the policy that it implements is correct. If the 
policy is not sufficiently restrictive, attackers can compromise the network by exploiting 
errors in the policy. On the other hand, if the policy is too restrictive, the firewall may 
interfere with legitimate traffic. 
A policy that contains errors exposes the network to many kinds of threats from both 
sides of the network perimeter. External threats, such as denial-of-service attacks or SSH 
brute force attacks can take advantage of these weaknesses to compromise important servers 
and workstations. Internal threats posed by compromised systems or malicious users with 
access to internal resources can amplify existing problems and extend them throughout the 
network. 
The importance of ensuring that the firewall policy is correct has led to the development 
of formal firewall testing procedures [57, 50] that employ many different kinds of tools to 
verify that the firewall policy meets the security requirements of the network. Unfortu-
nately, detecting and repairing errors is a very difficult process, which requires a significant 
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expenditure of time and resources. Furthermore, it is possible to introduce new errors into 
the policy while attempting to repair old ones. 
Inspecting the firewall policy manually is especially time-consuming for large networks 
with many hosts and multiple firewalls. The difficulty of repairing a firewall often leads to 
poor security practices. In order to avoid errors, some experts advocate using a sophisticated 
firewall design process [35, 39] in which the firewall design passes through several testing 
phases before deployment on production systems, but this approach requires a significant 
allocation of resources to firewall policy development. In fact, some experts [46, 47, 20] 
suggest that security can be better protected by reducing or eliminating the use of firewalls 
for security and instead relying on other techniques, such as patching, to defend the network. 
Some system administrators work around these problems by deploying generic firewall 
policies obtained from the Internet [14, 38, 55] or using graphical firewall policy wizards [29, 
54, 31, 21]. These policies protect a system against common threats, but are not tailored to a 
network's particular needs. This means that they seldom implement restrictive policies and 
leave important services vulnerable to attack. Adapting these policies to the requirements 
of a particular environment can sometimes be as challenging as developing a correct policy 
from scratch. 
Configuration of the firewall can sometimes be made simpler using policy visualization 
tools. Visualization tools such as PolicyVis [53] and FireVis [45] allow a system administra-
tor to better understand the behavior of a firewall, which can make it easier to detect errors 
in the policy. Unfortunately, many policies are so complicated that even these visualization 
tools can be difficult to use. 
There are several reasons firewall configuration is so difficult. One reason is that firewall 
policies are written in a complex language which the administrator must master to be able 
to maintain the policy. Another reason is that polices can be extremely long, containing 
hundreds or even thousands of rules. 
Maintaining a restrictive firewall policy is especially difficult on networks which change 
rapidly as users demand new services and systems are brought online or removed from 
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service. Securing these networks often requires the use of multiple interacting firewalls, each 
of which has a long and complicated policy. Every the policy is modified, an opportunity 
for error is created in which the system administrator may inadvertently introduce new and 
potentially devastating problems into the policy. 
Errors introduced into the policy can open the doors for a malicious intruder to compro-
mise a server or launch a denial of service attack. Even a simple typo can expose a network 
to a barrage of hostile traffic. In some firewall systems, merely reversing the order of two 
rules can completely invalidate the policy. 
1.1 iptables 
The Linux kernel implements an interface called netfilter [58, 43, 3], which provides the 
internal hooks for the iptables firewall. The iptables packet filter supports many advanced 
features such as packet mangling and stateful inspection and is freely available as part 
of any recent Linux distribution. This makes it an extremely cost-effective solution for 
organizations that need effective security, but cannot afford expensive commercial products, 
such as Cisco's PIX firewall or a Checkpoint firewall. 
The rising popularity of Linux as a desktop environment has made iptables the firewall 
of choice for many home users as well as business users. Unfortunately, because a restrictive 
firewall policy can be difficult to construct and maintain, many of these firewalls implement 
generic, minimally-restrictive, and infrequently tested policies. As a result, these policies 
provide very little protection for the hosts they are deployed to secure. 
In this dissertation, we will explore ways to simplify the testing, analysis, and repair of 
iptables firewalls. In order to follow the algorithms and examples we will use, it is helpful 
to have some understanding of the configuration and operation of an iptables firewall. 
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1.1.1 Creating an iptables Policy 
To create an iptables firewall policy, the system administrator constructs chains of fil-
tering rules. Each rule in a chain identifies a filtering action and a set of packets to which 
the action should be applied. The action ACCEPT indicates that the firewall should allow 
the packet to pass through the firewall and enter the network. The action DROP indicates 
that the firewall should discard the packet. The user can also specify that the packet should 
be passed to some other firewall chain for processing. 
iptables provides three built-in chains: the INPUT chain, the FORWARD chain, and 
the OUTPUT chain. Packets that are intended for the firewall itself are processed by the 
INPUT chain. Packets intended to pass through the firewall on their way to some other host 
are processed by the FORWARD chain. The OUTPUT chain processes packets generated 
by the firewall host. The rules in each of these chains can ACCEPT a packet, DROP a 
packet, or pass it to a user-defined chain for further processing. The three built-in chains 
also have a default policy that determines what action is taken on packets that do not match 
any rule of the chain. 
1.1.2 iptables Operation 
When determining what action should be taken on a particular packet, the rules in a 
chain are considered in first-to-last order. The first rule that matches will cause processing 
of that packet to cease or pass to some other chain. This means that inserting rules in the 
wrong order can seriously impact the behavior of the firewall. 
Chain FORWARD (policy ACCEPT): 
target prot source destination flags 
1 ACCEPT TCP 192.168.1.0/24 192.168.2.0/24 TCP dpt:ssh 
2 ACCEPT TCP anywhere 192.168.2.0/24 TCP dpt:http 
3 DROP all anywhere 192.168.2.0/24 
Figure 1.1: Example FORWARD chain 
An example FORWARD chain is shown in figure 1.1. This example policy secures a 
network 192.168.2.0/24 against threats from the outside world. In the example, the default 
7 
policy is ACCEPT. This means that a packet will be allowed to enter the network unless 
show rule in the policy specifically drops it. Each of the rules in the chain has a target 
and a set of match conditions. The target specifies an action that should be applied to 
packets that match all of the conditions. The conditions specify criteria for determining 
which packets match the rule. For instance, the first rule has the target ACCEPT. It also 
has a protocol match, a source match, a destination match, and a flag match. 
The protocol match specifies that only TCP packets should be considered. The source 
match ensures that the rule is only applied to packets from the trusted 192.168.1.0/24 sub-
net. The destination match indicates that only packets sent to hosts on the 192.168.2.0/24 
subnet will be processed. Finally, the additional match "TCP dpt:ssh" ensures that only 
SSH packets will be matched. In other words, the first rule of the chain specifies that ssh traf-
fic should be allowed to the protected network from hosts on trusted subnet 192.168.1.0/24. 
Similarly, the second rule specifies that http traffic should be allowed from any host. 
The third rule blocks all other traffic to the protected network. 
1.1.3 Firewall Errors 
Figure 1.2 shows the policy of a firewall that secures an internal network 192.168.2.0/24 
from intrusions by hosts on an unsecured wireless network 192.168.1.0/24. All traffic, in-
cluding HTTP traffic, should be dropped from that insecure network. Rule 1 drops any 
incoming ICMP packets. Rule 2 drops traffic from the insecure network. The remaining 
rules secure various services and allow access to the web server. All other traffic is dropped, 
unless it comes from a trusted subnet 113.192.10.0/24. 
Suppose the administrator decides to modify this configuration to allow trusted machines 
to send IPP printing traffic (on port 631) to the secure network. If she inserts an accept 
rule in the wrong place, she can produce the incorrect configuration in figure 1.3. This 
configuration allows printing service from the insecure network, because the new rule has 
been inserted before the rule which restricts the insecure subnet. Switching rules 2 and 3 
yields a correct configuration. This sort of error becomes harder to detect as the number 
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Chain FORWARD (policy DROP): 
target prot source destination flags 
1 DROP ICMP anywhere 192.168.2.0/24 
2 DROP all 192.168.1.0/24 192.168.2.0/24 
3 DROP TCP anywhere 192.168.2.0/24 TCP dpt:domain 
4 ACCEPT TCP anywhere 192.168.2.0/24 TCP dpt:HTTP 
5 DROP TCP anywhere 192.168.2.0/24 TCP dpt:SSH 
6 ACCEPT all 113.192.10.0/24 192.168.2.0/24 
Figure 1.2: A sample firewall that secures subnet 192.168.2.0/24 against intrusions from untrusted 
network 192.168.1.0/24 
of rules grows and the complexity of their structure increases. 
Chain FORWARD (policy DROP) 
target prot source destination flags 
1 DROP ICMP anywhere 192.168.2.0/24 
2 ACCEPT all anywhere 192.168.2.0/24 TCP dpt:631 
3 DROP all 192.168.1.0/24 192.168.2.0/24 
4 DROP TCP anywhere 192.168.2.0/24 TCP dpt:domain 
5 ACCEPT TCP anywhere 192.168.2.0/24 TCP dpt:HTTP 
6 DROP TCP anywhere 192.168.2.0/24 TCP dpt:SSH 
7 ACCEPT all 113.192.10.0/24 192.168.2.0/24 
Figure 1.3: A misconfigured firewall that allows the untrusted network to access printing services 
Consider also the firewall rule set described in figure 1.4, which protects an internal 
subnet 192.168.2.0/24 from the outside world. Can hosts on the protected network send 
SMTP traffic through the firewall? At first glance, it appears that hosts from 192.168.2.0/24 
can access SMTP (they are granted access in rule 5). That rule, however, only grants access 
if the connection is in an ESTABLISHED state. In order for a host to transmit, SMTP 
traffic to an outside host, it must first establish the connection. But this cannot be done, 
because NEW connections will be dropped by the default policy of the firewall. If the 
system administrator desires to allow SMTP traffic from protected hosts, the policy must 
be changed to allow creation of new connections from hosts on the 192.168.2.0/24 subnet. 
While the problems in these example policies could easily be avoided by a careful system 
administrator, far more complex errors can exist in a real-world firewall policy. As the 
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Chain FORWARD (policy DROP) 
target prot source destination flags 
1 ACCEPT ICMP anywhere 192.168.2.0/24 
2 ACCEPT TCP anywhere 192.168.2.0/24 TCP dpt:ssh 
flags:SYN ,ACK/SYN 
3 ACCEPT UDP anywhere 192.168.2.0/24 UDP dpt:domain 
4 ACCEPT all 113.117.1.4 192.168.2.0/24 
5 ACCEPT all 192.168.2.0/24 anywhere TCP dpt:smtp 
state ESTABLISHED 
Figure 1.4: A stateful rule set which allows SMTP access only for established connections. 
firewall policy becomes longer and more complicated, it becomes more difficult to implement 
and make changes to the policy without introducing mistakes. In a survey of 37 corporate 
firewalls, Wool [60] discovered an average of 7 configuration errors per system. While his 
study examined only Checkpoint and PIX firewalls, it is not unreasonable to assume that 
other firewall systems have comparable error rates. 
In this dissertation, we explore techniques for performing a detailed formal analysis of 
an iptables firewall policy and for detecting errors in the firewall policy using an equivalence 
class decomposition of the hosts on a network. These analytical techniques have many prac-
tical applications to the problem of detecting and correcting firewall errors. In examining 
this area, we also address several theoretical issues such as how to efficiently model a fire-
wall policy in software, how to derive useful queries for testing the firewall policy, and the 
tradeoff between producing insufficiently detailed output and producing more information 
than a user can easily process. 
To this end, we explore four major areas. First, we describe a multi-way decision 
diagram representation of the firewall policy which allows us to answer logical queries about 
the behavior of the firewall. Second, we describe the application of this MDD model to a 
tool for testing Linux firewalls. Third, we present an extension of this technique that 
enables the analysis of systems of connected firewalls and firewalls that use advanced packet 
mangling techniques, such as network address translation. Fourth, we discuss a technique 
for generating an equivalence class representation of the firewall policy, which can be used 
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to detect certain classes of errors without constructing a series of queries or test cases. Last, 
we consider ways to partially automate repair of a policy. 
Chapter 2 
Representations of a Firewall 
Policy 
A firewall is a facility (which can be either hardware or software) that implements a 
filtering policy for one or more network hosts. Usually, the policy is specified as a set of 
rules in which each rule consists of an action and one or more conditions. The conditions 
identify a set of packets to which the action should be applied. In this work, we consider 
matches against the attributes source address, destination address, protocol, source port, 
destination port, connection state, incoming network interface, outgoing network interface, 
and the six TCP flags (SYN, ACK, URG, PSH, RST, and FIN). It is possible to extend our 
work to consider other attributes, but we will focus on these attributes in order to simplify 
the discussion of our techniques. 
In order to perform formal analysis of the policy, we must address the issue of construct-
ing a model of the firewall which can be used to accurately represent the policy. There have 
been many approaches to this problem. We will consider first the efforts of others to produce 
an analytic model and then describe our own technique. 
11 
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2.1 Other Models 
One approach is to use linked lists of rules to describe the firewall policy. This is 
the approach used by many firewall implementations. For instance, in the LimlX iptables 
system, rules are grouped into sequential lists called chains, which are further organized 
into four tables. The filter table contains chains directly related to filtering. The nat table 
contains chains related to network address translation. Chains in the mangle table modify 
packets in more exotic ways (such as increasing the TTL of a packet). There is also a raw 
table which allows processing of packets before connection tracking analysis is applied. 
Internally, each rule consists of a data structure with pointers to a linked list of matches 
and a linked list of targets (a linked list is necessary for implementation of user-defined 
target values which perform processing and then pass control on to other targets). The 
chains of the firewall are represented using doubly linked lists. Caches are used to speed 
up operations on these lists. The tables are simple structures which contain pointers to the 
various chains along with some additional management information [42]. 
The linked list approach suffers from several disadvantages. First, performance can be 
poor, especially for policies with many rules, since lookups may require searching the entire 
list. Caching can reduce the impact of this problem, but does not entirely eliminate it. 
Second, the linked list model is not very amenable to analysis. One major drawback is the 
fact that a policy can have two different linked list representations with identical behavior. 
This makes it difficult to compare two policies for equivalence or perform more complex 
operations on them. 
2.1.1 Binary Decision Diagrams 
A more sophisticated approach to modeling the firewall is to use Binary Decision Dia-
grams (BDDs). Hazelhurst [24, 25] demonstrated a BDD-based technique for representing 
firewall policies in which each node of the BDD corresponds to exactly one bit of a match 
condition. Every path through the BDD corresponds to one packet seen by the firewall. 
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Using reduction and merging operations, duplicate and redundant nodes are removed from 
the BDD to produce a compact and canonical representation of the firewall policy. 
2.1.2 Interval Decision Diagrams 
Fleury and Christensen [9, 11, 10] extended this work to implement a Decision Diagram 
based packet filter for Linux that outperforms Netfilter for policies with more than 100 
rules. Their work uses Interval Decision Diagrams (IDDs), a generalization of BDDs in 
which each node represents a range of values rather than a single boolean variable. This 
is a more natural representation of the policy, since most of the matches in a firewall rule 
correspond to integer ranges rather than boolean values. The IDD representation is a 
reduced decision diagram in which duplicate nodes are not allowed and redundant nodes 
with all arcs pointing to the same descendant are removed. A major drawback to the IDD 
approach is that application of the reduction rules causes generation of the IDD to require 
polynomial time - a significant cost. Furthermore, a path through the IDD can contain 
multiple nodes that reference the same attribute (for instance, there may be two nodes 
which impose conditions on the source address). This affects the performance of algebraic 
operations on the IDD representation slightly and makes analysis drastically more difficult. 
2.1.3 Firewall Decision Diagrams 
Gouda, Liu, et. al [22] constructed a decision diagram representation of the policy using 
Firewall Decision Diagrams (FDDs). An FDD is similar to an IDD, but does not allow any 
path to contain multiple nodes corresponding to the same attribute. Using this model, they 
presented a technique for detecting structural errors (such as duplicate rules) in the firewall 
policy. In other work, they described a system for evaluating SQL-like queries [34] against 
a firewall policy modeled using FDDs. 
In a Firewall Decision Diagram, duplicate nodes and redundant nodes are removed by 
the repeated application of reduction rules. While applying these reduction rules can lower 
the memory requirement for storing the final decision diagram and slightly reduces the cost 
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of performing lookups, other operations may incur some overhead whenever a removed node 
needs to be "put back" into the MDD in the middle of an operation. 
2.1.4 Quasi-Reduced Multi-way Decision Diagrams 
In our work, we use quasi-reduced MDDs [12] in which redundant nodes are allowed, 
but duplicate nodes are removed using a hashing algorithm. Through the efficient use of 
caches, we can obtain very efficient manipulation of the firewall policy model which enables 
fast and accurate analysis of the firewall policy. 
2. 2 Notation 
In the remainder of this chapter, we will carefully define the terms, models, and algo-
rithms we employ in describing and constructing a representation of the firewall policy. We 
will then show that the MDD model is an accurate representation of the firewall policy. To 
this end, we first provide a formal characterization of an iptables firewall policy by care-
fully defining each of its constituent parts: match conditions, firewall rules, and chains of 
rules. We will then describe Quasi-Reduced Multiway Decision Diagrams and give several 
algorithms which can be used to construct a (QR)MDD model of a firewall policy. We also 
demonstrate the correctness of these algorithms by proving that the MDD model accepts 
(or drops) exactly those packets accepted (or dropped) by the firewall policy. 
To formally describe an iptables firewall, we use the following definitions. 
Definition 1 The domain of an attribute is the set of possible values that can hold. A 
match condition, m, over an attribute a, is a boolean function which maps a subset of 
the domain of a to the values TRUE and FALSE. 
Each match condition identifies a set of packets to which a filtering rule should be 
applied. Because the match condition corresponds to exactly one attribute of the firewall 
rule, the user must combine several match conditions to obtain fine-grained definition of 
the match set. 
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For each match condition m, we let 'D(m) represent the domain of values which satisfy 
the condition. For instance, if m is a match condition on the source port, 'D(m) is a set of 
ports that satisfy the condition. 
There are several different ways in which we can use match conditions to describe the 
behavior of the firewall. For instance, to represent source address, we could construct a 
single match condition over the source address attribute or we could split the source address 
into octets and create separate match conditions for each octet of the source address. We 
will take the latter approach in our implementation, but our theoretical results generalize 
to any definition of the match conditions. To simplify discussion, we define a constant, K, 
which represents the total number of attributes to be considered in modeling the policy. 
This definition of a match condition allows us to formally describe both filtering rules 
and filtering chains. Because these concepts are inextricably linked, we first define "filtering 
rule" and use that definition to define the concept of a filtering chain. 
Definition 2 A filtering rule r is a tuple (t, m1, ... , mK) in which each mi is a match 
condition, and t, the target, is either the action ACCEPT, the action DROP, or a filtering 
chain. The match set of r, written M(r), is the set of packets which match each of the 
match conditions in r. 
We sometimes use the notation r[k] to represent the kth match of rule r using the 
convention that r[OJ = t and r[i] =mi. When discussing a named attribute, we may also 
use the notation r.X to specify attribute X of rule r. 
Definition 3 A firewall chain is an ordered sequence of firewall rules. 
For iptables firewalls, chains are processed in first-match order so that when a packet 
matches a rule of the chain processing halts and the packet is either accepted, dropped, or 
passed to some other chain for handling. 
We are interested in which packets a firewall chain will accept and which it will reject. 
In order to describe this concept fully, we define two terms: the accept set of a firewall 
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chain and the accept set of a firewall rule. It is necessary to employ a circular reference in 
defining these concepts in order to account for the possibility that a rule targets a firewall 
chain. Therefore, we first define "accept set of a rule" using the idea of "accept set of a 
chain" and then define "accept set of a chain" using "accept set of a rule". The fact that 
iptables does not allow a rule to reference any chain which is its own ancestor ensures that, 
despite the circular reference, these definitions are well-formed. 
Definition 4 The accept set of a rule r is defined as follows: 
0 If r[D] is "DROP" 
A(r) = niE[l,K(D(r[i]) If r[O] is "ACCEPT" 
niE[l,K(D(r[i]) n A(r[O]) If r[O] is a chain. 
Less formally, the accept set describes the set of packets which are accepted by rule r. 
The reject set of a rule, R(r) is defined similarly by replacing "ACCEPT" with "DROP" 
and A(r[O]) with R(r[O]). 
Definition 5 The accept set of a chain c = (ro, r1, ... , rn) of size n+l is defined as follows: 
A( c) = A(ro) UiE[l,n] (A(ri) n R(ri-1) n ... n R(ro)) 
Or (more concisely): 
A(c) = A(ro) uiE[l,n] (A(ri) nsE[O,i-1] R(rs)). 
In other words, the accept set of a chain is the set of packets accepted by a rule in the 
chain that are not dropped by any previous rule of the chain. The reject set of a chain, 
R( c) is defined similarly. 
2.3 Multi-way Decision Diagrams 
A multi-way decision diagram (MDD) is a directed acyclic graph, M = (V, E, L), where 
V is a set of nodes, E ~ V x V is a set of directed edges, and L : E ----> Z is a labeling 
function which maps each edge to a distinct integer value. The nodes of the MDD are 
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organized into K + 1 levels and all edges from a node at non-terminal level k > 0 point to 
nodes at level k - 1. We assign a unique index p to each node at level k. This allows us to 
describe node <k:p> where k is the level and p identifies the node. We use the notation 
<k:p>[i] to describe the child of node <k:p> which can be reached by following the edge 
with label i. 
We will frequently use lowercase subscripts to refer to the index of a node. For instance, 
we sometimes use np to refer to the index of node <k : np>. Since the root node of an MD D 
often requires special consideration, we will use the notation <K: Np> for the node at level 
K which has index Np. When referring to the entire decision diagram, we will use the 
capital letter M, for instance, we might say that the MDD Mr has root node <K: Nr>· 
Figure 2.1: A rule set MDD for the chain in figure 1.2 
In this application, every path through the MDD represents a packet potentially received 
by the firewall. Each of the non-terminal levels of the MDD correspond to a specific attribute 
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of the packet. For instance, in figure 2.1, the MDD representation of the rule set given in 
figure 1.2, the top four levels represent the source address and the next four levels represent 
the destination address. The next level represents the protocol. Below these levels are levels 
for the source port and the destination port, the six TCP flags (URG, PSH, SYN, ACK, 
RST, FIN), and the connection state. Level 0 is a special terminal level which represents 
the target of the firewall rule (ACCEPT, DROP, LOG, or a user-defined chain) as a unique 
integer index. We reserve terminal index 0 for the special meaning "not yet specified". 
For readability, we represent the edge-labeling function, L, by drawing labels above 
each arc. Although these arcs appear inside the box representing a node, they should be 
interpreted as labels for the edges leading from that node to levels below. 
A non-terminal node at level k represents a subset of packets that share some attributes. 
An arc from a node at level k to a node at level k - 1 represents a choice of value for the 
attribute represented at level k. When many arcs from a node point to the same child, we 
use ellipses in the figure to save space. In the actual MDD there would be arcs for each 
value we have hidden in this manner. 
To see that an HTTP packet from 68.10.1.3 to 192.168.2.10 is accepted by the firewall, 
start with the node at level 20 of the MDD. Since the first source octet of the packet is 
68, which falls between 0 and 113, follow the first arc to the highlighted node at level 19. 
Now there is only one arc to follow, since all values between 0 and 255 have been grouped 
together using ellipses. Since 10 falls between 0 and 255, we follow the highlighted arc to 
a node at level 18. Again, 1 falls between 0 and 255 so follow the arc to level 17. The last 
octet of the source address is 3, which falls between 0 and 255, so follow the highlighted arc 
to the node at level 16. 
Level 16 represents the first octet of the destination address, which for our example is 
192. Since there is an arc for 192, proceed to level 15. If the destination address had been 
193.1.1.1, you would know that the packet is dropped by the firewall, since there is no arc 
for 193 and DROP is the default policy. Instead, at level 15, examine the second octet of 
the destination address. Since there is an arc for 168, proceed to level 14. Continue in this 
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manner to level 12. 
At level 12, there is an arc for TCP and an arc for ICMP. Since HTTP is a TCP 
protocol, follow the arc for TCP to the highlighted node at level 11. Continue in this 
manner until you reach the node at terminal level 0. Since it is the ACCEPT node, the 
packet will be accepted by the firewall. 
2.4 Implementation 
Nodes at each level are stored in a dynamic array and are referenced by a unique integer 
index. At every level, we reserve index 0 for a special node, node zero, which represents the 
empty set. This can be thought of as a node with all its arcs pointing to node zero at the 
level below. To save a small amount of memory, we do not explicitly store node zero, but 
instead handle it as a special case in our algorithms. Using the notation presented above, 
we will sometimes use <k: 0> to mean node zero at level k. 
Like nodes, edges are stored in a per-level dynamic array. Each element of the array 
holds the index of a child node. The index of each element corresponds to the label of the 
edge, offset so that the edges for each node can be stored separately. We keep track of the 
offset for each node's edges in the node structure. More details on the MDD implementation 
are available in [36]. 
2.5 Building an MDD for a Filter Rule 
In order to construct an MDD for a rule, we first parse the rule into target, source ad-
dress, destination address, source port, destination port, protocol, state, incoming interface, 
outgoing interface, and flag components. From these components, we create a parsed rule, 
which represents each component at level k as an integer range. We store these ranges in 
an array of size K + 1. We use the notation pr[k].low and pr[k].high to reference the lower 
and upper bounds of the range. We also define an operation MakeMDDFromRule, which 
nodeJndex MakeMDDFromRule(ParsedRule pr) 
1 old = LookUpTarget(pr.target). 
2 for k = 1 to K: 
3 n = NewNode(k). 
4 fori= 0 to MaxValue(k): 
5 if i 2: pr[k].low and i :S pr[k].high: 
6 <k:n>[i] =old. 
7 old =CheckForDuplicates(n). 
8 return n. 
Figure 2.2: An MDD for a rule 
Algorithm for building an MDD from a rule 
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takes the parsed firewall rule and returns the root node of an MDD representing that rule. 
Pseudocode for MakeMDDFromRule is given in figure 2.2. 
The algorithm starts at level 0 and builds upward toward the root node. At each level, 
it creates new nodes that represent the criteria of the parsed rule. In line 1, node <0 : n> 
is calculated by finding the integer index which represents the rule target. For ACCEPT, 
DROP, and LOG targets this is a predefined constant less than 4. For user-defined rules, 
the index comes from a pre-generated table that maps the user-defined chains, in the order 
of their discovery during parsing, to integers greater than 3. 
Lines 2-7 construct nodes at levels 1 through K. The call to NewNode in line 3 creates 
a new node and initializes all its arcs to point at node zero. Lines 4 - 7 examine each 
potential value i of filter rule attribute k. If i falls within the range specified by the parsed 
rule, arc <k: n> [i] is connected to node <k - 1: old>. Otherwise, the arc is left at its default 
value, which points to node zero. 
When we reach line 7, we have considered all the potential values of attribute k, so 
we now call CheckForDuplicates, which uses hashing to identify any nodes that exactly 
duplicate node <k:n>. If such a node exists, <k:n> is freed and CheckForDuplicates 
returns the index of the duplicate node. Otherwise, it returns <k: n>. 
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2.6 Correctness of MDD generation for simple terminal rules 
To demonstrate that the rule generation algorithm is correct, we first define the idea of 
an accept set of an MDD. We then show that the accept set of the MDD representation of 
a rule generated by MakeMDDFromRule is equivalent to the accept set of the rule. 
Definition 6 The accept set of an MDD node <k: p> is the set of packets s such that there 
exists a path (eo, e1, ... , ek) fr:om <k:p> to the terminal node ACCEPT such that for all 
0 :=:; i :=:; k, L(ei) = s[i]. The accept set of a rule set MDD M with root node <K:Np> is 
given by the formula A ( M) = A ( <K: Np>). 
In other words, the accept set of an MDD node is the set of packets for which there is 
a path from that node to the node ACCEPT, such that every edge in the path is labeled 
with an attribute that corresponds to the packet. The accept set of an MDD is the accept 
set of its root node. 
We define R( <k: p>), the reject set of an MDD node <k: p> and R( M), the reject set 
of MDD M, similarly, by replacing ACCEPT with DROP. 
In order to demonstrate that the rule generation algorithm is correct, we show that the 
accept set of the MDD representation is identical to the accept set of the original rule. 
Lemma 1 Given a firewall ruler, let Mr be the MDD generated by MakeMDDFromRule(r ). 
Then, A(Mr) = A(r). 
Proof: 
Step 1: A(r) ~ A(Mr)· 
We must show for any packets E A(r), that s E A(Mr)· 
If A(r) is the empty set (i.e. r is not an accept rule), then A(Mr) is likewise empty, 
since the lookup in line 1 will never return ACCEPT. This means that the first 
iteration of the loop will not create an arc to the ACCEPT node. Since no other arcs 
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are created to the terminal nodes, there can be no path to the accept node and, by 
the definition of the accept set of an MDD, A(Mr) will be the empty set. 
Suppose that A(r) is not the empty set and let s E A(r). We must show that 
s E A(Mr)· 
The loop in line 2 considers each level of the MDD in turn. For each level, the inner 
loop in line 4 creates arcs from node <k: n> to node <k - 1 :old> for every value 
i in the range of the kth attribute of r. Let ek be the arc labeled s[k]. The path 
S =(eo, e1, ... , eK) is a path in which every edge ei is labeled s[i]. Because s E A(r), 
we know that S leads to the ACCEPT node. Therefore, by definition, s E A(Mr ). 
Step 2: A(Mr) ~ A(r). 
If A(Mr) is empty, then A(r) must also be empty, since A(Mr) can be empty only when 
the rule is not an accept rule. If A(Mr) is not empty, lets E A(Mr) be a packet in the 
accept set of Mr. By the definition of A ( Mr), there exists a path S = ( e0, e 1 , ... , e K) 
from the root node of the MDD to the node ACCEPT such that each edge ek Is 
labeled with value s[k]. 
Now, since arcs are only created in line 6, each edge of Sis labeled with value ik. The 
if statement in line 5 ensures that this label must be between pr[k].low and pr[k].high. 
Since this holds true for all k, we know that s matches r. Furthermore, sis accepted 
by r, since the only way a path can point to ACCEPT is when the lookup in line 1 
returns ACCEPT and an arc is created to the terminal node by line 6 during the first 
iteration of the loop. 
Therefore, since A(Mr) ~ A(r) and A(r) ~ A(Mr), A(Mr) = A(r). • 
The proof that R(Mr) = R(r) is similar- simply replace "ACCEPT" with "DROP". 
Furthermore, ifT(r) represents the set of packets that match some target t (perhaps another 
chain), we can adapt this proof to show that T(Mr) = T(r) by replacing "ACCEPT" with 
t, a fact we will make use of later. 
2.7 Inserting a Rule into the Chain MDD 
nodeJndex Assign(level k, node_index ne, ParsedRule pr) 
1 if k = 0: 
2 return LookUpTarget(pr.target). 
3 nt=NewNode(k). 
4 fori= 0 to MaxValue(k): 
5 if i E pr[k]: 
6 nt[i]=Assign(k- l,ne[i],pr). 
7 else: 
8 nt[i]=ne[k][i]. 
9 return CheckForDuplicates(nt). 
Figure 2.3: Inserting a rule 
Algorithm for inserting a rule into an MDD 
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The assignment operator in figure 2.3 generates an MDD representing the insertion of a 
new ruler into an existing chain c, where the MDD representation of cis an MDD, Me. The 
insertion is performed in such a way that the new rule overrides the rules already inserted. 
The algorithm is recursive, starting from node <k : ne> and descending the graph until 
it reaches a terminal node at level 0. Initially, we set node ne to the index of the root node 
of Me. Lines 1 and 2 of the algorithm handle the terminating case. If k = 0, we return a 
node representing the target of the rule. If k > 0, the algorithm constructs a new node to 
represent the result of insertion (line 3). 
This result is constructed by the loop in lines 4 - 8. In each iteration of the loop we 
consider a value, i, of attribute k. If i does not match the condition r[k], we create an arc 
to the corresponding child of <k: ne>. If i does match the rule, we use recursion to descend 
to the next level of the graph. 
Because values that do not match the range of the new rule are linked to nodes from the 
old MDD, packets that do not match the rule are not affected by the insertion. However, 
the algorithm will create a path to the appropriate terminal node for packets which do 
match the new rule. 
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2.8 Correctness of Assign operator 
Lemma 2 Let Mn = Assign(K, Me, r) for some MDD Me and ruler. A(Mn) = A(r) U 
(A(Me) n R(r)). 
Proof: We must show that the accept set of the new MDD is all packets accepted by the 
new rule, plus all those accepted by the old rules that are not dropped by the new rule. 
Step 1: A(Mn) ~ A(r) u (A(Me) n R(r)). 
We must show that for any packet s E A(Mn), that s E A(r) U (A(Me) n R(r)). To 
do this we show that sis either in A(r) or in A(Me) n R(r). 
Since s E A(Mn), there exists a path e = (eo, ... , eK) from the root of Mn to the 
terminal node ACCEPT such that each edge, ek, of the path is labeled with the value 
s[k]. Now, arcs are only created in lines 6 and 8. We have two cases. 
Case 1: Every edge in the path is labeled with a value that satisfies the match condi-
tion of the rule. 
If this is the case, then s E A(r) by the definition of A(r) and the fact that since 
s E A(Mn), e is a path to ACCEPT. Therefore s E A(r)U(A(Me)nR(r)), which 
is what we wish to prove. 
Case 2: There is an edge ek E e which is labeled with a value outside of the range 
pr[k].low to pr[k].high. 
If this is the case, we choose the first such arc (that is, the arc at the lowest level) 
and note that the if statement in line 5 evaluates to false for this value. This 
means that arc ek points to node <k: ne> [ i]. But this means that s E A( Me), by 
the definition of A(Me) and the fact that s E A(Mn)· 
Because ek does not match pr[k], we know that s is not in R(r). Thus, s E 
A(Mc) n R(r). Therefore, s E A(r) u (A(Mc) n R(r)). 
Step 2: A(r) u (A(Mc) n R(r)) ~ A(Mn)· 
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We must show for any packet s E A(r) U (A(Mc) n R(r)), that s E A(Mn)· By 
properties of set union, we know that either s E A(r) or s E (A(Mc) n R(r)). 
If s E A(r), then the path labeled (ACCEPT,s[1], ... ,s[K]) is in Mn. To see this, 
note that each call of "Assign" will create a new node and set the arc labeled s[k] in 
that node to the result of calling the algorithm at the level below. When the algorithm 
reaches level 0, the lookup in line 2 will will evaluate to ACCEPT, since the target of 
r is ACCEPT. Therefore, s E A(Mn)· 
If sis not in A(r), we know that s E A(Mc)nR(r). This means that s E A(Mc) and s E 
R(r). Let the path e =(eo, e1, ... , eK) be the path in Mn labeled (s[O], s[1], ... , s[K]). 
Since s E A(Mc), there exists a corresponding path c = (co, ... , CK) in Me for which 
each edge is labeled with the values (s[O], s[1], ... , s[K]). 
Since s E R(r) and s is not in A(r), there is at least one level k for which s[k] 
is not in the range pr[k].low to pr[k].high. Consider the highest such level, kmax· 
Because s[kmax] is not in the range pr[kmax].low to pr[kmax].high, the if statement in 
line 5 will fail and the algorithm will create an arc to node <kmax - 1 : nc>. Now, 
let (fo, h, ... , A max -1) be a path from <kmax - 1: nc> to ACCEPT. Then, the path 
e = (fo, ... ,fkma.x-l,ekma.x''"'eK) in Mn is a path to the ACCEPT node from the 
root of Mn. Since this path has labels (s[O], s[1], ... , s[K]), s E A(Mn)· 
Therefore, since A(r) u(A(Mc) nR(r)) t:::; A(Mn) and A(Mn) t:::; A(r) u(A(Mc) nR(r)), 
we have that A(Mn) = A(r) u (A(Mc) n R(r)). 
• 
2.9 Intersection 
The algorithms above can be used to construct an MDD representation of a chain which 
only has rules with the targets ACCEPT or DROP. An iptables firewall also allows rules in 
which the target is a user-defined chain. Figure 2.4 shows two chains of a policy. The chain 
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myChain is a user-defined chain which allows traffic to enter the 192.168.3.0/24 subnet 
and blocks all ftp traffic that is not sent to that subnet. This chain, however, will only be 
applied to certain packets. 
The FORWARD chain drops any SMTP packets and then passes any packets from 
untrusted network 192.168.1.0/24 to the user-defined chain. Any packets that are not 
accepted or dropped by myChain will be dropped unless they match rule 3, which allows 
any packets bound for subnet 192.168.2.0 to pass the firewall. 
Chain myChain: 
target prot source destination flags 
1 ACCEPT all 192.168.3.0/24 anywhere 
2 DROP all anywhere anywhere dpt tcp:ftp 
Chain FORWARD (policy DROP): 
target prot source destination flags 
1 DROP all anywhere anywhere dpt tcp:smtp 
2 my Chain all 192.168.1.0/24 anywhere 
3 ACCEPT all anywhere 192.168.2.0/24 
Figure 2.4: Example policy with a user-defined chain 
(c) Result of Intersection 
Figure 2.5: Intersection of the two chains 
To represent chains with rules that link to some other chain, we implement a special 
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intersection operator that combines the MDD representation of the target chain with an 
MDD representing the rule which targets the chain. This special intersection operation 
is illustrated in figure 2.5. An MDD representation of myChain is given in the left-most 
column of the figure. The next column illustrates the MDD representing rule 2 of the 
FORWARD chain, which passes packets from the 192.168.1.0/24 subnet to the user-defined 
chain. The right-most column shows the result of intersecting these two chains. The 
intersection restricts the chain MDD to only those packets that match the targeting rule, 
in this case, rule 2. By examining the resulting MDD, you can see that the result does 
not cause packets from 192.168.3.0/24 to be accepted, even though myChain accepts such 
packets, because the targeting rule only applies to packets from the 192.168.1.0/24 subnet. 
nodeJndex Speciallnt(level k, mdd nt, n 5 ) 
1 if n 8 = 0: 
2 return 0 
3 if nt = 0: 
4 return 0 
5 if k = 0: 
6 return nt 
7 nn = NewNode(k) 
8 fori= 0 to MaxValue(k): 
9 if nt[i] # 0 and ns[i] # 0: 
10 nn[i] = Speciallnt(k- 1, nt[i], ns[i]) 
11 return nn[i]. 
Figure 2.6: Intersection Operation 
Pseudocode for the special intersection algorithm is given in figure 2.6. The arguments 
to Speciallnt are a level and the indices of two MDD nodes. To intersect two MDDs, Ms 
and Mt, we pass the root nodes of each of the MDDs in the initial call to Specialint. 
In lines 1 - 6, we check for the base cases. If n 5 is the zero node, then no corresponding 
path exists in the match set of the targeting rule. Therefore, we return the empty node. If 
nt is the zero node, then the target chain does not match any packets along the path we 
have followed and we return 0. If neither node is the zero node and we have reached the 
terminal level, then the value of Mt (the targeted chain) overrides the existing value, so we 
28 
return the value of nt. 
Lines 7 - 10 handle nodes at the non-terminal levels. In each case, a new node is 
created and populated using recursive calls. To simplify the description of the algorithm, 
we assume that nx [i] is the index of the node reached by following the arc with label i from 
node <k: nx> and that nx [ i] = 0 ifthere is no arc labeled i in <k: nx>. 
2.9.1 Correctness of the Special Intersection Algorithm 
Lemma 3 Given a ruler, such that r.target = c, where cis a chain of the firewall, let C(r) 
be the set of packets that r maps to c. If <K: Ne> and <K: Nr> are the root nodes of MDDs 
Me and Mr, respectively, and Nn = Speciallnt(K, Ne, Nr), then A(Mn) = C(r) n A(Me), 
where Mn is the MDD rooted at <K: Nn>· 
By lemma 1, we know that C(r) = C(Mr). Therefore, we must show that A(Mn) = 
C(Mr) n A(Me)· It is sufficient to show that at every level k, Speciallnt(k, nt, n 8 ) returns 
a node <K: nn> such that A( <k: nn>) = A( <k: nt>) n C( <k: n 8 > ), since then the node 
returned by Special! nt( K, Ne, Nr), where <K: Ne> and <K: Nr> are the root nodes of Me 
and Mr, respectively, will prove the lemma. 
Proof: 
We proceed by induction on k, the level of the MDD at which we are performing the 
intersection operation. 
Base Case Consider the case that k = 0. There are three possibilities: 
Case 1: n 8 = 0 
If n 8 = 0, then C(ns) = 0 by the definition of C(X). Lines 1 and 2 of the algorithm 
return 0, so nn = 0. Therefore, A( <k: nn>) = 0 = A( <k: nt>) n 0 = A( <k: nt>) n 
C(<k:ns>). 
Case 2: ns =/=- 0, but nt = 0. 
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If nt = 0, then A( <k: nt>) = 0 by definition of accept set of an MDD. Since n 5 
is not 0, the if statement in line 1 will evaluate to false and we will skip line 2. 
Lines 3 and 4, however, will cause the algorithm to return 0, so nn = 0. Therefore, 
A( <k:nn>) = 0 = 0 n C( <k:ns>) =A( <k:nt>) n C( <k:ns> ). 
Case 3: n 8 and nt are both non-zero. 
Since n 8 and nt are both non-zero, the first two if statements will evaluate to false. 
Since we are at level k = 0, the if statement in line 5 will evaluate to true and the 
algorithm will return nt, so nn = nt. Now, n 5 can be one of two terminals. It can 
be the terminal 0 or it can be the terminal representing chain c. We know that n 5 is 
not 0, so it must be the terminal representing chain c. Now, by definition of C(X), a 
packet p is an element of C (X) if there exists a path P from node X to the terminal 
node c which has the property that every edge ei in the path, that L(ei) = p[i]. When 
X is the terminal node for c, this definition is trivially satisfied for every packet. 
Therefore, <k: ns> is a node representing the set of all packets. This means that 
A( <k :nt>) n C( <k:ns>) = A( <k:nt> ). Therefore, A( <k:nn>) = A( <k:nt>) = 
A( <k:nt>) n C( <k:ns> ). 
Induction Hypothesis Assume for some integer K, that if at each level 0 < k < K, 
nn = Speciallnt(k, nt, n 5 ) 
then 
A(<k:nn>) = A(<k:nt>) nC(<k:ns>). 
Induction Step We will show that if at level k = K > 0, 
nn = Speciallnt(k, nt, n 5 ) 
then 
A(<k:nn>) = C(<k:ns>) nA(<k:nt>). 
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We have three cases. 
Case 1: ns = 0 
If n 8 = 0, then line 2 will return 0. Thus nn = 0 and 
A( <K:nn>) = 0 = 0 n A( <K :nt>) = C( <K:ns>) n A( <K:nt> ). 
Case 2: nt = 0 
If nt = 0, then line 4 will return 0. Thus nn = 0 and 
A( <K :nn>) = 0 = C( <K:ns>) n 0 = C(<K :ns>) n A( <K :nt> ). 
Case 3: n 8 and nt are both non-zero. 
Step 1: A(<K:nn>) s;;; A(<K:nt>) nC(<K:ns>). 
Let pEA( <K :nn> ). By definition of accept set of an MDD, there is a path Pn 
from <K: nn> to the terminal node ACCEPT such that for every edge ek E Pn, 
L(ek) = p[k]. 
Since n8 and nt are non-zero, the if statements in lines 1 and 3 will evaluate to 
false, so the algorithm will continue past them. Since K > 0, the if statement in 
line 5 will evaluate to false and the algorithm will proceed to lines 7 through 10. 
Now, the node <K: nn> created in lines 7 through 9 is formed by calling Spe-
ciallnt recursively to obtain a node at level K - 1. The algorithm then attached 
an arc with label i to this node from <K: nn>· We refer to the child node as 
<K :nn>[i]. Now consider the child node produced when i = P[K]. We know 
that such a node exists, because p E A(Mn)· But this means that there is an arc 
with label P [ K] from <K : nt> to <K : nt > [ i]. Call this arc f K. There is also an 
arc with label P[K] from <K:n5 > to <K:ns>[i]. Call this arc 9K· 
By the induction hypothesis, we know that A( <K: nn> [i]) = A( <K: nt> [i]) n 
C( <K :ns>[i]). Therefore there is a path Pt = (fo, h, ... , fK-1) from <K :nt>[i] 
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to the terminal node for ACCEPT such that L(fk) = p[k] for each edge fk. 
There is also a path Ps = (go, g1, ... , gK-1) from Ms to the terminal node for 
chain c such that L(gk) = p[k] for each edge gk. 
Therefore, the path (fo, JI, ... , fK) is a path from <K :nt> to ACCEPT such 
that L(fk) = p[k] for each edge A and the path (go, g1, ... , gK) is a path from 
<K: n8 > to the terminal node for chain c such that L(gk) = p[k] for each edge 
gk. Thus, p E A(Mt) and p E C(Ms). Therefore, A(Mn) ~ A(Mt) n C(Ms). 
Step 2: A(Mt) n C(Ms) ~ A(Mn). 
Let p E A(Mt) n C(M8 ). We will show that p E A(Mn)· 
Since p E A(Mt) n C(Ms), p E A(Mt)· Therefore, there is a path 
Pt = (eo,e1, ... ,eK) from node <K:nt> to the terminal node ACCEPT such 
that for each edge ekl L ( ek) = p[ k ]. Similarly, p E C ( Ms), so there is a path 
Ps = (fo, fi, ... , f K) from <K: n8 > to the terminal node for chain c such that 
L(fk) = p[k]. This means that p E A(<K:nt>[i]) and p E C(<K:ns>[i]) by 
definition of accept set of an MDD and C(X). 
Consider what happens when i = p[K] in the for loop in line 8. In line 9, 
we create a new arc, GK, from <K :nn> to a new node <K :nn>[i] which has 
label i = p[K]. By the induction hypothesis, we know that A( <K: nn>i) = 
A(<K:nt>i) n C(<K:n8 >i). Therefore, there is a path Pn = (go,gb ... ,gK_1) 
from <K:nn>[i] to the terminal node ACCEPT such that for each edge gk, 
L(gk) = p[k]. Since GK has label i = p[K], the path P;t = (go,g1,··· ,gK) is a 
path from <K:nn> to the terminal node ACCEPT such that for each edge gk, 
L(gk) = p[k]. Therefore, p E A(Mn)· Thus, A(Mt) n C(Ms) ~ A(Mn)· 
Therefore, by induction, A(Mn) = A(Mt) n C(Ms)· 
• 
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2.10 Replace Algorithm 
While the intersection operation restricts the chain MDD to only those packets that 
match the rule, we also need to be able to insert the result into the chain containing that 
rule. We want to do this in such a way that packets that match the new rule are filtered 
appropriately, but packets that don't match the rule are handled exactly as before. 
(a) The original Forward chain (b) Result of Intersection 
Figure 2. 7: The Replace Algorithm 
This process is illustrated by the graphics in figure 2.7. The MDD in the left column 
represents the FORWARD chain of figure 2.4 before insertion of rule 2. The middle column 
gives the MDD representation of rule 2 after the intersection operation has been applied. 
The right column shows the effect of the replace operation. Notice that FTP packets 
from the 192.168.1.0/24 subnet are dropped, but that packets from any other network are 
accepted as long as they are sent to the 192.168.2.0/24 subnet. 
Pseudocode for the replace algorithm is given in figure 2.8. The algorithm takes two 
MDDs. The first MDD represents the chain before the rule is inserted. The second MDD 
represents the result of intersecting the rule with the targeted chain. The algorithm returns 
a new MDD which applies filtering to only those packets that match the new rule. 
The algorithm is recursive. In lines 1 and 2, we check for a base case in which there is 
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node_index Replace(level k, mdd Vc, mdd Vr) 
1 if Vc = 0: 
2 return Vr. 
3 if Vr = 0: 
4 return Vc. 
5 if k = 0: 
6 return Vr. 
7 vt = NewNode(k). 
8 fori= 0 to MaxVals(k): 
9 V't[i] = Replace(k-1, Vc[i], Vr[i]). 
10 return vt. 
Figure 2.8: Algorithm which inserts a filtered rule into a chain 
no node representing the existing chain. If this is the case, we return a node representing 
the rule MDD. In lines 3 and 4, we check for the base case in which the rule MDD is 0. If 
this is the case, we return a node representing the existing chain. In lines 5 and 6, we check 
to see whether we have reached the bottom level of the MDD. If so, the MDD for the new 
rule takes precedence over the existing chain and we return a node representing it. If none 
of the base cases intercepts control, we create a new node at level k and use recursion to 
set its arcs to the result of calculating the replacement at the level below. 
2.11 Correctness of Replace Algorithm 
Lemma 4 Let <K: Nc> be the root node of MDD Me, <K: Nr> be the root node of MDD 
Mr and Nv be the root node of the MDD, Mv, created by Nv = Replace{K, Nc, Nr)· Then 
To show this, it is sufficient to prove that at every level k, that Replace(k, nc, nr) returns 
a node nn that satisfies the property that A( <k: nn>) = A( <k: nr>) U (A( <k: nc>) n 
R( <k: nr> )). 
Proof:. 
We proceed by induction on k, the level of the M DD. 
34 
Base Case Let k = 0. Then we have the following three possibilities: 
Case 1: nc = 0. 
If nc = 0, then A(nc) = 0. The if statement in line 1 will evaluate to true, so 
the algorithm will return nr. Thus A(<k:nn>) = A(<k:nr>) = A(<k:nr>) U 0 = 
A(<k:nr>) u (0 n R(<k:nr>)) = A(<k:nr>) u (A(<k:nc>) n R(<k:nr>)). 
Case 2: nc is non-zero, but nr = 0. 
If nr = 0, then A( <k: nr>) = 0 and R( <k: nr>) = 0. The if statement in line 
3 will evaluate to true, so the algorithm will return nc. Therefore, A( <k: nn>) = 
A(<k:nc>) = 0UA(<k:nc>) = 0u(A(<k:nc>)n0) = A(<k:nr>)U(A(<k:nc>)n0) = 
A( <k:nr>) u (A( <k: nc>) n R( <k:nr> )). 
Case 3: nr and nc are both non-zero nodes. 
If nr and nc are both non-zero, then the algorithm will proceed past the first two 
if statements. Since k = 0, the if statement in line 5 will evaluate to true and the 
algorithm will return nr. 
Now, since nr is non-zero and we are at the terminal level, nr is either the ACCEPT 
node or the DROP node. If nr is the ACCEPT terminal, then A( <k: nr>) is the set 
of all packets and R( <k: nr>) is the empty set. So 
A(<k:nn>) =A( <k:nr>) =A( <k:nr>) U 0 
=A( <k:nr>) U (A( <k:nc>) n 0)A( <k:nr>) U (A( <k:nc>) n R( <k :nr> )). 
If nr is the DROP terminal, then A(<k:nr>) = 0 and R(<k:nr>) is the set of all 
packets. Therefore, 
A(<k:nn>) = A(<k:nr>) = 0 = 0 U 0 
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= 0 u (A( <k:nc>) n 0) = 0 U (A( <k:nc>) n R( <k:nr> )). 
Thus, 
Induction Hypothesis Assume that for all levels 0 < k < K, if nn = Replace(k, nc, nr ), 
then A(<k:nn>) = A(<k:nr>) U (A(<k:nc>) n R(<k:nr>)). 
Induction Step There are three cases: 
Case 1: nc = 0. 
If nc =- 0, then A( <k: nc>) = 0 and the if statement in line 1 evaluates to true. 
Therefore, the algorithm returns nr and A( <k: nn>) = A( <k: nr>) = A( <k: nr>) U 
0 = A(Nodeknr) u (A( <k :nc>) n 0) =A( <k:nr>) u (A( <k:nc>) n R( <k:nr> )). 
Case 2: nc is non-zero, but nr = 0. 
If nr = 0, then A( <k: nr>) = 0 and R(() <k: nr>) = 0. The if statement in line 
1 will evaluate to false, but the if statement in line 3 will evaluate to true. So the 
algorithm will return nc. Thus, A(<k:nn>) = A(<k:nc>) = 0u (A(<k:nc>) n0) = 
A( <k:nr>) U (A( <k:nc>) n R( <k:nr> )). 
Case 3: Both nr and nc are non-zero. 
If both nr and nc are non-zero, then since k > 0, none of the if statements will evaluate 
to true and the algorithm will proceed to the for loop in lines 7 through 10. 
We will show that if k = K and Nn = Replace(K, Nc, Nr), then A(Mn) = A(Mr) U 
(A(Mc) n R(Mr)). 
Step 1: A(Mn) ~ A(Mr) U (A(Mc) n R(Mr)). 
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Let p E A(Mn)· From the definition of accept set of an MDD, we know that there 
is a path Pn =(eo, e1, ... , eK) such that for each edge ek in Pn, L(ek) = p[k]. 
Now, the node <k: nt> created in lines 7 through 9 is formed by calling Replace 
recursively to obtain nodes at level k - 1. In each iteration of the loop, we 
attach an arc with label i to node <k : nt> [i] created by the recursive call. Now 
consider the child node produced when i = p[k]. We know that such a node 
exists, because p E A(Mn)· But this means that there is an arc with label p[k] 
from Me to <K :nc>[i]. Call this arc fK· There is also an arc with label p[K] 
from <K:nr> to <K:nr>[i]. Call this arc 9K· 
By the induction hypothesis we know that 
A(<K:nn>[i]) = A(<K:nr>[i]) u (A(<K:nc>[i]) n R(<K:nr>[i])). 
Therefore, there is either a path 
Pr = (fo, JI, · · ·, fK-1) 
from <K:nr> to ACCEPT such that L(fo) = p[k] or both of the following 
conditions are true: 
• There is a path Pc = (go,g1, ... ,gK-1) from <K:nc> to ACCEPT such 
that L(gk) = p[k]. 
• There is no path (ho,h1, ... ,hK-1) from <K:nr> to REJECT such that 
L(hk) = p[k] for each edge hk on the path. 
If there is a path from <K:nr>i to ACCEPT, then the path (fo, JI, ... , fK) is 
a path from <K:nr> to ACCEPT such that L(fk) = p[k] for each edge fk, so 
p E A(Mr)· Thus, p E A(Mr) U (A(Mc) n R(Mr)). 
If there is no path from <K: nr>[i] to ACCEPT, then the path (go, g~, ... , 9K) 
is a path from <K:nc> to ACCEPT such that L(gk) = p[k] for each edge 9k· 
There can be no path (ho,h1, ... ,hK) from <K:nr> to REJECT for which 
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each edge hk = p[k], because the only arc labeled p[k] points to <K:nr>[i] and 
the induction hypothesis guarantees that there are no paths from <K: nr>[i] to 
REJECT. Thus, p E A(Mr) U (A(Mc) n R(MR)). 
Therefore, A(Mn) ~ A(Mr) u (A(Mc) n R(Mr)). 
Step 2: A(Mr) U (A(Mc) n R(Mr)) ~ A(Mn). 
Let p E A(Mr) U (A(Mc) n R(Mr)). 
There are two cases: 
Case 1: p E A(Mr). 
If p E A(Mr), then there is a path Pr =(eo, e1, ... , ex) such that L(ek) = 
p[k] for each edge ek in the path. Let fx be the edge created when the for 
loop reaches i = p[k] and we call Replace(k- 1, <k:nc>[i], <k:nr>[i]) to 
create a node <k : nn> [ i] at level k - 1. Since p E A ( Mr), we know that 
p E A(<k:nr>[i]). This means that 
p E A(<k:nr>[i]) U (A(<k:nc>[i]) n R(<k:nr>[i])). 
By the induction hypothesis, 
A(<k:nn>[i]) = A(<k:nr>[i]) u (A(<k:nc>[i]) n R(<k:nr>[i])) 
sop E A(<k:nn>[i]). This means that there is a path 
Pn = (fo, fi, · · ·, fK-1) 
from <k:nn>[i] to ACCEPT such that L(fk) = p[k] for each edge fk of Pn. 
But this means that the path (/o, JI, ... , fx) is a path from <K: Nn> to 
ACCEPT such that for every edge !k, L(fk) = p[k]. 
Therefore, p E A(Mn)· 
Case 2: p ~ A(Mr) and p E A(Mc) n R(Mr). 
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Since p E A(Mc) n R(Mr), there is a path Pc = (eo,el, ... ,eK) such that 
L(ek) = p[k] for each edge ek in the path. Let fK be the edge created when 
the for loop reaches i = p[k] and we call Replace(k-l, <k:nc>[i], <k:nr>[i]) 
to create a node <k:nn>[i] at level k- 1. Since p ¢ R(Mc), we know 
that there is no path Pc = (go, 91, ... , 9K) from <K: Nr> to DROP such 
that L(gk) = p[k] for every edge of the path. Therefore, on any path from 
<K:Nr> to DROP, there is some edge 9i such that L(gi) =1- p[k]. We 
know that L(gK) = p[k], because i = p[k]. Therefore, there is no path from 
<K:nr>[i] to DROP for which every edge 9k has the label p[k]. Thus, 
p E R(<K:nr>[i]). Since p E A(Mc), we know that p E A(<K:Nc>[i]). 
This means that 
pEA( <K: Nr>[i]) U (A( <K: nc>[i]) n R( <K :nr>[i])). 
By the induction hypothesis, 
A(<K:Nn>[i]) = A(<K:Mr>[i]) U (A(<K:Nc>[i]) n R(<K:Nr>[i])) 
so p E A( <K: N n> [ i]). This means that there is a path 
from <K :Nn>[i] to ACCEPT such that L(fk) = p[k] for each edge fk of 
Pn. But this means that the path 
is a path from <K:Nn> to ACCEPT such that for every edge fk, L(fk) = 
p[k]. 
We have that p E A(Mn)· 
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In either case, p E A(Mn)· Therefore, A(Mr) U (A(Mc) n R(Mr)) ~ A(Mn)· 
Therefore, by induction, we know that A(Mn) = A(Mr) U (A(Mc) n R(Mr)). 
• 
2.12 Chain Building Algorithm 
nodeJ.ndex MakeMDDFromChain(Chain c) 
1 Me= 0 
2 For each rule r E c in reverse order: 
3 if r.target =ACCEPT or r.target =DROP: 
4 Mc=Assign(Mc, r) 
5 else: 
6 Mr=MakeMDDFromRule(r) 
7 Mn =MakeMDDFromChain( r.target) 
8 Mt=Speciallnt(Mn, Mr) 
9 Me=Replace(Me, Mt) 
10 return Me· 
Figure 2.9: Algorithm for building an MDD from a chain 
Figure 2.9 gives pseudocode for generating an MDD from a firewall chain. The algorithm 
makes calls to the Speciallnt and Replace algorithms discussed previously to generate an 
MDD in which rules at the beginning of the chain mask later rules. 
2.13 Correctness of Chain Building Algorithm 
Theorem 1 Let c be any chain of the firewall and let Me be the MDD representation of c 
produced by MakeMDDFromChain. Then, A(Me) = A(c). 
In order to prove that the chain building algorithm constructs an MDD which is equiv-
alent to the original chain, we consider the call-graph of the firewall defined as follows. 
Definition 7 Let F be a firewall with chains co, c1, ... , Cn and let Gp = (V, E) where V is 
the set {co, c1, ... , cn} and E: V x V is the set {(co, c1) I :Jr E co such that r.target = ci}. 
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Then G F is the call-graph ofF. For each node v E V, we say the set C ( v) = { u E V I ::Je E 
E such that e0 = v and e1 = u} represents the children of node v. 
In other words, G F is the graph formed over the chains of the firewall for which there 
is an edge between two chains if and only if the first chain contains a rule which targets 
the second chain. Since iptables does not allow cyclic references in chains, G is a directed, 
acyclic graph. 
To each node v of Gp, we assign a height, H(v). If v has no outgoing edges (i.e. the 
chain contains only ACCEPT and DROP statements, but does not target another chain), 
then H(v) = 0. Otherwise, H(v) = (maxuEC(v) H(u)) + 1. 
Theorem 2 Let c = (ro, ... , rn) be a chain in firewall F. Then, A(Me) =A( C). 
Proof: 
We proceed by induction on the height of c in the call-graph. 
Base Case Consider the case that H(c) = 0. 
Since H(c) = 0, c contains only ACCEPT and DROP rules. Therefore, in each iteration 
of the loop in line 2, the algorithm will use the Assign operator to add one rule at a time 
to the MDD. 
After the first iteration of the loop, we know that A(Me) = A(rn) by lemma 2 since 
A(Me) = 0. Applying the same lemma to the next iteration yields that A(Me) = A(rn-1) U 
(A(Rn)nR(rn-1)). Let Me; be the value of Me after iteration i. By continued application of 
lemma 2, we obtain the recurrence relation A(MeJ = A(r(n+1)-i)u[A(Me;_ 1 )nR(r(n+l)-i)]. 
Expanding this recurrence, we find that in iteration i, A(Me;) = A(rn-i) UjE[(n+l)-i,n] 
(Aj nsE[n-i,j-1] R(rs)). 
After the last iteration (iteration n), we have that A(Me) = A(Men) = A(ro) UjE[l,n] 
(Aj ns in [O,j-1] R(rs)) (by substitution of n fori). 
But by the definition of A(c), we can see that this is the same as A(c). 
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Induction Hypothesis Assume that A(Mx) = A(x) for any chain x such that the height 
of x in the call-graph is less than or equal to some value hx. 
Induction Step We will show that for any chain c with a call graph of height hx + 1, 
that A(Mc) = A( c). To see this, let c = (ro, ... , rn)· Let Mci represent the value of Me 
after iteration i of the loop in line 2. In each iteration, we have two cases: 
Case 1: The target of ri is a terminal node. 
In this case, we have that A(McJ = A(r(n+I)-i) U [A(Mci_1 ) n R(r(n+l)-i)] by appli-
cation of lemma 2. 
Case 2: The target of ri is a non-terminal node of height less than hx. 
We have that C(rn+I-i) is the set of all packets that match Tn+I-i· By lemma 3, we 
know that after line 6, C(Mr) = C(rn+I-i)· 
After line 7, we have that 
A(Mn) = A(rn+l-i·target) 
and that 
R(Mn) = R(rn+l-i·target) 
from the induction hypothesis. 
After line 8, we have that 
and that 
by lemma 3. 
After line 9, we have that 
A(Mt) = C(r) n A(Mn) 
R(Mt) = C(r) n R(Mn) 
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This gives us A(McJ = [M(rn+l-i) n A(Mn)] U [A(Mc;_J n M(rn+l-i) U R(Mn)] by 
the above mentioned properties of A(Mt) and an application of DeMorgan's Law. 
Using the induction hypothesis, we have that 
A(Mc;) = [M( r n+l-i) nA( r n+l-i·target)] U [A(Mc;_ 1 ) nM ( r n+l-i) U R( r n+l-i·target) ]. 
But by the definition of accept set of a rule, this means that A(Mc;) = A(rn+l-i) U 
A(Mc;_ 1 ) n (R(rn+l-i)). 
Therefore, in either case, we have that 
Similarly, we can see that R(Mc) = R(c). • 
Chapter 3 
Linux Firewall Analysis using 
Queries 
Despite the increasing popularity of iptables firewalls, there are very few tools for testing 
and debugging a Linux firewall policy. Some work has been done on testing iptables itself 
for software bugs [26], but these tools do not provide assurance in the configuration of the 
firewall. 
Existing tools for testing the firewall policy fall into two categories: active testing solu-
tions, which rely on transmitting traffic across the wire, and passive testing solutions, which 
analyze a model of the firewall off-line using sophisticated data structures. 
Active testing tools such as SATAN [18], nessus [32], and Ftester [4] subject a firewall 
to a sequence of carefully crafted packets and see which ones get through. Active testing 
can also be accomplished using port scanners such as nmap [19] and hping [6]. Since it 
is impossible to test every possible packet, active tools test only a portion of the firewall 
configuration. This makes them well-suited for detecting specific vulnerabilities and for 
detecting implementation bugs in the firewall software, but not for generating trust in the 
overall security of a firewall configuration. It also means that testing can interfere with 
normal network activity. 
Passive testing tools can test the entire packet space, but require the use of an analysis 
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Chain INPUT (policy DROP 373K packets, 
pkts bytes target prot opt in 
740K 294M external_pa.ckets 
190K 79M intern.al_pa.ckets 
0 0 internal_packets 
0 0 ACCEPT 
Chain FORWARD (policy DROP 0 packets, 
pkts bytes target prot opt in 
108 7296 DROP icmp -- eth1 
0 0 DROP icmp -- ethO 
4709K 499M ACCEPT tcp 
0 0 ACCEPT tcp 
936 47842 ACCEPT tcp 
0 0 ACCEPT tcp 
28M 38G ACCEPT tcp eth1 
29194 1849K ACCEPT udp eth1 
0 0 ACCEPT tcp ethO 
0 0 ACCEPT udp ethO 
52M 26G ACCEPT 0 
0 0 REJECT eth1 
0 0 REJECT etbl 
0 0 REJECT eth1 
0 0 REJECT eth1 
0 0 REJECT eth1 
0 0 REJECT eth1 
0 0 REJECT 0 eth1 
0 0 REJECT 0 eth1 
0 0 REJECT 0 eth1 
0 0 REJECT 0 eth1 
0 0 REJECT eth1 
0 0 REJECT eth1 
0 0 REJECT eth1 
0 0 REJECT eth1 
0 0 REJECT ethl 
0 0 ACCEPT udp etb1 
0 0 ACCEPT udp eth1 
0 REJECT udp ethl 
0 0 REJECT udp etbO 
134K 11M ACCEPT 0 eth1 
0 0 ACCEPT ethO 
0 0 LOG 
Chain Otri'Ptrr (policy DROP 13 packets, 
pkts bytes target prot opt in 
0 0 ACCEPT 0 
126K 122M ACCEPT 
0 0 ACCEPT 
136K 52M ACCEPT 
0 0 LOG 
0 0 DROP icmp -- . 
Chain external_packets (1 references) 
pk.ts bytes target prot opt in 
4213 365K ACCEPT icm.p 
7389 633K ACCEPT tcp 
191K 63M ACCEPT udp 
0 0 ACCEPT udp 
80097 118M ACCEPT tcp 
37720 2867K ACCEPT udp 
0 0 ACCEPT tcp -- • 
12444 77H ACCEPT 0 
Chain internal_packets (2 references) 
pkts bytes target prot opt in 
69 12294 ACCEPT icmp -- . 
0 0 ACCEPT tcp 
67966 22M ACCEPT udp 
0 0 ACCEPT udp 
29892 44H ACCEPT tcp 
37728 2867K ACCEPT udp -- • 
0 0 ACCEPT tcp 
0 0 ACCEPT udp 
0 0 ACCEPT udp 
0 0 ACCEPT udp 
28225 1811K ACCEPT 0 
41M bytes) 
out source 
eth2 0.0.0.0/0 
eth1 0.0.0.0/0 
ethO 0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0 bytes) 
out source 
o.o.o.oto 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
101.92.26.68 
192.168.0.0/22 
192.168.0.0/22 
192.168.0.0/22 
192.168.0.0/22 
0.0.0.0/0 
192.168.5.121 
192.168.5.122 
192.168.5.123 
192.168.5.124 
192.168.5.125 
192.168.5.126 
192.168.5.101 
192.168.5.101 
192.168.5.129 
192.168.5.130 
192.168.5.131 
192.168.5.132 
192.168.5.133 
192.168.5.134 
192.168.5.135 
192.168.5.250 
192.168.5.77 
192.168.0.0/22 
192.168.0.0/22 
192.168.0.0/22 
192.168.0.0/22 
0.0.0.0/0 
1009 bytes) 
out source 
127.0.0.1 
192.168.5.1 
192.168.4.1 
101.92.2.78 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
out source 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
101.92.0.0/16 
101.92.0.0/16 
101.92.0.0/16 
101.92.0.0/16 
0.0.0.0/0 
out source 
192.168.0.0/22 
192.168.0.0/22 
0.0.0.0/0 
192.168.0.0/22 
192.168.0.0/22 
192.168.0.0/22 
192.168.0.0/22 
192.168.0.0/22 
192.168.0.0/22 
192.168.0.0/22 
0.0.0.0/0 
destination 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
127 .0.0.1 
destinatioll 
0.0.0.010 
0.0.0.0/0 
192.168.0.0/22 
192.168.0.0/22 
192.168.0.0/22 
192.168.5.15 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
o.o.o.oto 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
o.o.o.oto 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
destination 
o.o.o.oto 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
o.o.o.oto 
0.0.0.0/0 
destination 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
destination 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
0.0.0.0/0 
icmp type 8 
icmp type 8 
tcp dpt:22 
tcp dpt:80 
tcp dpt: 8080 
tcp dpt: 3306 
tcp dpt:22 
udp dpt :53 
tcp dpt:22 
udp dpt:53 
state RELATED,ESTABLISHED 
reject-with icmp-port-UDreachable 
reject-with icmp-port-UDreachable 
reject-with icmp-port-UDreacha.ble 
reject-with icmp-port-UDreachable 
reject-with icmp-port-un.reachable 
reject-with icmp-port-un.reachable 
reject-with icmp-port-UilXeachable 
reject-vi th icmp-port-un.reachable 
reject-with icmp-port-UDreachable 
reject-with icmp-port-Uilieachable 
reject-with icmp-port-unreachable 
reject-with icmp-port-Uilieachable 
reject-with icmp-port-unreachable 
reject-with icmp-port-un.reacbable 
reject-with icmp-port-unreachable 
udp dpt : 2049 
udp dpt: 2049 
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udp dpt :2049 reject-with icm.p-port-Uilieachable 
udp dpt:2049 reject-with icmp-port-unreachable 
limit: avg 3/min burst 3 LOG flags 0 level 7 
prefix 'IPT_FDRWARD_packet_died: • 
limit: avg 3/min burst 3 LOG flags 0 level 7 
prefix 'IPT_atrrPUT_pack.et_died: • 
state INVALID 
tcp dpt:22 
udp dpt:67 
udp dpt:515 
tcp dpt:515 
udp dpt: 123 
tcp dpt: 123 
state RELATED,ESTABLISHED 
tcp dpt:22 
udp dpt:67 
udp dpt:515 
tcp dpt:515 
udp dpt: 123 
tcp dpt: 123 
udp dpt:1812 
udp dpt:1813 
udp dpt:1814 
state RELATED,ESTABLISIIED 
Figure 3.1: An iptables firewall as printed by the iptables -L -n command 
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engine. The current state of the art in passive analysis is a commercial tool produced by 
Algorithmic Security called "Algosec Firewall Analyzer", which is available for Cisco's PIX 
and Checkpoint's FW-1 firewalls. It is a closed-source commercial project based on Wool's 
Fang [37] and Lumeta [59] engines. Fang allowed the user to perform simple queries such 
as "what types of packets can reach the mail server?" In Lumeta, the developers replaced 
Fang's query functionality with a graphical tool that checks for specific configuration errors. 
Algosec is a more capable commercial version of Lumeta. Each of their systems is capable of 
analyzing multiple firewalls in a specified network topology. Redseal [40] produces a quan-
titative analysis tool which is similar to the Algosec product. Given a Cisco or Checkpoint 
firewall policy and a description of the network topology, it identifies each system on the 
network with a risk factor that can be used to determine which hosts are most in danger of 
compromise by an intruder. 
Another branch of research has focused on simplifying a firewall configuration by remov-
ing redundant and conflicting rules. Gouda and Liu [22] present an algorithm for construct-
ing a firewall decision diagram and applying reduction techniques to derive a complete, 
compact, and consistent firewall. Their technique can reduce the complexity of a poorly 
configured firewall and uncover some configuration errors, but has a different purpose than 
such engines as Algosec and SATAN. Gouda and Liu's work focuses on errors in the struc-
ture of a firewali rule set rather than in design flaws such as typos and incorrect rule order. 
Other passive analysis engines use expert systems and constraint solvers [16] or compu-
tational geometry [15] to analyze a firewall policy. 
Unfortunately, none of these passive techniques is widely available in an open source 
tool which can be used with iptables. The commercial tools are available only for PIX and 
FW-1 firewalls and no implementations of the academic work have been made available. 
This means that system administrators must use active testing techniques to evaluate Linux 
firewalls. Using the quasi-reduced MDD representation of the firewall policy presented in 
the previous chapter, we have implemented a passive testing tool, ITVal, which allows a 
system administrator to analyze the behavior of the firewall using logical queries. This 
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enables a system administrator to detect errors in the policy. For instance, the tool can 
determine to which hosts the firewall permits SSH access. Using this information, the system 
administrator can determine whether a host that should be protected provides unwanted 
connections to the outside world. In this chapter, we will describe the basic query solving 
functionality provided by the tool. More advanced features of the tool will be described in 
the remaining chapters. 
3.1 ITVal, An Open Source Tool 
ITVal is implemented using FDDL [36], a Multi-way Decision Diagram (MDD) library. 
We chose to use quasi-reduced MDDs [13] over Binary Decision Diagrams(BDDs) [7] because 
they are better suited for representing integral values such as ports and IP address. 
The analysis engine generates an MDD model of the firewall from the textual description 
of the firewall rule set generated by the "iptables -1 -n" command. An example of this input 
is given in figure 3.1. The example is taken from the filtering table of a firewall used to 
isolate research machines from workstations and servers. As a security precaution, we have 
modified the addresses and ports, but we have kept the structure of the firewall in place. 
From the figure, you can see that working with a textual representation of the firewall is 
very difficult. The policy is moderately long (about 75 lines of text containing roughly 
70 rules) and uses two user-defined chains to process packets sent out over three different 
ethernet interfaces and the loop back device. Debugging this policy by hand is very difficult 
and time-consuming. The analysis engine allows the administrator to avoid the arduous 
task of processing all 75 lines of policy manually. 
To use the analysis engine, the system administrator creates a file containing queries 
written in a simple specification language. In the query file, the user can ask questions 
such as "What services can be reached on host X?" or "Which machines can be reached 
with SSH?" The analysis engine can handle many of the features of iptables, including 
stateful inspection. The tool parses this query file and generates intermediate MDDs for 
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the elements of each query. These intermediate MDDs are combined to produce a result 
MDD using intersection and union operations. From the result MDD, the tool obtains a 
list of packets which match the query from which it can generate the query results. 
Using the output produced by the query engine, a system administrator can verify the 
important security invariants of the network. By running an analysis of the firewall before 
and after making a change to the policy, she can ensure that the change has not violated 
any important security constraints. If the query engine returns an unexpected result, she 
can repair the policy and re-apply the security check to ensure that everything is working 
correctly. 
3.2 Query Language 
The analysis tool provides a straightforward query language which allows complex 
queries to be built from simple primitives. 
GROUP internalnet 68.10.120.* 68.10.121.*; 
GROUP wlan 68.10.122.*; 
SERVICE mail TCP 25 TCP 110; 
SERVICE ftp TCP 21 TCP 20; 
QUERY DADDY FROM wlan AND (FOR mail OR FOR TCP 80) 
AND ACCEPTED forward; 
QUERY SPORT TO internalnet AND FOR ftp AND IN NEW 
AND ACCEPTED output; 
QUERY SADDY TO internalnet AND FOR 68.11.230.45 AND 
(NOT IN NEW AND NOT IN RELATED) 
AND ACCEPTED forward; 
QUERY DPORT FROM internalnet AND TO wlan AND 
(IN NEW OR IN ESTABLISHED) 
AND ACCEPTED forward; 
Figure 3.2: An example ITVal query file 
An example query file is given in figure 3.2. The query file is made up of group and 
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service definitions followed by one or more query statements. In this example, the first four 
lines are definitions. The next four lines are query statements. 
3.3 Query Statements 
Query statements begin with the word QUERY followed by a su~ject, a condition, and 
a semicolon. The subject of the query specifies what information should be printed about 
packets that match the query. For instance, the query in line 5 uses the subject "DADDY" 
to indicate that the destination address should be printed. The valid subjects are: 
• SADDY : Source Address 
• DADDY : Destination Address 
• SPORT : Source Port 
• DPORT : Destination Port 
• STATE : Connection State 
The rest of the query statement consists of a condition which specifies the packets to 
consider. 
3.4 Simple Conditions 
The query engine allows the user to build complex conditions out of a few simple con-
ditions. Conditions are built from nine primitives: 
• FROM <address group> : Specifies one or more source addresses to match. 
• TO <address group> : Specifies one or more destination addresses to match. 
• ON <service> : Specifies one or more source ports to match. 
• FOR <service> : Specifies one or more destination ports to match. 
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• WITH <flag> Specifies a TCP flag (URG, SYN, ACK, PSH, RST, or FIN) to 
match. 
• IN <state> : Specifies a connection state to match. 
• LOGGED : indicates that there is a rule which potentially logs the arrival of the 
packet. 
• ACCEPTED <chain> : Specifies the set of packets accepted by the firewall in chain 
chain. 
• DROPPED <chain> Specifies the set of packets dropped by the firewall in chain 
chain. 
Each of the primitives selects those packets that are accepted and that match the speci-
fied criteria. For instance "FROM 127.0.0.1" specifies those packets accepted by the firewall 
which are outbound from localhost. 
In the FROM and TO queries, the address group can either be the name of a predefined 
address group or the numeric IP address of a host. Asterisks or CIDR notation may be 
used in numerical addresses to describe an entire subnet. 
In the ON and FOR queries, the service can be either the name of a user-defined service 
or the name of a protocol type (TCP, UDP, BOTH, or ICMP) followed by either the numeric 
port number of the service, a range of ports expressed using the syntax "[low-high]" (where 
low and high define an inclusive interval of port numbers), or an asterisk. The asterisk 
signifies that all packets of the given protocol type should match the query primitive. If 
the protocol ICMP is chosen, the ICMP packet type number should be specified instead 
of a numerical port. If BOTH is specified, the query primitive will match TCP and UDP 
packets, but not ICMP packets. 
The WITH primitive allows queries against any of the significant TCP flags. 
The IN primitive allows the connection state to be described as any of the following: 
INVALID, NEW, ESTABLISHED, or RELATED. 
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The LOGGED primitive stands on its own without any parameters. It indicates that a 
packet may have been logged by the firewall. Since iptables LOG rules can specify time-
related and other external criteria for logging, there is no guarantee that every matching 
packet will actually be logged. 
These conditions can be combined with the ACCEPTED and DROPPED primitives to 
analyze the behavior of the firewall. The ACCEPTED condition specifies all packets that 
are accepted by some chain of the firewall. The DROPPED condition specifies the packets 
that are dropped by a chain. The chain must be one of the three built-in chains: INPUT, 
FORWARD, or OUTPUT. If no chain is explicitly given, the analysis engine assumes that 
the FORWARD chain should be considered. 
3.5 Complex Queries 
The boolean connectives NOT, AND, and OR allow the user to posit queries of arbitrary 
complexity. These operators work as one would expect. The expression "NOT FROM TCP 
21" matches all packets which are not TCP packets on port 21. The combination "FOR mail 
OR FROM 127.0.0.1" selects both mail packets and packets outbound from localhost. The 
AND and OR operators are left associative, while the NOT operator is right associative. 
Parentheses may be used to disambiguate subexpressions containing multiple operators. 
3.6 Group and Service Definitions 
If the user had to explicitly mention every host address in every query, creating a query 
file would be a tedious and error prone process. To address this issue, we allow named groups 
of addresses to be defined and used throughout the query file. The syntax for specifying 
a group is the word GROUP followed by a name and a space separated list of addresses. 
As with the FROM and TO primitives, subnets can be specified using asterisks or CIDR 
notation. Group names must consist entirely of letters and may not match any keyword of 
the query language. 
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Similarly, named groups of services may be defined. The syntax for defining a service is 
the word SERVICE followed by a name and a space separated list of protocols and ports. 
Here are some examples of queries that can be used in ITVal: 
• QUERY SADDY TO 192.168.* AND ACCEPTED forward; 
List all hosts with access to subnet 192.168.0.0/16. 
• QUERY DPORT FROM 113.137.10.* AND 
NOT FOR TCP 993 AND ACCEPTED forward; 
List all destination ports, except the secure IMAP :port(993), that can be accessed by 
hosts in the 113.137.10.0/24 subnet. 
• QUERY SPORT NOT FROM 192.168.1.101 AND 
FOR 137.113.6.2 AND ACCEPTED forward; 
List all source ports open on host 137.113.6.2 to machines other than 
host 192.168.1.101. 
• QUERY DADDY FOR TCP 25 AND 
(IN NEW OR IN ESTABLISHED) AND ACCEPTED forward; 
List all hosts that can receive packets on port 25 on a connection in the NEW or 
ESTABLISHED state. 
• QUERY DADDY FROM 192.168.1.* AND 
(FOR TCP 25 OR FOR TCP 80 OR FOR TCP 110) AND ACCEPTED forward; 
List all hosts that can receive SSH, SMTP, or HTTP traffic from hosts on the 
192.168.1.0/24 subnet. 
3. 7 Implementation 
The MDD representation of a query is very similar to the MDD representation of a 
firewall chain and we can reuse most of our notation from the previous chapter. As with 
the MDD representation of a firewall chain, nodes in the query MDD represent sets of 
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packets. Each arc represents a choice of value for a particular attribute. Instead of terminal 
nodes for ACCEPT and DROP, however, level 0 of a query MDD consists of two special 
terminal nodes. The node MATCHES represents the set of packets that match the query. 
The terminal node 0 represents those packets which do not match the query. As with the 
rule set MDD, we reserve index 0 at each level to store a special node symbolizing the empty 
set, which is not explicitly stored, but treated as a special case by the MDD algorithms. 
We will continue to use the notation <k: p> to describe the node with index p at level k 
and the function L(ei) to represent the label on edge ei. 
In order to create the MDD representation of a query, we associate each of the query 
primitives with a set of attributes which correspond to levels of the MDD. For instance, 
the primitive "FROM" corresponds to the four levels which represent the source address. 
The primitive "TO" corresponds to the set of levels which encode the destination port. 
3.7.1 ACCEPTED and DROPPED primitives 
Project ( node_index Tar get, level k, nodeJ.ndex nr): 
1 if k = 0: 
2 if nr=Target: 
3 return MATCHES. 
4 else: 
5 return 0. 
6 if nr = 0: 
7 return 0. 
8 nt = NewNode(). 
9 fori from 0 to maxVal[k]: 
10 <k:nt>[i] = Project(Target, k -1, <k:nr>[i]). 
11 return nt. 
Figure 3.3: MDD Projection Algorithm 
MDDs for the ACCEPTED and DROPPED primitives are created using the projec-
tion operation given in figure 3.3. The projection operation isolates only the accepted 
(or rejected) packets from the rule set MDD. For instance, if nr is index of the root 
node of MDD Mr. where Mr is the representation of the a chain of the firewall, then 
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Project(ACCEPT, K, nr) returns an MDD which matches the packets accepted by Mr. 
Lines 1 through 5 of the algorithm handle the case in which the algorithm has reached 
the terminal level. In this case, if nr is the correct terminal node, we return the index of a 
terminal node which represents "matches the query". Otherwise, we return terminal node 
0. 
Lines 6 and 7 handle the possibility that nr is node 0. If this is the case, <k: nr> 
represents the empty set, which means that none of the packets represented by that node 
are accepted (or dropped) by the chain. Therefore, we return index 0, which represents the 
empty set. 
In lines 8 through 10, we create a new node to represent the result of projecting the sub-
MDD rooted at <k: nr> onto the target. We look at each possible value of the attributes at 
level k and create an arc <k : nr> [ i] to the result of calling Project on each child of <k : nr > 
at level k - 1. 
Figure 3.4 demonstrates the projection algorithm. The left panel contains a copy of the 
rule MDD for the firewall described in the introduction. The right panel shows the result 
of the projection operation on that MDD for the primitive "ACCEPTED forward". You 
can determine visually that every path in the rule MDD from the root to the terminal node 
ACCEPT has a corresponding path to the terminal node MATCHES in the result MDD. 
All of the paths to DROP in the rule MDD have been removed by the projection operation. 
3.7.2 Correctness of the Projection Operation 
To show that the Project algorithm is correct, we must demonstrate that given an MDD 
Mr, the algorithm returns an MDD which matches exactly those packets accepted by Mr. 
Lemma 5 Let Mr be the MDD for a firewall chain, let <K: Nr> be the root node of Mr, 
and let 
nt = Project(ACCEPT,K,Nr)· 
54 
Figure 3.4: MDD For "ACCEPTED forward" 
Then, A(Mr) = M(Mt), where Mt is the MDD with root node <K:Nt> and M(Mt) 
represents the set of packets that map to the MATCHES terminal in Mt. That is, that for 
every packet p, p E A(Mr) if and only if p E M(Mt)· 
Proof: 
Step 1: If p E A(Mr), then p E M(Mt)· 
Since p E A(Mr), there is a path P =(eo, e1, ... , eK) from <K:Nr> to the terminal 
node ACCEPT such that for each edge ei E P, L(ei) = p[i]. We must show that 
there is a path Q = Uo, h, ... , f K) from <K: Nt> to the terminal node MATCHES 
such that for each edge fi E Q, L(fi) = p[i]. We proceed by induction on k, the level 
of the MDD. 
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Base Case Let k = 0. To see that A(<k:nr>) = M(<k:nt>), observe that since 
k = 0, the if statement in line 1 will always evaluate to true. Since p E A(Mr), 
<k:nr> is the terminal node ACCEPT. Therefore, the if statement in line 2 will 
also evaluate to true and the Project statement will return the node MATCHES. 
Therefore, <k :nt> is the terminal node MATCHES and it is obvious that p E M(Mt) 
since the path from MATCHES to MATCHES has no edges and therefore trivially 
satisfies the requirement that each edge have an appropriate label. 
Induction Hypothesis Assume that when k < K, that there is a path Q = 
(fo, h, ... , fk) from <k: nt> to the terminal node MATCHES such that for each 
edge fi E Q, L(fi) = p[i]. 
Induction Step Let k = K. Since p E A(Mr), there is a path P =(eo, e1, ... , eK) 
from <K: nr> to the terminal node ACCEPT such that for each edge ei E P, L( ei) = 
p[i]. If k = 0, by the base case we know that p E M(Mt)· If k -=/= 0, then the if statement 
in line 1 will be false in the first call to Project. Since p E A(Mr), nr is not node 0 
and the if statement in line 6 will also be false. Therefore, the algorithm will proceed 
to the for loop in lines 9 and 10. 
When the for loop reaches iteration p[k], the algorithm will create an arc fn with label 
p[k] from <k:nt> to the result of calling Project(ACCEPT, k -1, <k:nr>[i]). Since 
k - 1 < K, by the induction hypothesis we know that there is a path (fo, h, ... , f K -1) 
from the returned node to the terminal node MATCHES such that for each edge fi 
in the path, L(fi) = p[i]. Thus, the path Q = (fo,fi, ... ,fK-l,!K) is a path from 
<K: nt> to MATCHES which satisfies the condition that for each edge fi E Q, 
L(fi) = p[i]. 
Step 2: If p E M(Mt), then p E A(Mr)· 
Since p E M(Mt), there is a path P =(eo, e1, ... , eK) from <K :Nt> to the terminal 
node MATCHES such that for each edge ei E P, L(ei) = p[i]. 
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We will show, by induction on k, that for each level there is a path Q = (fo, h, ... , !k) 
from <k:nr> to the terminal node ACCEPT such that for each edge fiE Q, L(Ji) = 
p[i]. 
Base Case Let k = 0. Since p E M(Mt), Project returned the node MATCHES. 
This can only happen in line 3, which means that the if statement in line 2 evaluates 
to true. Therefore, <k:nr> was the node ACCEPT. Thus, it is trivially true that 
p E A(<k:nr>). 
Induction Hypothesis Assume that when k < K, that there is a path Q = 
(fo, h, ... , fk) from <k:nr> to the terminal node ACCEPT such that for each edge 
fi E Q, L(fi) = p[i]. 
Induction Step Consider Project( ACCEPT, K, nr) when k = K > 0. Since 
k > 0, we know that <k: nt> was not created by the return statement in line 2. We 
also know that <k:nt> was not created in line 7, because nt =f 0. Therefore, nt was 
created in lines 8 through 11. 
We know that there is a path from <k:nt> to MATCHES for which each edge of 
the path at level i is labeled with p[i]. Therefore, in iteration p[k] of the loop, the 
algorithm created an edge from <k:mt>[p[k]] to a node at level k- 1 which forms a 
path from <k:nt> to MATCHES. 
This edge could only be created by following an arc !K with label p[K] from <K: Nr>. 
Since this arc points to a node at level K- 1, by the induction hypothesis, there is 
a path (fo, h, ... , !K-1) from this child node to ACCEPT such that for each edge 
fi, L(fi) = p[i]. Therefore, the path (fo, h, ... , fK-1, fK) is a path from <K: Nr> to 
ACCEPT such that for each edge fi, L(fi) = p[i]. 
• 
The proof of correctness for the DROPPED keyword is similar. Simply replace 
ACCEPT with DROP and A(Mr) with R(Mr)· 
3. 7.3 Other Primitives 
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Primitives such as FROM and TO specify sets of packets whose attributes match the 
argument of the query. For instance, the query primitive FROM 192.168.1.2 specifies the 
set of all packets with source address 192.168.1.2. Each of the attributes matched by a 
particular query primitive is associated with a set of levels in the MDD representation of 
the query. We call this set the level set of the query. 
Figure 3.5: MDD for the query primitive "FROM 192.168.1.*" 
To construct an MDD for a query primitive other than the ACCEPTED or DROPPED 
primitives, we identify each level in the level set with a range of values that match the 
argument of the query. For instance, the query primitive "FROM 192.168.1.*", can be 
represented by the list of ranges ([192~192], [168~168], [1~1], [0~255]). The query primitive 
"FOR TCP 22" can be represented by the list of ranges([TCP~TCP], [D-0], [22~22]). 
To generate an MDD representing the primitive, we begin at the bottom level with node 
MATCHES and work our way up creating a single node at each level. The node created 
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at a level which is not in the level set has arcs for every value to the node created at the 
level below. A node created at a level in the level set has arcs only for those values in the 
corresponding range. 
An example MDD for the primitive "FROM 192.168.1.*" is shown in figure 3.5. The top 
four levels of the MDD correspond to the source address attributes of the query and make 
up the level set of the FROM operator and have a single node with arcs only for values in 
the corresponding range. The remaining levels consist of "wildcard nodes" which have arcs 
for every possible value. 
node_indexQuery2MDD(query q, level k): 
1 if k=O: 
2 return MATCHES. 
3 nr = NewNode(k). 
4 nj = Query2MDD(q,k-1). 
5 if k ¢: LS(q): 
6 fori from 0 to maxVal[k]: 
7 <k :nr>[i] = j. 
8 else: 
9 fori from q[k].low to q[k].high: 
10 <k:nr>[i] = j. 
11 return nr. 
Figure 3.6: Pseudocode for constructing an MDD from a query primitive 
We use the algorithm given in figure 3.6 to construct a decision diagram from these 
ranges. The algorithm is recursive and takes two parameters: an object representing the 
elements of the query and an integer representing the level of the MDD to construct. 
Lines 1 and 2 handle the base case in which the algorithm has reached level 0. In this 
case, we simply return the terminal node MATCHES. Line 3 creates a new node to store 
the result of the operation. In line 4, we use recursion to obtain the index of the node 
created at level k - 1. The if statement in line 5 determines whether the current level is in 
the level set of the query. If not, lines 6 and 7 create arcs to node <k: nj> for all possible 
values of the attribute at level k. If so, lines 9 and 10 create arcs only for those values in 
the appropriate range. Finally, line 11 returns the new node. 
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3.7.4 Correctness of the Query MDD Generation Algorithm 
To demonstrate the correctness of the query MDD produced by Query2MDD, we first 
define a few terms. 
Definition 8 A packet p matches a query q if for every level k in the level set of q, 
q[k].low :S p[k] :S q[k].high. We call the set of packets that match a query its match 
set. 
We will use the notation M(q) to represent the match set of query q. 
Lemma 6 Given a query q, let Nt = Query 2M D D( q, K) and let Mt be the MDD with root 
node <K:Nt>· Then, M(Mt) = M(q). 
Proof: 
Step 1: M(q) ~ M(Mt)· 
Let p E M(q). We must show that p E M(Mt)· That is, that there is a path 
P = (eo,ei, ... ,eK) from <K:Nt> to the terminal node MATCHES such that for 
each edge ei E P, L(ei) = p[i]. We proceed by induction on k. 
Base Step Let k = 0. The if statement in line 1 will always evaluate to true, so 
the algorithm will return the node MATCHES. Thus, <k:nt> is the terminal node 
MATCHES. Since M(MATCHES) is the set of all packets, p E M(<k:nt>). 
Induction Hypothesis Assume that when k < K, for any integer K, that if p E 
M(q) and nt = Query2MDD(k,q), then p E M(<k:nt>). That is, that there is a 
path P =(eo, e1, ... , ek) such that for each edge ei E P, L(ei) = p[i]. 
Induction Step We must show that when k = K, the algorithm produces a node 
<k:nt> such that if p E M(q), then p E M(<k:nt>). Let Nt = Query2MDD(K,q). 
Since k > 0 (otherwise, the base case takes care of everything), the if statement in 
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line 1 will evaluate to false. Therefore, we create a new node in line 3. There are two 
cases: 
Case 1: k ~ LS(q) 
If k ~ LS(q), the if statement in line 4 will evaluate to true and in lines 5 through 
7 we set the arcs of the new node to point to the result of calling Query2MDD at 
the level below. Let ek be the arc with label p[i]. This arc points to a node formed 
by calling Query2MDD at level k -1. By the induction hypothesis, we know that 
P = (e0 , e1 , ... , ek_1) is a path to the terminal node MATCHES such that for 
each edge ei E P, L(ei) = p[i]. Therefore, the path Q =(eo, e1, ... , en-1, ek) is a 
path from <k:nt> to the terminal node MATCHES that satisfies the condition 
that each edge ei E Q has label p[i]. 
Case 2: k E LS(q) 
If k E LS(q), the if statement in line 4 will evaluate to false, so the algorithm 
proceeds to lines 9 and 10. Now, q[k].low :S p[k] :S q[k].high, since p E M(q). 
Therefore, the for loop will eventually create an arc ek with label p[k] to a node 
at level k -1. By the induction hypothesis, there is a path P =(eo, e1, ... , ek_1 ) 
from this node to MATCHES such that for each edge ei E P, L(ei) = p[i]. 
Therefore, the path Q = (eo,e1, ... ,ek-1,ek) is a path from <k:nt> to the 
terminal node MATCHES such that for each edge ei E Q, L(ei) = p[i]. 
In either case, we have that p EM( <K: Nt> ), sop E M(Mt)· Therefore, by induction, 
M(q) ~ M(Mt). 
Step 2: M(Mt) ~ M(q). 
Let p E M(Mt). By definition, there exists a path P = (eo,e1, ... ,eK) from <K:Nt> 
to the terminal node MATCHES such that for each edge ei E P, L(ei) = p[i]. 
We must show that p E M(q). That is, that for each level k, if k E LS(q), then 
q[k].low :S p[k] :S q[k].high. We proceed by induction on k. 
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Base Step If k = 0, it is trivially true that p E M(q), since level 0 cannot be in the 
level set of a query. 
Induction Hypothesis Assume that when k < K, for some K, that if k E LS(q), 
q[k].low ~ p[k] ~ q[k].high. 
Induction Step Consider the case that k = K. Then, since k > 0, nt could not 
have been returned by line 2. Therefore, nt was returned by line 11. Let eK be the 
arc from <k:nt> which has label p[K]. There are two cases: 
Case 1: K ¢:. LS(q). 
By the induction hypothesis, we know that for every level k < K, that if k E 
LS(q), q[k].low ~ p[k] ~ q[k].high. Since K ¢:. LS(q), all the levels that are in 
the level set are at levels less than K. Therefore, we can say that for every level 
k ~ K, if k E LS(q), q[k].low ~ p[k] ~ q[k].high. 
Case 2: K E LS(q). 
Since K E LS(q), eK must have been created in lines 9 and 10. But this can only 
happen if the label on arc eK is between q[K].low and q[K].high, since these are 
the boundaries of the for loop. Therefore, since eK has label p[K], we know that 
q[K].low ~ p[K] ~ q[K].high. By the induction hypothesis, we know that at 
every level k < K in the level set of q, q[k].low ~ p[k] ~ q[k].high. Therefore, 
for all k ~ K such that k E LS(q), we know that q[k].low ~ p[k] ~ q[k].high. 
In either case, p E M(q), so M(Mt) ~ M(q). 
• 
3.8 Combining Queries 
The MDDs created for each query primitive can be combined using MDD intersection 
and union operations to construct representations of more complex queries. Pseudocode 
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for the MDD intersection operator is given in figure 3.7. An MDD union algorithm can be 
derived directly from the intersection operator by modifying the base cases. 
nodeJ.ndex IntersectMDD(level k, nodeJ.ndex p, nodeJ.ndex q) 
1 if k = 0: 
2 if <k:p>=MATCHES and <k:q>=MATCHES then return MATCHES. 
3 else return 0. 
4 if p = 0 or q = 0 then return 0. 
5 result = NewMDDNode(). 
6 for value from 0 to MaxValue(k): 
7 Arckresultvalue = 
IntersectMDD(k -1, <k:p>[value], <k:q>[value]]). 
8 result = CheckForDuplicates( <k: result>). 
9 return result. 
Figure 3. 7: MDD Intersection Algorithm 
Lines 1 - 4 of the algorithm handle the base cases. The if statement at line 1 checks to 
see if the algorithm has reached the terminal level. If so, then we return MATCHES if 
and only if both of the input nodes are MATCHES. If we are not at the terminal level, we 
return node <0: 0>. In line 4, we handle the special case that one of the argument nodes is 
node <k: 0>, which represents the empty set. If so, we indicate that the result is the empty 
set by returning index 0. 
Lines 5 - 9 create a new MDD node representing the intersection of the arguments. 
The for loop in lines 6 and 7 examines each possible value for the attribute at level k and 
recursively computes the intersection of the corresponding children of the argument nodes. 
Line 8 ensures that the result node does not duplicate any existing node. Line 9 returns 
the result. 
The function MaxValue called in line 6 is a helper function that returns the maximum 
value for the field associated with level k. For instance, the maximum value of level K is 
255, since level K represents the first octet of the source IP address. 
A copy of the rule set MDD from chapter 2 is given on the left panel of figure 3.8. The 
middle panel shows the MDD representation of the query "FROM 68.10.122.* AND (FOR 
TCP 25 OR FOR TCP 80 OR FOR TCP 110)". The result of intersecting the query MDD 
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Query MDD 
Figure 3.8: Intersecting a query MDD and a rule MDD 
with the MDD produced from the rule MDD by the primitive "ACCEPTED forward" is 
given in the right panel. 
To see which packets are represented by the result MDD, we start with the top node of 
the graph. This node has a single arc representing the value 68, so all packets in the result 
have a source address that begins with 68. 
Following the arc, we reach another node with a single arc. This node represents all 
packets with second source octet equal to 10. Continuing in this manner, we see that 
the source address of all packets in the result must be in the group 68.10.122. * and the 
destination address must be in the group 192.168.2.*. 
The protocol must be TCP and the source port can have any value, but the destination 
port must be port 80, the HTTP port. When we continue down the graph, we find that the 
result contains packets with any TCP flag condition and in any connection state. In other 
words, the result of our query is exactly: all HTTP packets from hosts on the 68.10.122.0/24 
subnet to hosts on the 192.168.2.0/24 subnet. 
GROUP wlan 68.10.122.8; 
SERVICE mail TCP 25 TCP 110; 
QUERY DADDY FROM wlan AND 
(FOR mail OR FOR TCP 80) 
AND ACCEPTED forward; 
Addresses: 192.168.2.* 
256 results. 
Figure 3.9: ITVal output for sample query 
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In the context of ITVal, the output of the sample query applied to the sample rule set 
is shown in figure 3.9. Note that the human-readable output corresponds directly to the 
result MDD of figure 3.8. 
3.9 Correctness of the Intersection Operation 
To demonstrate the correctness of the intersection algorithm in figure 3.7, we must 
demonstrate that the match set of the result of intersecting two MDDs is the same as the 
intersection of the match sets of those two MDDs. 
Lemma 7 Let Ma be an MDD with root node <K:Na>, let Mb be an MDD with root 
node <K:Nb>, and let Nt = IntersectMDD(K,Na,Nb)· If Mt is the MDD with root node 
Proof: 
Step 1: M(Ma) n M(Mb) ~ M(Mt)· 
Let p E A(Ma)nA(Mb)· Then, there is a path P = (eo,el, ... ,eK) from <K:Na> 
to MATCHES such that for each edge ei E P, L(ei) = p[i] and there is a path 
Q = (fo, JI, ... , !K) such that for each edge fiE Q, L(fi) = p[i]. 
We show by induction on k, that at each level, there is a path from <k: nt> to 
MATCHES with appropriate labels on each edge. 
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Base Step Let k = 0. Then, since P and Q are both paths to MATCHES, p 
and q are both the terminal node MATCHES. Therefore, the algorithm will return 
MATCHES in line 2. Thus, the trivial path consisting of the node MATCHES is 
a path from <k:nt> to MATCHES with appropriate labels and p E M(Mt)· 
Induction Hypothesis Assume that for every level k < K, that there is a path 
R = (eo,el, ... ,ek) from <k:nt> to MATCHES such that for each edge ei E R, 
L(ei) = p[i]. 
Induction Step Let k = K. We can assume that k > 0, since otherwise the base 
case demonstrates that p E M(Mt)· Since k > 0, the if statement in line 1 evaluates 
to false. The if statement in line 4 also evaluates to false, because p E M(Ma) and 
p E M(Mb)· Therefore, a new node is created in line 5. When the for loop in line 
6 reaches the value i = p[K], it will create a new arc 9K with label p[K] to the 
node created by intersecting the nodes obtained by following arcs eK and fK· By the 
induction hypothesis, there is a path R = (go,gi, ... ,9K-I) from this new node to 
MATCHES such that for each edge 9i E R, L(gi) = p[i]. The arc 9K has label p[K], 
so the path (go,g1,····9K-I,9K) is a path from <K:Nt> to MATCHES for which 
every edge 9i satisfies the property that L(gi) = p[i]. Therefore, p E M(Mt)· 
Thus, by induction, M(Ma) n M(Mb) ~ M(Mt)· 
Step 2: M(Mt) ~ M(Ma) nM(Mb)· 
Let p E M(Mt)· We know that there is a path P = (eo, e1, ... , eK) from <K: Nt> to 
the terminal node MATCHES such that for each edge ei E P, L ( ei) = p[ i]. 
We must show that there are paths Q = (fo,fl, ... ,fK) from Ma to MATCHES 
and R = (go,gl, ... ,gK) from Mb to MATCHES such that for each edge fi E Q, 
L(fi) = p[i] and for each edge 9i E R, L(gi) = p[i]. 
We proceed by induction on k. 
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Base Step Let k = 0. Then, <k: nt> is the node terminal node MATCHES. Since 
k = 0, the if statement in line 1 will always be true. Since <k: nt> is not node 0, we 
must have returned nt from line 2. Therefore, <k: na> and <k: nb> must also be the 
node MATCHES. 
This means that p E M ( <k : na>) and p E M ( <k : nb>), since the path consisting 
solely of the node MATCHES is a path from <k: na> to MATCHES and also a 
path from <k: nb> toM ATC H ES, which trivially satisfies the requirement that each 
edge be labeled with an appropriate attribute of p. Thus, p E M(Ma) n M(Mb)· 
Induction Hypothesis Assume that when k < K, for some integer K, that if 
p E M(<k:nt>), then p E M(<k:na>)nM(<k:nb>). That is, if there is a path 
(eo,el, ... ,ek) from <k:nt> to MATCHES such that L(ei) = p[i] for all 0 :S i :S k, 
then there is a path P = (fo,fl, ... ,fk) from <k:na> to MATCHES and a path 
Q = (go,gl, ... ,gk) from <k:nb> to MATCHES such that fi = 9i = p[i] for all 
0 :S i :S k. 
Induction Step Let k = K. We can assume that k > 0, since if k = 0, the base 
case proves that p E M(Ma) nM(Mb)· Therefore, <k:nt> was not returned by lines 
2 or 3. Since nt #- 0, it was not returned by line 4. Therefore, <k: nt> was constructed 
by lines 5 through 8. Now the loop in line 6 considers each possible value of attribute 
k and creates an arc for each value. Consider the iteration which creates an arc ek 
with label p[k]. We know that ek does not have label 0, since p E M(Mt)· Therefore, 
neither <k: p> [i] nor <k: q> [i] points to the node <k - 1: 0>. From the induction 
hypothesis, we know that they must instead point to nodes from which there are 
paths Uo,fl, ... ,fk-1 and (go,g1,···,9k-d totheterminalnodeMATCHESwhich 
have appropriate labels. 
Let fk = <k:p>[i] and let 9k = <k:q>[i]. The paths (fo,fl, ... ,fk-l,fk) from 
<k:Na> to MATCHES and (go,gl, ... ,gk) from <k:Nb> to MATCHES satisfy 
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the condition that each edge at level i is labeled p[i]. 
Therefore, by induction, p E M(Ma) n M(Mb)· 
• 
3.10 Performance 
MDD operations can be performed very efficiently through the judicious use of operation 
caches. Caching the MDD node created by applying an MDD operation to one or more 
argument ensures that each we consider each combination of arguments exactly one and 
gives us a guarantee that the algorithm is linear in the product of nodes in the argument 
MDDs. For clarity of the correctness proofs, we have omitted the caching mechanism from 
the description of the algorithms above. Adding caching to the operations as outlined is 
straightforward and does not affect correctness. 
3.11 Application of ITVal Queries 
GROUP wlan 192.168.1.*; 
SERVICE special ICMP * TCP 53 TCP 80 TCP 22; 
QUERY DPORT FROM wlan AND ACCEPTED forward; 
QUERY DADDY FOR ICMP * AND ACCEPTED forward; 
QUERY SADDY FOR TCP 53 AND ACCEPTED forward; 
QUERY SADDY FOR TCP 80 AND ACCEPTED forward; 
QUERY SADDY FOR TCP 22 AND ACCEPTED forward; 
QUERY SADDY NOT (FOR special OR FROM wlan) AND ACCEPTED forward; 
Figure 3.10: Example queries 
To illustrate how a hypothetical system administrator might use ITVal to detect and 
correct configuration errors, we return to the rule set described in the introduction as 
figure 1.2 (the MDD for this policy is reproduced in this chapter on the left side figure 3.4). 
The query file shown in figure 3.10 can be used to verify the most important assertions 
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about this network. For instance, the query on line 3 lists all services which can be accessed 
by the wireless network. The result of this query should be the empty set, since we want 
to restrict all access from that network. Similarly, the last query lists all hosts not on the 
wireless network that can access a service other than those explicitly permitted or denied. 
Only hosts from the trusted 113.192.10.0/24 network should appear in the answer to this 
query. 
GROUP wlan 192.168.1.*; 
SERVICE special ICMP * TCP 53 TCP 80 TCP 22; 
QUERY DPORT FROM wlan AND ACCEPTED forward; 
# Ports: 
# 0 results. 
QUERY DADDY FOR ICMP * AND ACCEPTED forward; 
# Addresses: 
# 0 results. 
QUERY SADDY FOR TCP 53 AND ACCEPTED forward; 
# Addresses: 
# 0 results. 
QUERY SADDY FOR TCP 80 AND ACCEPTED forward; 
#Addresses: [0-191] ·*·*·* 
# 192.[0-167] ·*·* 
# 192.168.0.* 
# 192.168.[2-255].* 
# 192.[169-255] ·*·* 
# [193-255] ·*·*·* 
# 4278190080 results. 
QUERY SADDY FOR TCP 22 AND ACCEPTED forward; 
# Addresses: 
# 0 results. 
QUERY SADDY NOT (FOR special OR FROM wlan) AND ACCEPTED forward; 
#Addresses: 113.192.10.* 
# 256 results. 
Figure 3.11: Output of ITVal when run on a rule set without errors 
Running ITVal on the initial configuration gives the output shown in figure 3.11. It 
is easy to verify that all the requirements are satisfied. Suppose that, as described in the 
introduction (figure 1.3), the administrator incorrectly inserts a rule allowing IPP printing 
traffic to the beginning of the policy. This change allows undesirable behavior in that hosts 
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from untrusted network 192.168.1.0/24 are allowed to print from systems on the trusted 
network. 
GROUP wlan 192.168.1.*; 
SERVICE special ICMP * TCP 53 TCP 80 TCP 22; 
QUERY DPORT FROM wlan AND ACCEPTED forward; 
#Ports: 631 
#1 result. 
QUERY DADDY FOR ICMP * AND ACCEPTED forward; 
#Addresses: 
#0 results. 
QUERY SADDY FOR TCP 53 AND ACCEPTED forward; 
#Addresses: 
#0 results. 
QUERY SADDY FOR TCP 80 AND ACCEPTED forward; 
#Addresses: [0-191] ·*·*·* 
# 192.[0-167] ·*·* 
# 192.168.0.* 
# 192.168.[2-255] ·* 
# 192.[169-255].*.* 
# [193-255] ·*·*·* 
# 4278190080 results. 
QUERY SADDY FOR TCP 22; 
# Addresses: 
# 0 results. 
QUERY SADDY NOT (FOR special OR FROM wlan) AND ACCEPTED forward; 
# Addresses: *·*·*·* 
# 4294967296 results. 
Figure 3.12: Output of ITVal after an error has been introduced into the rule set 
Running ITVal on this new rule set produces figure 3.12. It is evident from the fact that 
the first query no longer produces an empty result that this rule set is incorrect. Realizing 
her mistake, the system administrator can then move the rule to its correct location in the 
rule set. Now the output of the first query will once again be the empty set. 
3.12 Advantages of the Query Language 
One advantage of using a query language is that generic queries generated for one 
firewall system can be employed on another firewall system with only a few modifications. 
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This means that even without a complete understanding of the query language syntax, a 
system administrator can use ITVal to check fundamental security properties. Since manual 
inspection of the firewall policy requires detailed knowledge of the policy language, this is 
a significant improvement in usability. 
Furthermore, queries are easier to generate correctly than the firewall rule set, because 
they are more general, not order dependent, and don't involve a complex interaction between 
independent chains. Therefore, it is much easier for a system administrator to test the 
firewall using queries than it is to design a correct rule set initially or make manual changes 
to the policy. 
Chapter 4 
Composition of Firewalls 
Networks with a large number of hosts must defend against both external and internal 
intruders. While a perimeter firewall will block many external threats, it is useless against 
attacks from inside the network. With Trojan horses and viruses extremely prevalent, the 
problem of intrusions from internal hosts is growing rapidly [33]. To solve this problem, 
many system administrators complement the perimeter firewall with local firewalls on im-
portant internal hosts [28, 20]. On moderately complex networks, the system administrator 
may place additional firewalls between the perimeter firewall and groups of related hosts to 
further regulate access between important subnets. 
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Figure 4.1: Common firewall architecture for defeating insider threats 
The resulting architecture looks something like figure 4.1, which depicts a network with 
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a perimeter firewall, one unprotected host (host 113.137.10.2), two protected servers (hosts 
113.137.10.3 and 113.137.10.4), and an internal network (subnet 192.168.1.0/24), which 
requires additional restrictions. The protected systems could be a mail server and a web 
server, while the protected subnet might include clients in an accounting department with 
financial information that must be secured. 
The perimeter firewall can mitigate denial of service and other external threats, while 
the firewall on each workstation secures services that must be protected from an inside 
intruder. The firewall separating the protected subnet from the rest of the network provides 
additional protection against internal threats such as zombie hosts and rogue users. Usually, 
most of the workstations have very similar filtering policies, which makes the distribution of 
changes easier since the policy can be edited on a single system and then distributed across 
the network. One or more of the firewalls may also use network address translation (NAT) 
to further protect critical hosts or to work around the IPv4 address space problem. 
The multiplicity of firewalls, in networks like the one described, greatly increases the 
difficulty of avoiding configuration errors. Removing a rule at the perimeter often means 
exposing hosts that are not sufficiently protected by their local firewalls. Incorrectly adding 
rules to a local or intermediate firewall can unintentionally block important network services. 
Firewalls with NAT are even more complex because a set of translation rules must be 
considered in addition to the filtering rules. 
For example, consider the filtering chains given in figure 4.2 that could be used to secure 
the network shown in figure 4.1. The first chain is the forwarding chain of a perimeter fire-
wall that protects the 113.137.10.0/24 network against intrusions from an insecure network 
113.137.9.0/24. Rule 1 of the chain blocks traffic from the insecure network. Rule 2 protects 
the mail server by blocking all traffic from the outside world. The remaining rules secure 
various services that should be allowed to pass through the firewall. 
The second chain is the INPUT chain of the internal mail server, 113.137.10.3. It permits 
SMTP, secure IMAP, and SSH traffic, but blocks anything else. 
There are several invariant properties that the administrator wishes to preserve on this 
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Chain FORWARD (policy DROP): 
target prot source destination flags 
1 DROP tcp 113.137.9.0/24 anywhere 
2 DROP tcp anywhere 113.137.10.3 
3 ACCEPT tcp anywhere anywhere TCP dpt:80 
4 ACCEPT tcp anywhere anywhere TCP dpt:53 
Rule Set on the Perimeter Firewall 
Chain INPUT (policy DROP): 
target prot source destination flags 
1 ACCEPT tcp anywhere anywhere TCP dpt:22 
2 ACCEPT tcp anywhere anywhere TCP dpt:993 
3 ACCEPT tcp anywhere anywhere TCP dpt:25 
Rule Set on the Mail Server 
Figure 4.2: Rule Sets for an Example Network 
network. First, web traffic from anywhere but the insecure network should always be allowed 
to host 113.137.10.4, the web server. Second, hosts from the outside world should never 
be able to SSH into the mail server. Third, no traffic should ever be permitted from the 
insecure network. 
Chain FORWARD (policy DROP): 
target prot source destination flags 
1 DROP tcp 113.137.9.0/24 anywhere 
2 ACCEPT tcp 113.137.8.0/24 anywhere 
3 DROP tcp anywhere 113.137.10.3 
4 ACCEPT tcp anywhere anywhere TCP dpt:80 
5 ACCEPT tcp anywhere anywhere TCP dpt:53 
Figure 4.3: An Incorrect Perimeter Rule Set 
Let's assume that the administrator decides to allow SSH traffic through the perimeter 
firewall for hosts on subnet 113.137.8.0/24 by adding a rule to the forwarding chain of the 
perimeter firewall as shown in figure 4.3. The first rule and the last three rules are the · 
same as those in figure 4.2, but the second rule is new. This change preserves the first and 
third invariant, but violates the second, because SSH traffic from the outside world can now 
reach the mail server. To correct the violation, the system administrator can either add 
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restrictions to the filter on the mail server or switch the order of rules two and three in the 
perimeter filter. 
Chain FORWARD (policy DROP): 
target prot source destination Hags 
1 DROP tcp l13.137.9.0/24 anywhere 
2 DROP tcp anywhere l13.137.10.3 
3 ACCEPT tcp 113.137.8.0/24 anywhere 
4 ACCEPT tcp anywhere anywhere TCP dpt:80 
5 ACCEPT tcp anywhere anywhere TCP dpt:53 
Figure 4.4: A Correctly Modified Rule Set 
A correct rule set for the perimeter firewall is show in figure 4.4. The new rule set allows 
HTTP and DNS traffic from 113.137.8.0/24, but preserves all three invariants. 
4.1 Analyzing Firewall Systems using Existing Tools 
Active testing tools such as SATAN [18], Nessus [32, 2], ISS [27], and SARA [51] can 
be used to test multiple firewalls at once and can test firewalls that use NAT. In fact, 
with these tools it is often more difficult to segregate firewalls on the network than it is to 
process them together. Since these tools analyze traffic on the network with little or no 
information about the firewall topology, it is more difficult for them to determine which 
firewall is blocking a particular set of packets. 
Active tools also have the disadvantage of consuming bandwidth and interfering with 
normal traffic. Sending a test packet to the wrong host might crash an important server or 
cause significant delays on the network link. Furthermore, active tools are very inflexible. 
Rather than providing general functionality for investigating the firewall configuration, they 
are designed to test specific vulnerabilities. Since they usually simulate packets originating 
from a single host or small group of hosts, they will miss errors that allow packets from an 
untested host. Some tools [4] use address spoofing to mitigate this problem, but because of 
bandwidth constraints, no active tool can test every possible address that might originate 
a packet to the firewall. 
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When using active tools with multiple firewalls and address translation, it can be very 
challenging to obtain adequate coverage of the policy. Because packets dropped by one 
firewall are never seen by the second, it is often difficult for an active tool to generate 
a spoofed packet that will exploit configuration errors in both firewalls. Also, replies to 
packets with NAT'd source addresses may never be seen by the active analysis tool. 
Because active tools have these drawbacks, passive tools, which perform an offline analy-
sis of the firewall can be more practical. Passive tools, such as Redseal [40] and Lumeta [59], 
provide general query capability for offline testing of firewalls and provide support for testing 
multiple firewalls. Unfortunately, these tools are closed source tools that are not designed 
to work with iptables firewalls. Existing structure analysis tools [22, 34] also do not support 
NAT or analysis of multiple firewalls. 
Some work has been done [23, 30] on modeling NAT using passive model checking tools, 
but this work is targeted at demonstrating the correctness of a few specific firewall config-
urations and is not easily generalizable to arbitrary firewall policies. Other research [56] 
performs a passive analysis of a distributed firewall system, but handles only a limited 
number of queries regarding address spoofing. 
In this chapter, we show how the quasi-reduced MDD model can be extended to analysis 
of groups of connected firewalls, network address translation, and more advanced packet 
mangling techniques such as masquerading and redirection. We illustrate the implementa-
tion of these features in ITVal. 
4.2 Composing Nested Firewalls 
In order to extend our technique to work with multiple firewalls, we introduce the 
concept of a meta-firewall. A meta-firewall is an imaginary firewall that represents a com-
position of the rule sets of two or more serially connected firewalls. 
The meta-firewall has three filter chains analogous to the built-in chains of a normal 
firewall. The FORWARD chain of the meta-firewall regulates traffic passing through all 
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the firewalls in either direction. The INPUT chain of the meta-firewall regulates traffic 
inbound to the innermost firewall through all of the outer firewalls. The OUTPUT chain 
represents traffic generated by the innermost firewall that successfully passes through the 
outer firewalls to the outside world. 
Queries are performed against the meta-firewall as if it were a single iptables firewall. 
For instance, the query 
QUERY DPORT FOR 192.168.* AND IN NEW AND ACCEPTED forward; 
will list the destination ports of packets bound for the 192.168.0.0/16 subnet that pass 
through all the firewalls in the set. 
Firewall* ConstructFirewall(int n, Firewall* fws) 
1 newFW = NewFirewall() 
2 newFW.forward = fws[O].forward 
3 newFW.input = fws[O].input 
4 newFW.output = fws[O].output 
5 for i in 1 to n - 1: 
6 newFW.forward = IntersectMDD(K, newFW.forward, fws[i].forward). 
7 newFW.input = lntersectMDD(K, newFW.input, fws[i].forward). 
8 newFW.output = lntersectMDD(K, newFW.output, fws[i].forward). 
9 return newFW. 
Figure 4.5: Algorithm for Constructing a Meta-Firewall 
To construct the meta-firewall, ITVal joins the MDD for each chain of the component 
filters using the MDD intersection operator described in chapter 2. 
Pseudocode for generating the meta-firewall is shown in figure 4.5. The INPUT chain 
of the meta-firewall is constructed by intersecting the FORWARD chains of the outer n -1 
firewalls and the INPUT chain of the innermost firewall. The OUTPUT chain is created 
by intersecting the OUTPUT chain of the innermost firewall with the FORWARD chains 
of the outer n- 1 firewalls. The FORWARD chain is the intersection of all n FORWARD 
chains. 
An MDD depicting the meta-firewall for the rule sets in figure 4.2 is shown in figure 4.6. 
In order to save space, only the levels for source address, destination address, and destination 
Source 
Address 2 
Source 
Address 3 
~~~:::.== 
L.......,==~:!---.!::::::oo---1 
Destination 
Address 2 
DestiDation 
Address 3 
Destination 
Address4 
Destination 
Portl 
Destination 
Port2 
Figure 4.6: Combining two rule sets into a meta-firewall 
port are shown. We also display only paths to the node ACCEPT. 
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Figure 4. 7 illustrates how ITVal might be used to detect the errors described in section 4. 
We depict the results of three queries before and after the incorrect change. The original, 
valid, results are shown in Roman font, while the query results for the incorrect policy are 
shown in bold. 
Each query corresponds to one invariant that the administrator wishes to preserve. The 
first query asks which hosts, other than those on the insecure net, can access the web server. 
In the original results, we see that, as expected, any host not on the insecure network can 
access the web server. The new results show that this important invariant still holds in the 
modified policy. 
The second query asks whether the SSH port on the mail server can be accessed from 
outside the firewall. The original results show that no external machine can reach the mail 
server. After the modification, however, the results show that the SSH port can be accessed 
from outside the firewall. The change allows SSH traffic from 113.137.8.0/24 to reach the 
>ITVal Example.fw mail.rs mail.nat perimeter.rs perimeter.nat 
#First invariant: Web traffic not from insecure net 
#can always reach the web server 
GROUP insecure 113.137.9.•; 
QUERY SADDY FOR TCP 80 AND NOT FROM insecure AND FOR 113.137.10.3 AND ACCEPTED input; 
#Addresses: [0--112].*.*.* [114--255].*.*.* 113.[0--136].*.* 
# 113.[138--255].*.* 113.137.[0--8].* 113.137.[10--255].* 
# 4294967040 results. 
# Addresses: [0--112].*.*.* [114--255].*.*.* 113.[0--136].*.* 
# 113.[138--255].*.* 113.137.[0--8].* 113.137.[10--255].* 
# 4294967040 results. 
#Second invariant: External hosts should never be able to SSH to the mail 
# server. 
GROUP internal 113.137.10.•; 
QUERY DPORT NOT FROM internal AND FOR TCP 22 AND TO 113.137.10.3 AND ACCEPTED input; 
#Ports: 
# 0 results. 
#Ports: 22 
# 1 results. 
#Third invariant: No traffic from the insecure network can reach the 
mail server. 
QUERY DPORT FROM 113.137.9.* AND TO 113.137.10.3 AND ACCEPTED input; 
#Ports: 
# 0 results. 
#Ports: 
# 0 results. 
Figure 4. 7: Query results before and after the change 
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mail server. By comparing these results, the administrator will realize that she has made 
a mistake and take steps to correct it. The last query tests whether services on the mail 
server are available to the insecure network. For both policies, the answer is no. 
4.2.1 Correctness of the Composition Operation 
To show that the composition algorithm is correct, we must demonstrate that the traffic 
accepted by the FORWARD chain of the meta-firewall is exactly that accepted by the 
FORWARD chain of every intermediate firewall, that the traffic accepted by the INPUT 
chain of the meta-firewall is exactly that accepted by the INPUT chain of the innermost 
firewall and by the FORWARD chains of the other n- 1 firewalls, and that the OUTPUT 
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chain of the meta-firewall is exactly that accepted by the OUTPUT chain of the innermost 
firewall and by the FORWARD chains of the other n- 1 firewalls. 
Theorem 4.1 Given an ordered list FW = (Fo, F1, ... , Fn-1), ofn firewalls, let Fm be the 
meta-firewall created by ConstructFirewall(n, FW). Then, for every packet s such that 
s E A(Fi.forward) for all 0 ::; i ::; n- 1, s E A(Fm.forward). Also, for each packet 
t E A(Fm.forward), t E A(Fi.forward) for all 0 ~ i ~ n- 1. 
Proof: 
Let s E A(Fi.forward) for all 0 ::; i ::; n- 1. Line 2 copies the FORWARD chain of 
Fo into Fm. Thus, since s E A(Fo.forward), s E A(Fm.forward) immediately after line 
2 has executed. The for loop in lines 5 and 6 intersects Fm.forward with each firewall 
Fi.forward and stores the result in Fm.forward. However, since s E A(Fi.forward) for 
all i, these intersections cannot removes from A(Fm.forward). Therefore, when we return 
in line 9, s E A(Fm.forward). 
Now, let t E A(Fm.forward). Since Fm.forward is created by the intersection of the 
FORWARD chains of each firewall of FW in lines 5 through 8, we know that 
A(Fm.forward) = U A(Fi.forward) 
O~i~n-1 
But the correctness proof of the intersection operator from chapter 2 implies that 
A(Fm.forward) ~ A(Fi.forward) for 0 ::; i ::; n- 1. Thus, t E A(Fi.forward) for each 
firewall Fi E FW. 
• 
This means that the FORWARD chain of the meta-firewall is exactly the intersection of 
the FORWARD chains of the constituent firewalls. By trivial modification of the proof, we 
can also see that the algorithm correctly sets the OUTPUT chain of the meta-firewall to be 
the intersection of the OUTPUT chain of the innermost firewall with the FORWARD chains 
of the other firewalls and the INPUT chain of the meta-firewall to be the intersection of the 
INPUT chain of the innermost firewall with the FORWARD chains of the other firewalls. 
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4.2.2 Network Address Translation 
In addition to filtering packets that pass through the firewall, iptables provides a mech-
anism for modifying a packet's destination address and destination port before filtering or 
source address and source port after filtering. Properly handling network address transla-
tion (NAT) in the query engine is important, because the modified packet may be treated 
differently by the filtering rules than the original packet. In order for our queries to take 
NAT into account, we must modify the rule set MDD to reflect each of the NAT rules. 
A NAT rule is a function which maps certain packets seen by the firewall to new, 
translated, packets. These new packets may differ from the original packets in source 
address, source port, destination address, or any other attribute. The most common types 
of NAT rules are "source NAT" rules, which modify the source address and/or source port 
of a packet and "destination NAT" rules, which modify the destination address and/or 
destination port of the packet. 
In practice, the translation rule is described as a set of match conditions that identify 
a set of packets which should be modified (just as every filtering rule has a set of match 
conditions which specify which packets should be filtered) and a set of target values which 
specify the attributes of the new packet produced by translation. Often, most of the target 
values will be the same as the original packet and only a few of the attributes will change. 
The match conditions describe a "match set" of packets which satisfy all of the con-
ditions. The translation rule maps packets which are not in the match set to themselves. 
That is, it leaves them unchanged. Packets which are in the match set are mapped to new 
packets. These new packets are usually identical to the original packet, except that some 
of the attributes have been set to new target values. 
Like filtering rules, translation rules are stored using chains. Destination NAT (DNAT) 
rules for incoming packets are specified in the PREROUTING chain, which is processed be-
fore filtering. In addition to the PREROUTING chain, iptables provides a POSTROUT-
ING chain, processed after filtering, which is the appropriate place for source NAT (SNAT) 
rules, and an OUTPUT chain for performing DNAT on locally generated packets. 
target 
1 DNAT 
2 DNAT 
3 DNAT 
4 DNAT 
Chain PREROUTING (policy ACCEPT): 
prot source destination flags 
all anywhere 113.137.10.101 TCP dpt:2002 to:192.168.1.2:22 
all anywhere 113.137.10.101 TCP dpt:2003 to:192.168.1.3:22 
all anywhere 113.137.10.101 TCP dpt:2004 to:192.168.1.4:22 
all anywhere 113.137.10.101 TCP dpt:3000 to 192.168.1.2:9999 
NAT rules for the intermediate firewall 
Chain FORWARD (policy ACCEPT): 
I target I prot I source I destination I flags 
1 I DROP I tcp I 113.137.10.4 I 192.168.1.0/24 I 
Filter rules for the intermediate firewall 
Figure 4.8: Rule set of a NAT'ing firewall 
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An example rule set for a firewall which uses NAT, is shown in figure 4.8. This rule 
set might represent the policy of the intermediate firewall, depicted at the beginning of the 
chapter in figure 4.1, which protects internal network 192.168.1.0/24 from the outside world 
by allowing internal hosts to use non-routable IP addresses. To access a host, an external 
system must connect directly to the NAT'ing firewall on a designated port. The firewall 
will then forward the connection to the appropriate machine. 
The PREROUTING chain given in figure 4.8 contains several NAT rules. The first 
three rules map packets arriving on ports 2002-2004 of the firewall host to the SSH ports of 
various internal hosts. The last rule of the chain maps incoming connections on port 3000 to 
port 9999 of machine 192.168.1.2 (a proprietary financial database is running on that port). 
The FORWARD chain prevents internal hosts from accessing the web server. The match 
set of the first rule in the PREROUTING chain is "all TCP packets from 113.137.10.101 on 
port 2002". The output of the rule is a new packet which is identical to the original packet 
except that the destination address is now 192.168.1.2 and the destination port has been 
changed to TCP port 22(the SSH port). 
To access host 192.168.1.2, a user must connect to port 2002 of the firewall host (host 
113.137.10.101). The firewall will then replace the destination address of the packet with 
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"192.168.1.2" and the destination port with "22" before applying the filter rules and handing 
the packet over to the router. 
Chain FORWARD (policy ACCEPT): 
target prot source destination flags 
1 DROP tcp 113.137.10.4 192.168.1.0/24 
2 DROP tcp 113.137.10.3 113.137.10.101 TCP dpt:3000 
Figure 4.9: Incorrectly Configured Filter on the NAT'ing firewall 
NAT adds another layer of complexity to the configuration of a firewall. One common 
mistake is to add filtering rules for the original address rather than the NAT'd address. For 
instance, if the system administrator decides to further restrict access to the internal hosts, 
she might add rule 2 of figure 4.9 to the FORWARD chain. This change should prevent the 
mail server from accessing the proprietary database. The new rule fails to block forwarded 
connections to the internal hosts, however, because filtering rules are not applied until 
processing of the translation rules has been performed. Such a mistake is difficult to catch, 
since it involves the complex interplay of rules in two different tables of the firewall policy. 
Rule Set Before NAT Rule Set After NAT 
Figure 4.10: Applying NAT to the Example Rule Set 
83 
To model network address translation using MDDs, we create an operator which takes 
as inputs a NAT rule and the MDD representation of a set of packets. It produces as 
output an MDD which has been modified in such a manner that rules which applied to the 
original, unmodified packets apply instead to the translated packets. This enables us to 
perform analysis of the policy which takes into account the effects of address translation. 
Figure 4.10 shows the MDD for a filtering policy before and after application of the 
NAT algorithm. Tracing a path through the MDD along the edges representing "a packet 
from address 113.137.10.3 to port 3000 of host 113.137.10.101" shows that such a packet 
will be accepted by the firewall. 
node_index NAT(NAT_RULE tr, level k, nodejndex p, nodejndex q) 
1 if k = 0: 
2 return q. 
3 r = NewNode(k). 
4 let j = tr[k].target. 
5 for each arc i E <k:p>: 
6 if i tf. (tr[k].low, tr[k].high): 
7 <k:r>[i] = <k:p>[i]. 
8 otherwise: 
9 <k:r>[i] = NAT(tr, k -1, <k:p>[i], <k:q>[j]). 
10 return r. 
Figure 4.11: Algorithm for NAT of MDDs 
Pseudocode for applying a NAT transformation on the MDD representation of the rule 
set of a single firewall is shown in figure 4.11. The algorithm takes as parameters a NAT 
rule and two MDD nodes. The first node, <k :p>, represents the set of rules which apply 
to untranslated packets. The second node, <k: q>, represents the rules which apply to 
translated packets. To apply a NAT rule, tr to an MDD Mp which represents a filtering 
chain, we call NAT ( tr, K, p, p) where <K : p> is the root node of Mp. 
The NAT rule is represented as an array of structures of size K. Each structure consists 
of two parts: a match interval and a target value. The match interval at position k of the 
array identifies a range (tr[k].low, tr[k].high) of values for the attribute at level k. These 
ranges are chosen in such a manner that every packet s matching the NAT rule will satisfy 
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the condition that at every level k, low[k] :S s[k] :S high[k]. 
In general, we are not guaranteed that it is possible to decompose the NAT rule into 
independent ranges for which this condition will hold. However, for the special case of 
iptables firewalls, the syntax of the policy language ensures that it is always possible to do 
so. We can extend this technique to other types of firewalls by splitting each NAT rule 
up into a list of arrays, rather than a single array of structures (in fact, ITVal implements 
NAT translation in this matter), but since this process significantly complicates discussion 
of the algorithm, we will treat the NAT rule as a single array. 
The target value at level k, tr[k].target, specifies a new value for the attribute at that 
level which should be applied to packets that match the NAT rule. 
Using this representation of a NAT rule, tr, we have the property that for any packet 
s such that tr[k].low :S s[k] :S tr[k].high, tr(s)[k] = tr[k].target. For all other packets, 
tr(s)[k] = s[k]. 
As we descend the graph recursively, we use index p to track the rules currently applied 
to a set of packets and index q to track the rules which should be applied to those packets 
after NAT. 
Lines 1 and 2 (see figure 4.11) check for the base case condition in which we have reached 
level 0. If this has happened, we don't need to do any more work as all the NAT related 
information is contained in the preceding levels. We return q, the index of the terminal 
node representing the action applied to the NAT'd packets. 
TheN ewN ode operation in line 3 creates a new MDD node <k: r> and returns its index. 
This new node will represent the result of the NAT operation. Line 4 sets a temporary 
variable j to the target value of the translation rule for level k. 
In lines 5 through 10, we consider each possible value i of the attribute represented by 
level k. If the value is not in the match interval of the NAT rule, the node reached by arc i 
represents rules applied to packets which do not match the NAT rule. Line 7 handles this 
case by copying the arc with label i from <k : p> into <k : r>. 
If i is in the match set of the NAT rule, line 9 creates a new node at level k -1. This node 
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is constructed by a recursive call of the NAT operation on nodes <k:p>[i] and <k:q>[j]. 
It represents the set of translated filtering rules which apply to packets with value i for 
attribute k. We create an arc with label i to this node from <k: r>. Finally, in line 10 we 
return r. 
GROUP insecure 113.137.10.3; 
QUERY SADDY FROM insecure 
AND FOR TCP 3000 AND 
ACCEPTED forward; 
# Addresses: 
# 0 results. 
Figure 4.12: Query for detecting errors in the NAT'ing firewall 
GROUP insecure 113.137.10.3 113.137.10.4; 
QUERY SADDY FROM insecure 
AND FOR TCP 3000 
AND ACCEPTED forward; 
#Addresses: 113.137.10.4 
# 1 result. 
Figure 4.13: Results for an Incorrectly Configured Firewall 
Figure 4.12 provides a query that might be used to detect the error in figure 4.9. The 
group "insecure" is a list of hosts that should be prevented from accessing the secure 
server. A correctly configured firewall should always return an empty result, as in the 
figure. After making the incorrect change to the filtering rules, the system administrator 
adds 113.137.10.3 to the group. If she now runs the query a second time, she will see the 
results in figure 4.13 and detect the error. 
4.2.3 Correctness of the NAT algorithm 
To prove the NAT algorithm is correct, we will show that every packet that is accepted by 
firewall after translation is accepted by the MDD for the translated rule set and vice-versa. 
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Theorem 4.2 Let Mp be a rule set MDD with root node <K :p> and let Mr be the MDD 
produced by NAT(tr,K,p,p). For every packets such that s E A(Mr), tr(s) E A(Mp)· 
Also, for every packet t such that tr(t) E A(Ms), t E A(Mr)· 
Proof: 
Step 1: If s E A(Mr), then tr(s) E A(Mp)· 
Since s E A(Mr ), there exists a pathS= (eo, e1, ... , eK) from the root node of Mr to 
the terminal ACCEPT such that L(ei) = s[i] for each edge ei in S. We must show 
that there is a path T = (fo, h, ... , fK) from the root node of Mp to ACCEPT such 
that L(fa) = tr(s )[a] for each edge fa in T. 
To show this, we use induction on k to show that at any level, for some node <k: p> 
of Mp, there is a path T = (fo, ... , fk) from <k:p> to the terminal ACCEPT such 
that L(fa) = tr( s )[a] for each edge fa in T. 
Base Case Let k = 0. Then since s E A(Mr), Mr consists of the terminal node 
ACCEPT. This can only happen if q was returned in line 2. Thus, <k:q> was also 
the terminal node ACCEPT. But since, initially, <K :q> = <K :p>, this means 
that the trivial path containing only the node ACCEPT is a path from <k:p> to 
ACCEPT such that for every edge fa in the path, L(fa) = tr(s)[a]. 
Induction Hypothesis Assume that at every level 0 < k < n, there is a path 
T = (fo, JI, ... , fk) from <k:p> to ACCEPT such that L(fa) = tr(s)[a] for each 
edge fa E T. 
Induction Step Let k = n > 0. Since k > 0, the algorithm will skip lines 1 and 
2. Therefore, <k: r> was created in line 3 and returned by line 10. Let i be the arc 
from <k: r> which has label s[k]. We know that i was created in the for loop of lines 
5 through 9. 
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There are two cases. 
Case 1: Arc i was created in line 7. 
In this case, the if statement in line 6 must have been true. This means that 
s[k] > tr[k].high or s[k] < tr[k].low. In either case, we know that s did not 
match the NAT rule, so s[a] = tr(s)[a] for all 0 ~a~ k. 
Now, line 7 copied an arc from node <k:p>, so there is an arc fk with label 
tr ( s) [ k] from node <k : p> that points to the same child as arc i of node <k : r>. 
Thus, the path T = (eo, e1, ... , ek-1, h) is a path from <k :p> to ACCEPT 
which satisfies the condition that L(fa) = tr(s)[a] for each edge fa in the path. 
Case 2: Arc i was created in line 9. 
In this case, the if statement in line 6 was false, so tr[k].low ~ s[k] ~ tr[k].high. 
Line 9 created an arc with label s[k] to the result of performing NAT at level 
k- 1 by following the arc from <k:q> with label j = tr(s)[k] to a node at level 
k-1. 
By the induction hypothesis, we know that there is a path T = (fo, JI, ... , fk_ 1) 
from this node to ACCEPT such that L(fa) = tr(s)[a] for each edge fa in the 
path. Thus, the path (fo, JI, ... , fk) is a path from <k: q> to ACCEPT such 
that L(fa) = tr(s)[a] for each edge fa in the path. 
Since in the initial call to NAT, <K: p> = <K: q>, this path is also a path from 
<k:p> to ACCEPT. 
In either case, we have that tr(s) E A(Mp)· 
Step 2: If tr(s) E A(Mp), then s E A(Mr)· 
lftr(s) E A(Mp), then there exists a pathS= (eo,e1, ... ,eK) from <k:p> to the 
terminal node ACCEPT such that L(ea) = tr(s)[a] for every edge ea E P. We must 
show that there is a path T = (fo, JI, ... , fK) from <k:r> to ACCEPT such that 
L(fa) = s[a] for every edge fa E T. 
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We proceed by induction. 
Base Case Let k = 0. Then, the if statement in line 1 will be true and we will 
return the terminal node ACCEPT in line 2. This means that <k:r> =ACCEPT. 
Thus, the trivial path containing only the terminal node ACCEPT is a path from 
<k :r> to ACCEPT such that for each edge fa in the path, L(fa) = s[a]. 
Induction Hypothesis Assume that for 0 < k < n, there is a path 
T=(fo,fi, ... ,fk) 
from <k:r> to ACCEPT such that L(fa) = s[a] for each edge fa E T. 
Induction Step Let K = n > 0. Since k > 0, we skip lines 1 and 2 and proceed 
immediately to line 3. This line creates a new node <k: r>. We then proceed to the 
for loop in lines 5 through 9, which examines each possible value, i, of the attribute 
at level k. When the for loop reaches i = s[k], we have two possibilities: 
Case 1: tr[k].low :S s[k] :S tr[k].high 
If this is the case, line 9 creates an arc fk with label s [ k J from node <k: r> to 
the node created by performing NAT at level k- 1. By the induction hypothesis 
there is a path (!0 , JI, ... , fk_ 1) from this node to ACCEPT such that for each 
edge fa in the path, L(fa) = s[a]. 
Thus, the path T = (fo, JI, ... , fk-1, !k) is a path from <k:r> to ACCEPT 
such that L(fa) = s[a] for each edge fa E T. 
Case 2: s[k] < tr[k].low or s[k] > tr[k].high 
In this case, s does not match the NAT rule, so we know that s[a] = tr(s)[a] for 
all 0 :S a :S k. Line 7 creates an arc fk with label s [ k] from <k: r> to a child of 
<k:p>. But since (eo,el, ... ,ek-l) is a path from this child to ACCEPT such 
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that L(ea) = tr(s)[a] = s[a], we know that the path T = (eo, e1, ... , ek-1, fk) is 
a path from <k:r> to ACCEPT such that for each edge fa E T, L(fa) = s[a]. 
Thus, in either case, s E A(Mr). • 
4.3 Nested Composition with Network Address Translation 
Firewall* NAT(int n, Firewall** FW) 
1 newFW = NewFirewall() 
2 newFW.forward = DNAT_ALL(fws[O].dnat, fws[O].forward). 
3 newFW.input = DNAT_ALL(fws[O].dnat, fws[O].input). 
4 newFW.output = DNAT_ALL(fws[n -l].nat, fws[n- l].output). 
5 for i in 1 to n - 1: 
6 newFW.forward = 
IntersectMDD(K, newFW.forward, fws[i].forward). 
7 newFW.forward = SNAT_ALL(fws[i- l].snat, newFw.forward). 
8 newFW.forward = DNAT_ALL(fws[i].dnat, newFW.forward). 
9 newFW.input = 
IntersectMDD(K, newFW.input, fws[i].forward). 
10 newFW.input = SNAT _ALL(fws[i- l].snat, newFw.input). 
11 newFW.input = DNAT_ALL(fws[i].dnat, newFW.input). 
12 newFW.output = 
IntersectMDD(K, newFW.output, fws[(n- i)- !).forward). 
13 newFW.output = SNAT_ALL(fws[(n- -i)].snat, newFw.output). 
14 newFW.output = DNAT_ALL(fws[(n- i)- l].output, newFW.output). 
15 newFW.forward = SNAT _ALL(fws[n- l]:snat, newFw.forward). 
16 newFW.input = SNAT_ALL(fws[n -l].snat, newFw.input). 
17 newFW.output = SNAT_ALL(fws[O].snat, newFw.output). 
18 return newFW. 
Figure 4.14: NAT with multiple firewalls 
The pseudocode in figure 4.14 combines NAT with analysis of multiple firewalls. The 
procedure DNAT _ALL applies the chain of DNAT rules pointed to by its first parameter 
to the rule set MDD specified by the second parameter. The procedure SNAT _ALL works 
similarly for SNAT. 
In order to correctly derive the output chain of the meta-firewall, we work from the 
outermost firewall toward the innermost firewall combining pairs of firewalls. We DNAT 
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the outermost firewall, then enter a loop in which we intersect the result with the unNAT'd 
filter rules of the next firewall to be considered. In each iteration of the loop, we perform 
SNAT on the result of the intersection using the SNAT rules of the first firewall. We then 
DNAT using the DNAT rules of the second firewall. This alternating behavior simulates 
the traversal of a packet first through the PREROUTING chain, then through the filtering 
rules, and finally through the POSTROUTING chain. 
To derive the input and forward chains, we perform the same operations in reverse order, 
working from the innermost firewall to the outermost firewall. 
4.3.1 Correctness of NAT with Composition Operations 
Correctness of the algorithm in figure 4.14 follows directly from the proofs presented for 
the correctness of the NAT algorithm and the MDD intersection. 
From the correctness of the DNAT algorithm, we know that after line 2, newFW.forward 
contains an MDD which accepts exactly those packets accepted by firewall 0. 
To see that the for loop in lines 5 through 14 correctly merges the remaining firewalls 
into newFW.forward, notice that since the intersection algorithm is correct, we know that 
after line 6, newFW.f orward is an MDD which accepts exactly those packets which are 
have passed through firewalls 0 through i - 1 and through the forward chain of firewall i, 
but have not yet been processed by the POSTROUTING chain. From the correctness of 
the SNAT algorithm, we know that after line 7, newFW.forward accepts those packets 
which have passed through all chains of firewalls 0 through i. Therefore, at the end of the 
algorithm, the newFWforward is an MDD which accepts exactly those packets which can 
pass through the filtering and translation chains of all of the firewalls. 
Similarly, we know that the MDD for newFW.input accepts exactly those packets which 
pass through the n- 1 outermost firewalls and the input chain of the innermost firewall and 
the MDD for newFW.output accepts exactly those packets which pass from the innermost 
firewall through the remaining n- 1 firewalls. 
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4.4 Analyzing Firewall Systems with ITVal 
The techniques described in this chapter have been implemented by extending our tool, 
ITVal, to allow analysis of multiple firewalls and firewalls that use address translation. 
To analyze a meta-firewall, the user passes the names of several rule set description files 
on the command line. The order of the filenames must reflect the topology of the firewalls, 
with the innermost filter first on the command line and the outermost filter last. The user 
may optionally specify a topology file that identifies the IP addresses of each interface on 
any firewall host. 
In addition to supporting destination and source NAT, iptables provides two special 
case NAT targets. The REDIRECT target rewrites the destination address of a packet 
so that it will be routed to the firewall itself. The MASQUERADE target rewrites the 
source address of a packet so that it appears to have been originated by the firewall. The 
REDIRECT and MASQUERADE targets are extremely useful for environments in which 
addresses are assigned dynamically, since the address of the original host need not be known 
apriori when designing the rule set. In order to represent REDIRECT and MASQUERADE 
rules, ITVal looks up the IP address of the host in the topology table provided by the user 
and performs SNAT or DNAT using the correct address for that interface. 
Chapter 5 
An Equivalence Class Approach to 
Policy Testing 
Passive tools such as ITVal can make the process of testing and debugging the firewall 
much easier. Writing queries is simpler than constructing the policy, because the queries 
only need to provide a partial specification of the firewall policy. Furthermore, the query 
file is less complex than the rule set, because queries are order independent, while rules in 
a rule set often have very complicated dependencies. 
In theory, passive tools can test every possible behavior of the firewall. In practice, 
however, such a test produces too much unstructured output to be useful. Testing all 
eventualities would produce output for every possible packet seen by the network. Since 
there are 2554 possible source addresses and the same number of destination addresses, 
there are billions of packets to consider - an overwhelming amount of output. Since the 
decision of which behaviors are desirable and which are undesirable must be made by the 
user, the tool is unable to structure these outputs in a way that makes it easy to identify 
incorrect behavior. 
To avoid this problem, the user must carefully construct a set of queries that test for 
specific vulnerabilities. While it is often easier to construct these tests than to inspect the 
rule set manually, it can be difficult to create queries that test enough interesting behaviors 
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to provide confidence in the policy and also produce useful output. 
There is no way to guarantee that all important behaviors have been tested. To obtain 
an ideal set of queries in which exactly those behaviors are tested that could lead to a 
security violation, the administrator would need to be omniscient. 
This means that query-based tools may miss important vulnerabilities. If the system 
administrator fails to provide a test for an important threat, the testing software cannot 
detect that the firewall is vulnerable. Since mistakes that are difficult to catch by manually 
inspecting the rule set are also likely to be overlooked when writing queries, it is likely that 
the query tool will fail to detect a significant number of errors. 
Furthermore, constructing a set of comprehensive and effective queries can be an ex-
tremely challenging task, which requires a significant investment of time and resources. 
Designing good queries requires apriori knowledge of potential firewall problems and famil-
iarity with the subtleties of firewall design. 
This problem is not unique to passive testing tools that use query engines. Active tools 
require the user to decide which behaviors to test. For instance, to use a port scanner, 
the system administrator must provide a list of hosts to analyze. Scanning all ports on 
a few important servers will often catch the most critical vulnerabilities, but it is often 
helpful to also scan individual workstations for less obvious errors. To check for as many 
vulnerabilities as possible, the user must craft a testing pattern that balances running time 
against the number of hosts to scan, the number of ports to check, and the number of 
spoofed source addresses to employ. 
Vulnerability scanners such as Nessus [32] also require a significant amount of user input. 
These tools make use of a database of pre-designed tests. While well-known vulnerabilities 
can usually be caught using the scripts provided with the scanner, creating new tests requires 
learning a sophisticated scripting language. 
One reason firewalls are so difficult to manage is that slight differences in the rule 
set can cause dramatic changes in the behavior of the firewall. For instance, on iptables 
firewalls [17], the filtering policy is specified using ordered chains of rules. In each chain, the 
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first rule that matches a packet is used to determine the fate of the packet. Reversing two 
rules can introduce an error that is difficult to detect, but significantly modifies the behavior 
of the firewall. Other firewall systems have similarly deceptive semantics. For instance, the 
firewall policy on an ipfilters system uses a "last-match" policy to determine the fate of 
the packet [41]. Features such as network address translation and stateful filtering can also 
create opportunities for introducing difficult-to-detect errors. 
Another problem is that subtleties in the syntax of the query language can cause the 
query engine to generate unexpected results. This means that in addition to understanding 
the structure of a firewall policy, the user must learn the intricacies of the query language 
in order to employ the tool effectively. 
QUERY DADDY 
FOR TCP 80 AND 
NOT FROM 192.168.1.*; 
# Addresses: *·*·*·* 
Figure 5.1: Query for detecting web hits from outside an internal network 
The ITVal query given in figure 5.1 might be used to discover which servers provide 
web access to hosts outside the network. The "DADDY" subject tells ITVal to list the 
destination addresses of these machines. The query condition "FOR TCP 80" specifies a 
match against all HTTP packets while the condition "NOT FROM 192.168.1.*" excludes 
internal hosts from consideration. 
Chain FORWARD (policy DROP): 
target prot source destination flags 
1 ACCEPT all 192.168.1.0/24 Anywhere TCP dpt:80 
2 ACCEPT all Anywhere Anywhere state ESTABLISHED 
Figure 5.2: Forwarding chain of a stateful firewall 
For many firewalls, the query in figure 5.1 will work as expected. However, for a stateful 
firewall, such as the iptables rule set of figure 5.2, it is likely that this query will generate 
many false positives. 
QUERY DADDY 
FOR TCP 80 AND 
NOT FROM 192.168.1.* 
AND IN NEW; 
#Addresses: 192.168.1.* 
Figure 5.3: A better query for stateful firewalls 
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When ITVal processes the query against the stateful firewall of figure 5.2, it will report 
that any host can send web traffic through the firewall. This surprising result is correct 
because of a technicality in how stateful filtering works. The rule on line 2 allows arbitrary 
access on established connections. A careful examination of the rule set, however, reveals 
that only machines on the internal network can initiate new connections to the web server. 
A more precise query that examines only new connections is given in figure 5.3. The 
new query correctly reports that only internal hosts can initiate new HTTP connections. 
Although query-based testing tools can be a significant help to the system administra-
tor, they are limited by the user's ability to construct a comprehensive set of useful queries. 
It is difficult to tell whether a set of queries tests every important behavior of the fire-
wall. Furthermore, testing techniques often generate too much output for the user to easily 
distinguish dangerous vulnerabilities from desired behavior. 
Another approach to firewall analysis is to look for errors in the structure of the policy 
specification. Structure analysis tools [1, 22] detect problems such as duplicate or conflicting 
rules. Although these tools do not directly identify vulnerabilities, they often uncover fun-
damental weaknesses in the policy that can produce more significant errors. Some of these 
tools also generate a simpler version of the policy that removes these structural weaknesses. 
The generated policy is often easier to inspect manually than the original policy. 
One significant advantage of structure analysis tools is that they can be fully automatic. 
The only input the user must provide is the firewall policy itself. The tool builds a list of 
anomalies and outputs a report or a restructured version of the policy. Unfortunately, there 
are many types of vulnerabilities that cannot be detected using these tools. For instance, 
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allowing mail traffic from the outside world to certain workstations could be undesirable 
behavior on some networks. A structure analysis tool would not detect a problem of that 
nature unless the rule that permitted the flow of such traffic also conflicted with another 
rule or violated the structural criteria in some other way. 
5.1 Host Classification 
The "Lumeta Firewall Analyzer" [59], a commercially available tool derived from 
FANG [37], combines some of the advantages of a structure analysis tool with the flexibility 
of a passive analysis tool. Lumeta automatically generates a comprehensive set of queries 
by using routing information to classify hosts into groups [59]. This reduces the amount 
of output since results can be provided on a per-subnet or per-zone basis rather than a 
per-host basis. It also automates the process of designing good queries by providing a set 
of hard-coded default tests that cover most of the interesting behaviors on the network. 
The idea of classifying hosts into groups allows a query engine to provide much simpler 
output and addresses the problem of creating good queries. Using the topology of the net-
work to classify hosts, however, has the drawback that hosts with very different properties, 
but that have similar addresses, are grouped together. 
Chain FORWARD (policy DROP): 
target prot source destination flags 
1 ACCEPT all 10.239.202.38 Anywhere dpt tcp:25 
2 ACCEPT all 10.239.202.0/24 10.239.202.38 dpt tcp:25 
Figure 5.4: Controlling mail with a packet filter 
Consider, for instance, the filtering policy shown in figure 5.4. This simple policy re-
stricts outgoing mail from an internal network 10.239.202.0/24. Outgoing traffic is only 
allowed from the mail server, host 10.239.202.38. Other hosts on the subnet are allowed to 
send mail to the mail server, but cannot send mail to each other or to the outside world. 
Incoming SMTP mail traffic from the outside world is also dropped unless it is destined for 
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the mail server. 
A classification based on the network topology would break the network into two groups: 
the set of hosts on 10.239.202.0/24 and the set of all other hosts. However, the mail server is 
a different type of host from the other machines on the network. As a result, queries about 
mail traffic will return imprecise results. For instance, the answer to the query "Can a host 
in 10.239.202.0/24 send mail to the outside world?" will be "yes" since the mail server is 
allowed to forward mail through the firewall. The query "Can all hosts in 10.239.202.0/24 
send mail to the outside world?" will be "no" since the client machines are not allowed to 
send mail to anywhere but the mail server. 
Neither of these queries accurately describes the fundamental organization of the net-
work: a special mail server which can send mail to the outside world and a set of clients 
which cannot. To improve the precision of these queries, we must use a different classifica-
tion scheme that allows us to group hosts by their function as well as by their placement in 
the network topology. 
5.2 Policy-Based Host Classification 
Hosts on a network play a variety of roles. Some hosts are workstations. Some are 
database servers. Some are web servers. Some provide multiple services. The firewall 
policy usually treats these various types of hosts very differently from each other, but treats 
hosts of the same type similarly. This means that the firewall implicitly classifies hosts into 
various groups based on their function. Sometimes the implicit classification of the firewall 
policy is not quite as straightforward as simply sorting hosts by the services they provide. 
For instance, the network may have web servers that provide service exclusively to hosts 
inside the network and a separate block of general purpose web servers that anyone can 
access. The filtering policy for these two kinds of hosts could be drastically different even 
though all of the hosts are web servers. 
The rule set in figure 5.5 prevents hosts on an untrusted network 192.168.2.0/24 from 
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Chain FORWARD (policy DROP): 
target prot source destination flags 
1 DROP all 192.168.2.0/24 192.168.1.0/24 
2 ACCEPT all Anywhere 192.168.1.1 dpt tcp:80 
Figure 5.5: A simple network with four host classes 
accessing systems on a protected network 192.168.1.0/24. Rule 1 divides the set of hosts 
into three groups. One group consists of hosts in the untrusted network. The second group 
contains hosts from the protected network. The third group contains all other hosts on the 
Internet. Rule 2 refines this classification by further restricting which services are available 
to the web server. This defines a fourth group by distinguishing the web server from other 
hosts on the protected network. The fourth group contains only the web server, while the 
third group contains all other protected hosts. 
This classification scheme has many advantages over a topological classification. An 
error in the firewall policy will often cause the firewall to treat similar hosts differently or to 
treat different hosts alike. This means that a classification scheme based on the structure 
of the firewall policy can be used to directly detect many kinds of errors. Furthermore, 
classifying hosts according to their treatment by the firewall produces groups of hosts that 
can be used to increase the precision of query-based testing techniques. 
5.2.1 Calculating Host Classes 
There are several possible ways in which we might use the structure of the firewall policy 
to categorize the hosts on a network. One approach is to search through the firewall policy 
and record every address or group of addresses mentioned in a rule as a separate host class. 
Unfortunately, this naive approach has some serious drawbacks. 
The core difficulty is that the algorithm may generate overlapping classes. For instance, 
the host 192.168.1.1 in figure 5.5 would be represented twice: once in its own class and 
once in the class containing all hosts from the 192.168.1.0/24 subnet. This is undesirable 
because it decreases the precision we can obtain in our analysis. 
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A host that appears in two classes is fundamentally different from the other hosts in 
those classes. To preserve this information, it is preferable to separate these hosts into their 
own classes. This will enable us to obtain more accurate and useful results. 
set CalculateClasses(Policy P): 
1 set C = 0.0.0.0/0. 
2 for each rule r in P: 
3 for each addr_range S in r: 
4 C = InsertAddr(C, S). 
5 return C. 
set InsertAddr(set C, addr_range S): 
1 for each element T of C: 
2 I= IntersectAddress(S,t). 
3 if I is empty: 
4 C = SetAdd(C, S). 
5 return C. 
6 c = SetDelete(C, T). 
7 c = InsertAddr(C, S-I). 
8 c = InsertAddr(C, I). 
9 c = InsertAddr(C, T-I). 
10 return C. 
Figure 5.6: Naive algorithm for computing host classes 
The algorithms in figure 5.6 reduce the amount of overlap by splitting overlapping 
classes into smaller pieces using set operations. The algorithm examines every host and set 
of addresses mentioned explicitly in the rule set. Each new range of addresses is added to 
a set of potential classes, C. 
If a new set of addresses overlaps with an existing class, we break both classes into three 
non-overlapping pieces and replace both original classes with the result. When we have 
considered every address of every rule, the elements of C describe a set of classes that can 
be used to analyze the behavior of the firewall. 
This approach yields an approximation of the firewall designer's view of the network. 
Addresses that are explicitly mentioned usually correspond to important components that 
the designer intended to control. Unfortunately, the technique does not give a perfect 
picture of the actual behavior of the firewall. For instance, the firewall rule set in figure 5. 7 
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Chain FORWARD (policy DROP): 
target prot source destination flags 
1 DROP all 192.168.2.0/24 Anywhere 
2 ACCEPT all Anywhere 192.168.2.0/24 
3 ACCEPT all 192.168.2.0/24 192.168.3.0/24 
Figure 5. 7: Rule set with a shadowed network 
seems at first glance to have three groups. The algorithm will create a group for subnet 
192.168.2.0/24 and for subnet 192.168.3.0/24. It will also create a group representing "all 
other addresses" . 
In reality, hosts on the 192.168.3.0/24 subnet are treated exactly the same as hosts in 
the "all other addresses" group, because rule 3 of the firewall policy is an unreachable rule. 
Since all packets from 192.168.2.0/24 will be dropped in rule 1, no packet can ever match 
rule 3. This is probably an error in the firewall configuration, but the naive algorithm will 
happily report that 192.168.3.0/24 is a separate class. Since this is what the user expects, 
the error will go undetected. 
To correct this problem we need to more carefully define the concept of a host class. We 
do this by constructing an equivalence relation over the set of all network hosts. The equiva-
lence classes determined by this relation will give us a precise and complete characterization 
of the policy that we can use for performing vulnerability analysis. 
5.2.2 Structure-Based Classification 
Every firewall policy can be described as a function, F, that maps the set of all network 
packets to the set {ACCEPT, DROP} of filtering decisions. For a specific packet s, we 
say F(s) =ACCEPT if the packet would be accepted by the firewall and F(s) =DROP 
if the packet would be dropped by the firewall. 
We define an equivalence relation, =so , as follows: let x and y be any two hosts. We 
say that x =s y (pronounced "x and y are source equivalent") if and only if for any two 
packets s from x and t from y that differ only by source address, F(s) = F(t). Similarly, 
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x =o y (pronounced "x andy are destination equivalent") if and only if F(s) = F(t) for 
any two packets s from x and t from y that differ only by destination address. If x =s y 
and x =o y, then we say that x =so y ("x andy are source and destination equivalent"). 
Informally, two hosts are source equivalent if replacing the source address of a packet 
from one host with the source address of the other does not affect the filtering decision of 
the firewall. They are destination equivalent if replacing the destination address does not 
affect the filtering decision. If they are both source and destination equivalent, we say that 
they are equivalent under the relation =so . The relation =so is derived directly from 
the function F, which describes the filtering policy of the firewall and can be computed 
without any other input from the user. 
It can be shown that =so is an equivalence relation, since it is reflexive, transitive, 
and symmetric. This means that =so partitions the set of network hosts into equivalence 
classes. In other words, a packet from a host in a particular equivalence class will only be 
accepted if identical packets from other hosts in the class would also be accepted. 
This means that if one host in the class has a vulnerability, all hosts in the class are 
vulnerable. On the other hand, if that host is adequately protected by the firewall, then all 
the others are too. This guarantee makes the equivalence class paradigm much more useful 
than the naive classification algorithm or a classification based on topology. 
5.2.3 Implementation 
We can use the reduction properties of MDDs to compute the equivalence classes of the 
firewall. Since we are using quasi-reduced MDDs, duplicate nodes are not allowed. This 
means that each node in the MDD represents a distinct class of packets from the other 
nodes at its level. 
In ITVal, we use quasi-reduced MDDs in which duplicate nodes, with all arcs the same, 
are not allowed. This requirement means that each node at level k represents an equivalence 
class over the set of attributes K through k + 1, where level K is the top level of the MDD. 
For instance, node <2: 1> of figure 5.8 represents the source equivalence class containing 
Source 
Address 
Destination 
Address 
Port 
Action 
Figure 5.8: A simplified rule set MDD 
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addresses 0 and 1. Node <2: 2> represents the class containing source address 2. By 
reordering the levels of the MDD, we can calculate equivalence classes over first the source 
address and then the destination address. We can use these intermediate classes to construct 
classes of hosts that are equivalent under the =so relation. 
An extremely simplified example MDD is given in figure 5.8. The top level of the MDD 
corresponds to the source address of a packet, while the second level corresponds to the 
destination address of the packet. The bottom level is a special terminal level representing 
the action that the firewall should take on a packet. The integer value 0 means to drop the 
packet. The integer value 1 means to accept the packet. 
1 Construct the MDD representation of each firewall chain. 
2 For each chain: 
3 Reorder the levels of the chain MDD so that source address is on top. 
4 Record the source equivalence classes. 
5 Reorder the levels of the chain MDD so that destination address is on top. 
6 Record the destination equivalence classes. 
7 Merge the source and destination classes of all three chains together. 
Figure 5.9: Outline of the equivalence class computation algorithm 
An outline of the class generation procedure is given in figure 5.9. In step 1, wegener-
ate an MDD representation for each of the three built-in chains. The MDD representation 
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takes into consideration network address translation and other packet mangling rules, We 
then consider each chain in turn. In steps 3 and 4, we compute a list of source equivalent 
addresses. To do this, we first use a level swapping algorithm to bring the levels encoding 
source address to the top of the graph. The reduction properties of the MDD now guaran-
tee that each node at the level immediately below the source address levels represents an 
equivalence class with respect to source address. Each path from the root node to a node at 
that level represents one element of the equivalence class associated with that node. Step 4 
extracts these equivalence classes and stores them in a new MDD. 
Destination Class 0 
Source Class 0 0.0, 0.1, 1.0 0.0,0.1,1.0,2.0 
Source Class 1 1.1, 2.0, 2.1 Destination Class 1 1.1 
Destination Class 2 2.1 
In the initial MDD, the two 
source address fields are at the 
top, so we do not need to re-
order the levels. Each node 
at the level below these levels 
defines a source equivalence 
class. To find the members of 
that class, we enumerate all 
paths from the root node to 
the node at that level. 
We reorder the MDD so that 
the destination address levels 
are at the top, followed by the 
source address levels. Each 
node in the third level now de-
fines a destination equivalence 
class. The members of each 
class can be found by collect-
ing all paths from the root to 
the nodes at that level. 
Host Class 0 0.0,0.1,1.0 
Host Class 1 1.1 
Host Class 2 2.0 
Host Class 3 2.1 
By merging and splitting the 
source and destination classes, 
we create three new sets for 
each pair of classes. One set 
is constructed from the inter-
section of the two classes. An-
other consists of addresses in 
the destination class, but not 
in the source class. The last 
set contains the source ad-
dresses not in the destination 
class. Empty sets are dis-
carded. The remaining sets 
are the equivalence classes. 
Figure 5.10: Step by step construction of the equivalence classes 
In steps 5 and 6 we perform an identical operation to collect a list of equivalence classes 
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with respect to destination address. When we have considered source and destination 
address in every chain, we now merge the various classes together using MDD union, inter-
section and difference operators. Finally, we print the result. 
A more detailed illustration of the algorithm is given in figure 5.10. 
5.3 Correctness of Equivalence Class Generation 
To show that the equivalence class generation algorithm is correct, we first establish 
that if the top four levels of the MDD represent the source address attributes, each node at 
level K - 4 represents an equivalence class under the =s relation. 
Theorem 5.1 Let 9 be a host with address 90·91·92·93 and let h be a host with address 
ho.h1.h2.h3. Then 9 =s h if and only if, there is a node <(K- 4) :s> such that there exist 
two paths Ps = (eo,e1,e2,e3) and Q8 = Uo,fi,h,h) from the root node <K:r> to node 
<(K- 4): s> for which L(ei) = 9i and L(fi) = hi for all 0 ::; i ::; 3. 
We will first show that each node at level K- 4 defines an equivalence class over the 
attributes at levels K through K - 3. We will then show that each equivalence class 
corresponds to exactly one node at level K - 4. 
Proof: 
Step 1: Let 
and 
Qs = (fo, !I, h, h) 
be paths from <K :r> to <(K- 4) :s>. Further, let L(ei) = 9i and L(fi) =hi for all 
0 ::; i ::; 3. Then 9 =s h. 
Let p be and q be any two packets such that pis from host 9, q is from host h, and p 
and q differ only by source address. To demonstrate that g =s h, we must show that 
F(p) = F(q). 
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Let Pp = ( CK -4, CK -3, ... , CD) be a path from <(K- 4): s> to the terminal node 
representing F(p) such that L(ci) = p[i] for all 0 ~ i ~ K- 4. Since p and q differ 
only by source address, we also know that L( Ci) = q[i] for all 0 ~ i ~ K- 3. Since Pp 
is a path from <(K- 4): s> to the terminal node for F(p), and Q5 is a path from the 
root node to <(K- 4): s>, the path P = (fo, JI, h, h, CK-4, Ck-3, ... , CD) is a path 
from the root node to the terminal node for F(p) .. But this means that F(p) = F(q). 
Since this is true for any packets p from g and q from h that differ only by source 
address, g =s h. 
Step 2: Let g =s h. Then there is a node <(K- 4) :p> such that for every packets from g 
and every packet t from h that differ only by source address, node <(K- 4) :p> lies 
on both the path Ps = (eo, e1, ... , eK) and Pt = (fo, JI, ... , fK) where L(ei) = s[i] 
and L(fi) = t[i] for all 0 ~ i ~ K. 
In order to prove that each equivalence class corresponds to a node at level K - 4, 
we prove the more general proposition that at every level k, and for every pair of 
packets s from g and t from h that differ only by source address, the paths Ps and 
Pt pass through some node <k :p>, where Ps =(eo, e1, ... , eK ), Pt = (fo, JI, ... , fK ), 
L(ei) = s[i] for all 0 ~ i ~ K and L(fi) = t[i] for all 0 ~ i ~ K. 
We proceed by induction k. 
Base Case Let k = 0. Then, for all packets s from g and t from h that differ 
only by source address, the path P5 = (eo,ei, ... ,eK) such that L(ei) = s[i] for all 
0 ::=:; i ::=:; K passes through terminal node <0 : s> and the path Pt = (fo, h, ... , f K) 
passes through terminal node <O:t>. Since g =s h, we know that F(s) = F(t). 
Therefore, <0: s> = <0: t>, so both paths pass through the same node. 
Induction Hypothesis Let k = n ~ K - 4. Then, for all packets s from g and t 
from h, the path P5 =(eo, e1, ... , eK) such that L(ei) = s[i] for all 0 ~ i ~ K passes 
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through node <k: s>, and the path Pt = (fo, h, ... , eK) such that L(fi) = t[i] for all 
0 :::; i :::; K passes through the same node, node <k: p>. 
Induction Step Let k = n + 1. Then, for all packets s from g and t from h, the 
path Ps =(eo, e1, ... , eK) such that L(ei) = s[i] for all 0:::; i:::; K passes through node 
<( n + 1): s>, and the path Pt = (fo, h, ... , !K) such that L(fi) = t[i] for all 0 :::; i :::; 
K passes through node <( n + 1) : t>. Suppose, in order to obtain a contradiction, that 
<( n + 1): s> i- <( n + 1): t>. Then, since we do not allow duplicate nodes in a quasi-
reduced MDD, there exists some value j such that <(n + 1) :s>[j] i- <(n + 1) :t>[j]. 
Now consider the packet s obtained from s by changing attribute k to value j and 
the packet i obtained from t by changing attribute k to value j. Since s differs from 
t only by source address, s differs from i only by source address. 
By the induction hypothesis, we have that the path Ps = (ao, a1, ... , aK) such that 
L(ai) = s[i] for all 0 :::; i :::; K and the path Pi = (bo, b1, ... , bK) for all 0 :::; 
i :::; K both pass through node <n:p>. But this contradicts the conclusion that 
<(n+1):s>[j] i- <(n+1):t>[j], since <(n+1):s>[j] = <n:s> = <n:p> and 
<(n + 1) :t>[j] = <n:i> = <n:p>. 
Therefore, for all packets s from g and t from h that differ only by source address, 
we have that Ps = (eo,el, ... ,eK) and Pt = Uo,JI, ... ,JK), where L(ei) = s[i] and 
L(fi) = t[i] for all 0:::; i:::; K, both pass through some node <K- 4: s>. 
• 
Thus, each class of the relation =s corresponds to a unique node at level K - 4 and 
each node at level K - 4 represents exactly one equivalence class of the =s relation. 
Using the same strategy as in the proof above, we can show that if the top four levels 
represent the destination address, each class of the relation =n corresponds to a node at 
level K- 4. This means that we can obtain both the =s relation and the relation =n by 
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enumerating nodes of the quasi-reduced MDD. By combining these results, we can compute 
all classes of the =so relation. 
5.4 Error Detection 
The information provided by the host classification algorithm can be extremely useful 
for detecting errors in the firewall policy. The list of classes is usually much shorter and 
simpler than the rule set, so it is easier for a system administrator to examine. Also, since 
the hosts tend to be categorized according to their intended functionality, the class list 
reinforces intuition and makes discovery of the error a much more straightforward process 
for the administrator. 
5.4.1 Detecting Remotely Accessible Services 
Chain FORWARD (policy DROP): 
target prot source destination flags 
1 ACCEPT all Anywhere 192.168.3.0/24 TCP dpt:80 
2 ACCEPT all 192.168.2.0/24 Anywhere 
3 DROP all 168.192.1.0/24 Anywhere 
4 ACCEPT all Anywhere 192.168.2.20 TCP dpt:25 
5 ACCEPT all 192.168.1.0/24 Anywhere 
Figure 5.11: Rule set with errors 
Simple errors such as typos and rule transpositions can often be detected by the presence 
of a strange and unexpected class of hosts. The policy in figure 5.11 is intended to protect 
networks 192.168.1.0/24, 192.168.2.0/24, and 192.168.3.0/24 by restricting access from the 
outside world. Because 192.168.1.0/24 contains several hosts with important financial in-
formation, outgoing traffic from that subnet should also be restricted. Mail traffic from the 
other subnets is allowed only to the mail server (host 192.168.2.20) to prevent compromised 
machines from becoming spam relays. The rule set also allows arbitrary web access to a 
group of web application servers located on the 192.168.3.0/24 subnet. The policy contains 
several errors, including a typo in rule 3 that allows remote access to a protected service. 
Class 0: 192.168.3.* 
Class 1: 168.192.1.* 
Class 2: 192.168.1.* 
192.168.2. [0-19] 
192.168.2. [21-255] 
Class 3: 192.168.2.20 
Class 4: [0.0.0.0]-[168.192.0.255] 
[168.192.2.0]-[192.168.0.255] 
[192.168.4.0]-[255.255.255.255] 
Figure 5.12: Equivalence classes for figure 5.11 
108 
The equivalence classes of this example network are listed in figure 5.12. There are five 
classes of hosts identified by the algorithm. Class 0 represents the group of web servers. 
Class 1 represents a strange class of hosts that is created by the typo in rule 3. The strange, 
unexpected class makes the effect of the typo immediately obvious to the administrator. 
While this may not directly allow him to diagnose and repair the problem, it does provide 
a significant amount of information about the error. In this case, the user can look for rules 
which refer to the 168.192.1.0/24 network, rather than pouring over the entire policy to 
discover the cause of the error. 
Class 2 combines the protected financial network and the unprotected 192.168.2.0 net-
work, minus the mail server. This should also arouse the analyst's suspicion since the fi-
nancial network is supposed to have much stricter protection than the unprotected subnet. 
The fact that they are treated the same by the firewall indicates that a serious vulnerability 
exists. Class 3 contains the mail server. It is in a class by itself since it requires special 
privileges in order to accept and relay mail. Everything else belongs to class 4. 
Using the equivalence classes to detect these errors is much easier than using query 
based tools. The presence of a class of hosts consisting entirely of strange addresses is a 
clear indication of an error in the policy. Since the tool requires no input but the policy, all 
the user has to do to discover the error is "fire and forget". 
A small amount of work is required to interpret the results of the classification system, 
but compared to the effort of constructing precise queries or compiling a list of hosts for 
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active testing, using the equivalence classes is fairly simple. For large installations, the gain 
is even greater due to the number of rules required to administer a large number of hosts 
and the greater difficulty of specifying a comprehensive set of queries that covers all the 
services provided by the network. 
5.4.2 Detecting Shadowed Rules 
If a packet matches more than one rule in the policy, the firewall will use the first rule 
that matches. This can mean that the policy contains useless or unreachable rules. The 
presence of these rules usually indicates an error in the policy. 
Chain FORWARD (policy DROP): 
target prot source destination flags 
1 ACCEPT all 192.168.2.0/24 Anywhere TCP dpt:80 
2 ACCEPT all 192.168.2.0/24 192.168.3.0/24 TCP dpt:80 
3 DROP all 192.168.2.0/24 192.168.4.0/24 TCP dpt:80 
Figure 5.13: Rule set with shadowed rules 
When one rule shadows another, the class list will often contain fewer classes than 
expected. For instance, the rule set in figure 5.13 contains two rules that are shadowed 
by rule 1. Rule 2 is a useless rule. Web packets from 192.168.2.0/24 to 192.168.3.0/24 
are already accepted by rule 1. Rule 3 is also unreachable. The class list for the example 
network is given in figure 5.14. 
Class 0: 
Class 1: 
192.168.2.* 
[0.0.0.0]-[192.168.1.255] 
[192.168.3.0]-[255.255.255.255] 
Figure 5.14: Equivalence classes for figure 5.13 
Notice that there are no classes for the networks 192.168.3.0/24 and 192.168.4.0/24 
mentioned in rules 2 and 3. These networks are included in class 1, the "all other hosts" 
class. When the system administrator discovers that the policy produces fewer classes than 
expected, she will examine the policy more closely and find the error or errors. Shadowed 
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rules often indicate that a rule contains an incorrect address. For instance, one way in which 
rules 2 and 3 may have become shadowed is if the source address in rule 1 was supposed to 
be 192.168.3.0/24, but was typed incorrectly. 
5.4.3 Detecting Outdated Services 
Chain FORWARD (policy DROP): 
target prot source destination flags 
1 ACCEPT all 192.168.2.0/24 Anywhere TCP dpt:22 
2 ACCEPT all 192.168.4.0/24 Anywhere TCP dpt:8080 
3 DROP all 192.168.4.0/24 192.168.2.0/24 TCP dpt:25 
Figure 5.15: Rule set with outdated rules 
Host classification can solve real world problems. One of our firewalls originally sup-
ported a wireless network on subnet 192.168.4.0/24. When wireless service was transferred 
to another network, we neglected to update the firewall rules. A portion of our rule set 
looked something like figure 5.15. A quick analysis using host classification immediately 
identified subnet 192.168.4.0 as a host group, enabling us to correct the problem. This 
error would have been very difficult to detect using query-based analysis tools. Without 
apriori knowledge of the error, we had no reason to create a query testing for service on 
that subnet. Active analysis tools like Nessus would have detected no vulnerabilities, since 
no hosts were available on that subnet. Using host classification, however, we were able to 
immediately identify a serious weakness in our policy. 
5.5 Using Equivalence Classes with Other Tools 
While a system administrator can detect many important vulnerabilities simply by 
studying the host equivalence classes of a firewall policy, even greater gains can be achieved 
by combining the equivalence class analysis with active and passive testing techniques. To 
combine the analysis with other testing paradigms, we can use the equivalence classes to 
determine which groups of systems to test. We can then perform active or passive testing 
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on a small selection of systems from each class, rather than on each host individually. By 
taking one or two systems from each equivalence class, rather than testing a random selec-
tion of hosts, we decrease the number of tests that we must perform, while increasing the 
probability that we have tested all the important behaviors of the firewall. 
Chain FORWARD (policy DROP): 
target prot source destination flags 
1 ACCEPT all Anywhere 10.239.202.13 TCP dpt:25 
2 ACCEPT all 10.239.202.13 Anywhere TCP dpt:25 
3 ACCEPT all 192.168.2.3 Anywhere TCP dpt:25 
4 ACCEPT all 192.168.2.3 Anywhere TCP dpt:22 
5 DROP all 192.168.2.0/24 Anywhere TCP dpt:25 
Figure 5.16: Rule set for preventing spam relays 
The filtering policy in figure 5.16 secures the mail service on an internal network 
192.168.2.0/24. Mail from the internal network can only be sent to the mail server, host 
10.239.202.13. The mail server is allowed to distribute mail to both internal and external 
hosts. All other mail traffic should be dropped. Unfortunately, a copy and paste error 
created rule 3 of the policy, which allows mail traffic from a workstation, host 192.168.2.3 
to escape the network. If that workstation is compromised, an intruder can set up a spam 
relay on that host and transmit thousands of unauthorized messages through the firewall. 
Class 0: 
Class 1: 
Class 2: 
Class 3: 
10.239.202.13 
192.168.2.3 
192.168.2. [0-2] 
192.168.2.[4-255] 
[0.0.0.0]- [10.239.202.13] 
[10.239.202.14-192.168.1.255] 
(192.168.3.0-255.255.255.255] 
Figure 5.17: Equivalence classes for figure 5.16 
The system administrator can easily detect this problem by combining host classification 
with a passive testing tool. The host classes for the example network are listed in figure 5.17. 
Class 0 contains the mail server. Class 1 contains the workstation which can circumvent 
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QUERY DPORT TO QUERY DPORT TO QUERY DPORT TO QUERY DPORT TO 
10.239.202.13 10.239.202.13 10.239.202.13 10.239.202.13 
AND FROM AND FROM AND FROM AND FROM 
10.239.202.13 192.168.2.3 192.168.2.1 192.168.3.0 
AND IN NEW; AND IN NEW; AND IN NEW; AND IN NEW; 
1 Port: 25 2 Ports: 22 25 1 Port: 25 1 Port: 25 
QUERY DPORT TO QUERY DPORT TO QUERY DPORT TO QUERY DPORT TO 192.168.2.3 
AND FROM 192.168.2.3 AND 192.168.2.3 AND 192.168.2.3 AND 
10.239.202.13 FROM 192.168.2.3 FROM 192.168.2.1 FROM 192.168.3.0 AND IN NEW; AND IN NEW; AND IN NEW; AND IN NEW; 2 Ports: 22 25 0 Ports: 0 Ports: 1 Port: 25 
QUERY DPORT TO QUERY DPORT TO QUERY DPORT TO QUERY DPORT TO 192.168.2.1 
AND FROM 192.168.2.1 AND 192.168.2.1 AND 192. 168.2. 1 AND 
10.239.202.13 FROM 192.168.2.3 FROM 192.168.2.1 FROM 192.168.3.0 
AND IN NEW; AND IN NEW; AND IN NEW; AND IN NEW; 
1 Port: 25 2 Ports: 22 25 0 Ports: 0 Ports: 
QUERY DPORT TO QUERY DPORT TO QUERY DPORT TO QUERY DPORT TO 192.168.3.0 
AND FROM 192.168. 3. 0 AND 192.168.3.0 AND 192.168.3.0 AND 
10.239.202.13 FROM 192.168.2.3 FROM 192.168.2.1 FROM 192.168.3.0 
AND IN NEW; AND IN NEW; AND IN NEW; AND IN NEW; 
1 Port: 25 2 Ports: 22 25 0 Ports: 0 Ports: 
Figure 5.18: Queries auto-generated using host classes 
the security policy. Class 2 contains the remainder of the 192.168.2.0/24 subnet. Class 3 
contains all other hosts on the Internet. 
By taking a source address from each of these groups and matching it with a destination 
address from each of the groups, we can construct the sixteen ITVal queries described 
in figure 5.18. While the increased amount of output makes it slightly more difficult to 
interpret these results, combining equivalence class analysis with the query analysis does 
help us find the problem. The query results show that the SMTP port on host 192.168.3.0 
can be accessed by host 192.168.2.3. Since 192.168.3.0 is an external host, the system 
administrator should recognize this as a legitimate security concern. 
Using the query tools by themselves would either have produced an enormous amount 
of data or required a large time investment in writing queries. However, by combining 
classification with passive testing, we are able to limit the scope of the query to the important 
distinctions between hosts. This combination also requires very little work by the user. 
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5.6 Advantages of Policy-based Classification 
Policy-based host classification has several significant advantages over existing firewall 
analysis techniques. Examining the classes implicitly defined by the firewall policy allows a 
system administrator to detect many kinds of firewall errors and anomalies. When combined 
with active or passive testing tools, the technique can be even more powerful. Using the 
equivalence classes significantly decreases the amount of the work required to verify the 
policy and is a step toward a fully automatic firewall analysis solution. The equivalence 
classes are also easy to extend. A recently published paper [52] adapts our technique to 
"packet classification automata", a formalism similar to fully-reduced MDDs. This allows 
them to produce classes over attributes other than the source and destination address. 
Chapter 6 
Guided Repair of Firewall Policies 
Queries and equivalence class analysis address the problem of detecting errors in a fire-
wall policy. Using this information, the system administrator can examine the firewall rule 
set and attempt to repair the firewall. To accomplish this, however, the system adminis-
trator must not only discover the existence of an error but determine which rules in the 
policy are incorrect. For policies with hundreds of rules, or policies distributed across mul-
tiple firewalls, tracing a problem to its source can be tedious and expensive, even when the 
existence of an error is obvious. This is a significant burden. Tracing through dozens or 
perhaps hundreds of correct rules to find the two or three critical inconsistencies can take 
hours or even days. 
To address this issue, we present two novel techniques for performing a "directed repair" 
of the firewall policy. Using these techniques, a system administrator can trace an error to 
its root causes without an expensive manual inspection of the rule set. 
6.1 Existing Techniques 
Both active and passive tools can be used for error detection in a policy, but most of 
these tools provide only a limited amount of information about each error. For instance, if 
the system administrator uses passive tools to analyze the query "Which hosts can connect 
to the mail server?", the analysis engine will list those hosts that have unwanted access to 
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the server, but will not provide any additional information that can be used to understand 
why the firewall failed to deny them access. It may be that the error only occurs when 
connections are made on a particular network interface or for a particular type of network 
traffic. While access to this information could greatly assist the system administrator in 
repairing the policy, traditional tools do not provide these helpful clues. 
The system administrator can sometimes obtain helpful information by refining a query 
to provide more information or by using multiple queries to obtain additional data. Unfor-
tunately, the process of developing a sufficiently detailed set of queries requires almost as 
much effort as manual repair of the policy. Furthermore, effective refinement of the query 
set requires apriori knowledge both of significant threats to the network and potential weak-
nesses in the firewall. If the system administrator does not have enough information to be 
able to pose a useful query, he is out of luck. 
This means that query tools are usually limited to detecting whether an error exists and 
have only limited utility for guiding repair of the policy. To repair the policy by hand, the 
system administrator must carefully consider each filtering rule to determine whether it is 
relevant to the error and, if so, whether it is correct. Since most of the rules will usually 
be irrelevant or already correct, manual repair is a very inefficient and time consuming 
process. When an error has many potential causes, debugging the policy can be especially 
difficult, since it may be challenging to distinguish the real cause of the problem from other 
possibilities. 
Active tools also provide only a limited amount of information about an error. For 
instance, suppose the system administrator uses a port scanner to detect that SSH traffic 
is blocked to a critical host. There are several reasons the port may be blocked: the SSH 
daemon may have crashed, the hosts.allow file may contain errors, or the firewall may be 
blocking the port. The port scanner does not provide any information that will enable the 
administrator to distinguish between these scenarios. When the problem is caused by an 
error in the policy, the port scanner can provide no information about which chain of the 
policy is responsible for the error. Therefore, the system administrator must investigate all 
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of these potential problems manually. This process is almost as tedious and error prone as 
manual inspection of the firewall policy. 
Chain FORWARD (policy DROP): 
target prot source destination input interface flags 
1 DROP all anywhere 192.168.1.0/24 eth1 
2 DROP all 192.168.3.0/22 anywhere any 
3 ACCEPT all anywhere 192.168.1.4 any dpt:tcp 80 
4 DROP all anywhere 192.168.1.0/24 any 
5 ACCEPT all 192.168.1.0/24 anywhere any 
Figure 6.1: An example rule set 
Figure 6.1 shows how difficult it can be to trace an error in the policy to its source. This 
rule set protects subnet 192.168.1.0/24 against attacks from the outside world. The system 
administrator wants to allow access to the web server, host 192.168.1.4, from any system in 
the outside world except those on an unsecured wireless network 192.168.3.0/24. 
An attempt to access the web server from a host on the 192.168.1.0/24 subnet will very 
quickly demonstrate that the rule set given in the figure fails to enforce the desired policy. 
Instead, hosts on the trusted subnet are prevented from accessing the web server. 
Determining the cause of the error is far more difficult. Almost any rule of the policy 
could be at fault. An error in rule 4, which drops traffic to the protected subnet, could be 
the source of the error. An error in rule 3, which overrides rule 4 to allow web traffic to 
enter the network could also cause the problem. Rule 1, an anti-spoofing rule which blocks 
traffic from the "wrong" interface, could also be to blame. 
As it turns out, none of these rules causes the error. The error is created by an incorrect 
subnet mask in rule 2, which causes the firewall to block traffic from the protected network 
as well as the untrusted net. A manual analysis of the policy would require a careful and 
tedious inspection of every rule in the policy to identify this problem. While this process 
might not take long for the five rule policy shown here, a policy with more than a few dozen 
rules would be much more difficult to inspect. Partially automating the repair process in 
a way that narrows down the potential sources of the error to just one or two rules could 
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save the administrator a significant amount of effort. 
6.2 Partially Automated Firewall Repair 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to fully automate repair of a generic firewall policy be-
cause incorrect behavior on one network may be expected behavior on another. For instance, 
on one network it may be desirable to allow SMTP traffic to reach certain hosts, such as the 
mail servers. On another network, however, a policy that permits SMTP traffic may enable 
infected machines to send spam to systems outside the network. Without input from the 
user, a repair algorithm cannot distinguish between these two cases. 
While a fully automatic strategy for firewall repair is impossible, partial automation is 
possible. Gouda, Liu, et al. [22] have done significant work on repair of structural errors 
in the firewall policy. Their technique uses transformation of decision diagrams to produce 
an improved rule set in which problems such as shadowed or duplicate rules have been 
eliminated without any input from the user. Unfortunately, these techniques do not address 
repair of logical errors such as typos or out-of-order rules. 
Ariother approach is to allow the user to make the final decision about how to repair the 
policy, but automate the process of determining the root causes of the error. By providing 
information about the possible causes of the problem, we can guide her toward a limited 
set of solutions from which she can choose the one best suited to her network and policy 
goals. This "directed repair" of the policy alleviates much of the tedious work required to 
fix the policy. 
6.3 Directed Repair 
In previous chapters, we explored ways to detect errors in a firewall configuration using 
logical queries and an equivalence class decomposition of the network. In this chapter, 
we describe two novel techniques that enable directed repair of the firewall policy. One 
technique generates relevant counterexamples from which the system administrator can 
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obtain detailed information about security failures in the policy. The second technique 
provides an extensive "history analysis" that identifies potential sources of the error and 
lists rules which should be considered for modification. 
To use these techniques, the user specifies the desired behavior of the firewall using 
logical assertions. The syntax for assertions is derived from the query language explained 
in previous chapters. The right and left conditions of the assertion are built from the same 
primitives as those in chapter 3. 
For example, we can match all accepted SSH packets from subnet 192.168.1.0/24 on 
interface ethO with the condition "FOR TCP 22 AND FROM 192.168.1.* AND INFACE 
ethO AND (ACCEPTED forward OR ACCEPTED input)". 
Using these conditions, the user can construct two types of assertions to describe the 
expected behavior of the packet filter. These assertions allow the user to describe important 
high-level security invariants which the policy should always satisfy. Equality assertions have 
the form: ASSERT <A> IS <B> where A and B are conditions. Containment assertions 
have the form ASSERT <A> SUBSET OF <B>. 
Equality assertions specify that those packets which match condition A are exactly 
those that match condition B. Containment assertions specify that the match set of A is 
(non-strictly) contained in match set B. 
For instance, the containment assertion "ASSERT FROM 192. 168. 2. * 
SUBSET OF DROPPED FORWARD;" specifies that any packet from subnet 192.168.2.0/24 is 
dropped. The equality assertion "ASSERT FROM 192 .168. 1. * IS (FOR TCP 80 
AND ACCEPTED forward)" can be used to check that only HTTP packets are allowed to 
enter the network from the 192.168.1.0/24 subnet and that no other web connections are 
allowed by the firewall. 
We call the set of packets that match a condition its "match set" and the set of packets 
that cause an assertion to fail the assertion's "fail set". We can easily represent each match 
set as an MDD using the technique given in chapter 3 for creating an MDD representation 
of a query condition. 
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We can then combine the match set MDDs together to generate an MDD representation 
of the fail set. By examining the fail set MD D, we can determine whether or not the assertion 
evaluates to true or false. 
bool testContainmentAssertion(condition A, condition B): 
1 mddA condition_toJMDD(A) 
2 mddB = condition_toJMDD(B) 
3 notB = MDD_complement(mddB) 
4 resultMDD = MDD_intersect(mddA, notB) 
5 if notEmpty(resultMDD) then: 
6 return ASSERTION_FAILED 
7 else: 
8 return ASSERTIONJHELD 
Figure 6.2: Checking a containment assertion 
Figure 6.2 gives pseudocode for determining whether a containment assertion holds. 
Lines 1 and 2 of the algorithm generate MDD representations of each condition in the 
assertion. Line 3 uses an MDD complement operation in to find the set of packets which 
do not match condition B, the right-hand side of the assertion. Line 4 intersects the MDD 
returned by the complement operation with the MDD representing condition A, the left-
hand side of the assertion, to find the fail set of the assertion. If the assertion fails, this 
resulting set will be non-empty, as illustrated by the left hand side of figure 6.3. If the 
assertion holds, we obtain the situation on the right hand side, in which the fail set is 
empty. 
Assertion fails. Assertion holds. 
Figure 6.3: Fail sets for the SUBSET OF operator 
Pseudocode for testing an equality assertion is given in figure 6.4. As in the algorithm for 
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evaluating a containment assertion, we use MDD complement and intersection operations, 
as above, to find the set of packets which match condition A, but not condition B, as 
above. However, in lines 3 and 6, we repeat the process, switching A and B, to find the 
set of packets which match condition B but not condition A. Line 7 combines the resulting 
MDDs together using the MDD union operation to obtain the fail set for the assertion. 
bool TestiSAssertion(condition A, condition B): 
1 mddA = condition_toJMDD(A) 
2 mddB = condition_toJMDD(B) 
3 notA = MDD_complement(mddA) 
4 notB = MDD_complement(mddB) 
5 resultA = MDD_intersect(mddA, notB) 
6 resultB = MDD_intersect(notA, mddB) 
7 resultMDD = MDD_union(resultA, resultB) 
8 if notEmpty(resultMDD) then: 
9 return ASSERTION_FAILED 
10 else: 
11 return ASSERTIONJHELD 
Figure 6.4: Checking an equality assertion 
If the fail set is non-empty, we have the situation illustrated by the left hand side of 
figure 6.5 and the assertion fails. If the fail set is empty, we have the situation given on the 
right hand side and the assertion holds true. 
Assertion fails. Assertion holds. 
Figure 6.5: Fail sets for the IS operator 
Using these techniques, we can determine whether or not a firewall policy satisfies a set 
of assertions. We can also extend these techniques to provide detailed information about 
the firewall policy and enable directed repair. 
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6.4 Relevant Counterexamples 
One useful extension of our MDD techniques is the generation of relevant counterexam-
ples that illustrate the failure of an assertion. These counterexamples provide a context for 
the error which can often help the administrator discover why a failure has occurred. 
Chain FORWARD (policy DROP): 
target prot source destination input interface flags 
1 ACCEPT all anywhere 192.168.1.0/24 ethO dpt:tcp 22 
2 ACCEPT all anywhere 131.106.3.253 eth1 
3 DROP all 63.118.7.16 anywhere ethO 
4 DROP all 192.168.2.0/24 anywhere any 
5 ACCEPT all anywhere anywhere any dpt:tcp 80 
Figure 6.6: An incorrect forwarding chain 
The example policy in figure 6.6 isolates an untrusted research network 192.168.2.0/24 
from the outside world. SSH traffic from the untrusted network to hosts on subnet 
192.168.1.0/24 is accepted, but all other traffic from that network is denied. The 
192.168.1.0/24 subnet contains several world-accessible web servers to which the policy 
grants access. The rule set blocks connections from 63.118.7.16, a malicious host. Trusted 
hosts are allowed to make connections to the web servers and an external server, host 
131.106.3.253, but cannot make any other connections. 
To test whether the untrusted hosts are sufficiently restricted by the firewall, the ad-
ministrator uses the assertion "ASSERT (FROM 192.168.2. * AND NOT FOR TCP 22) 
SUBSET OF DROPPED FORWARD" which specifies that only SSH traffic is accepted 
from hosts on the untrusted network. Due to an error in the ordering of rules 2 and 4, the 
assertion will fail. This subtle error could be very difficult to detect manually in a lengthier 
policy in which the rules were much further apart. Using ITVal, however, the administrator 
can easily discover that the assertion fails. 
Knowing that the assertion does not hold is an important first step, but does not give 
much information about the cause of the error. To give the user more information about 
the source of the error, we generate a counterexample - a packet that demonstrates the 
ASSERT EXAMPLE (FROM 192.128.2.* AND NOT FOR TCP 22) 
SUBSET OF DROPPED FORWARD; 
Assertion failed. Counterexample: 
TCP packet from 192.168.2.1:6362[eth1] to 131.106.3.253:25[eth1] 
in state NEW with flags[]. 
Figure 6. 7: Counterexample for the example assertion 
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falsity of the assertion. Figure 6. 7 shows the generation of one possible counterexample. 
Examination of the counterexample gives the system administrator important informa-
tion about the assertion failure. One significant clue is that the example packet arrived on 
interface ethl. Since only rule 2 mentions ethl, this fact draws the administrator's imme-
diate attention to rule ordering error. The destination address is also a helpful clue, since 
only rule 2 allows traffic specifically to host 131.106.3.353. Using either of these clues, the 
user can now correct the error by moving rule 2 to the correct location in the policy. 
packet testContainmentAssertion(condition A, condition B): 
1 mddA = condition_toJMDD(A). 
2 mddB = condition_toJMDD(B). 
3 notB = MDD_complement(mddB). 
4 resultMDD = MDD_intersect(mddA, notB). 
5 if notEmpty(resultMDD) then: 
6 return choose_element(resultMDD). 
7 else: 
8 return choose_element(mddA). 
Figure 6.8: Generating an example for a subset assertion 
To generate the counterexample for an assertion, we change the algorithms in figure 6.2 
and figure 6.4 to return an arbitrary element from the fail set by replacing the last four 
lines of each algorithm as shown in figure 6.8. 
The function choose_element(X) picks an arbitrary element from the set represented by 
MDD X. If the assertion fails, we choose an element from the fail set as the counterexample. 
If the assertion succeeds, we choose an element from the match set of the left-hand condition 
as a witness, since the elements of that set must match both conditions. To select an element, 
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the choose_element function walks the MDD from the root node to the bottom of the graph, 
arbitrarily selecting arcs at each level (in practice, we select the first non-zero arc of each 
node) and storing each selected attribute in a "packet" structure which can be printed at 
the end of the traversal. 
6.5 Rule History 
Counterexamples provide the system administrator with a great deal of information 
about the causes of an assertion failure. Nevertheless, tracing an error to the rules that cause 
the problem can be difficult even when a good counterexample is available. Fortunately, 
we can extend the example generation technique to provide the user with even more useful 
information about the potential causes of the firewall error. We do this by using MDDs to 
create a "history map" that allows us to remember which packets match each rule of the 
policy. 
Using the history map, we associate packets in an assertion's fail set with a small number 
of filtering rules, which the administrator should examine for errors. This permits the 
administrator to narrow his inspection of the policy to just a few critical areas. Since the 
set of rules to examine includes every rule that may match a packet in the assertion's critical 
set, it is possible that we may list some correct rules as well as the incorrect ones. However, 
constructing the history map allows the system administrator to ignore many rules that are 
completely unrelated to the problem. 
Given a packet p, we define the history set of p, H(p), to be the set of rules in the 
firewall that match p. Formally, we say H(p) = {ripE M(r)}. Given a set of packets, P, 
the history set of p is given by H(P) = upEP H(p), that is, the history set of p is the 
union of the history sets of each member of p. Another way to say this is that the history 
set contains all the rules that match any packet of P. 
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6.6 Implementing Rule History 
In order to build the history map, assign a unique identifier to each of the firewall policies 
provided by the user. For each firewall, we also assign a unique identifier to each chain of 
the policy and give each rule of the chain an integer index. 
During construction of the MDD for each chain of the firewall, we construct a "history 
MDD" representing the rule set of the policy. The history MDDs are constructed similarly 
to the rule set MDDs, but have three extra levels at the bottom of the graph. The extra 
levels store the firewall identifier, chain identifier, and index for each rule. We assign index 
0 to the default policy and index the remaining rules in each chain sequentially starting 
from 1. Pseudocode for constructing a history MDD for a rule is given in figure 6.9. 
node_index MakeHistMDD(ParsedRule pr, int rule.index, int chain.index, int fw_index) 
1 old = MATCHES. 
2 node n =NewNode(1). 
3 <1 :n>[rule_index] =old. 
4 old =CheckForDuplicates( n). 
5 n =NewNode(2). 
6 <2:n>[chain_index] =old. 
7 old =CheckForDuplicates(n). 
8 n =NewNode(3). 
9 <3:n>[fw_index] =old. 
10 old =CheckForDuplicates(n). 
11 fork= 4 to K + 3: 
12 n = NewNode(k). 
13 fori= 0 to MaxValue(k- 3): 
14 if i 2:: pr[k- 3].low and i:::; pr[k- 3].high: 
15 <k: n> [i] = old. 
16 old =CheckForDuplicates(n). 
17 return n. 
Figure 6.9: Algorithm for building a history MDD for a rule 
Lines 1 through 10 of the algorithm create nodes to represent the rule index, chain 
index, and firewall index. The for loop in lines 11 through 16 creates one new node at each 
level of the MDD which identifies which packets match the rule. 
We construct the history MDD for a chain using an MDD union operation to combine 
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the history MDDs of each rule in the chain. The history MDD for each rule is created 
on-the-fly during generation of the rule set MDD for a chain. If we encounter a rule which 
matches packets already matched by some other rule, the union operation ensures that the 
history MDD for the chain maps those packets to both rules. 
Chain FORWARD (policy DROP): 
target prot source destination flags 
1 ACCEPT all 192.168.2.0/24 anywhere 
2 DROP all anywhere 192.168.3.0/23 
3 ACCEPT all anywhere anywhere dpt:tcp 25 
Figure 6.10: Example Rule Set 
An example history MDD for the rule set of figure 6.10 is given in figure 6.11. To 
save space, only the levels for source address, destination address, protocol, destination 
port, firewall index, chain index, and rule index are represented in the figure. The source 
address and destination address are each represented by four levels of the MDD. These 
levels correspond to each octet of the address. The destination port is represented using 
two levels. The top level corresponds to the most-significant byte of the port and the level 
below it corresponds to the least-significant byte. By following the right-most path of the 
MDD, you can see that a packet from 192.168.2.4 to 192.168.4.9 on TCP port 25 will match 
rules 0, 1, 2, and 3 of chain 2 (in this example chain 2 is the FORWARD chain of the 
firewall). 
In addition to constructing history MDDs for the built-in chains of the firewall, we create 
history MDDs for each assertion by simply appending "wildcard nodes" to the bottom of 
the MDDs for the fail set. These wildcard nodes match every rule in every chain. 
By intersecting the fail set history MDD with the history MDD for a rule set, we obtain 
a MDD which represents a mapping from the critical packets that cause an assertion to fail 
to the rules that they match. This history map can be used to generate a list of rules which 
the system administrator should consider as important to the failure of the assertion. 
An example MDD for the assertion "NOT FROM 192.168.2 AND TO 192.168.4.* AND 
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Figure 6.11: History MDD for a firewall chain 
FOR TCP 25 SUBSET OF FORWARD ACCEPTED" is given on the left side of figure 6.12. 
When applied to the rule set given in the example, the assertion fails. The source of this 
error is non-obvious. A typo in the subnet mask of rule 2 causes the firewall to drop packets 
from the 192.168.4.0/24 subnet. Intersecting the extended fail set MDD for this assertion 
with the rule set MDD gives us the history map MDD on the right side of figure 6.12. 
Before After 
Figure 6.12: Using the history MDDs 
An examination of the result MDD shows that rules 2 and 3 match the packets which 
cause the assertion to fail (the default policy, rule 0 also matches, but since that is always 
true, it is not very significant). Therefore, the system administrator can ignore rule 1, which 
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is not relevant to the failure of the policy. Instead, he will focus on rule 2, which contains 
the error, and rule 3, the rule which should have accepted the incorrectly discarded packet. 
6. 7 Correctness of the History MDD representation 
To show that the MDD representation of the rule history accurately lists those rules 
which match a packet, we formally define the term "history set of an MDD" and then prove 
that the history set of an MDD for a rule is equivalent to the history set of the rule. 
We use the notation Trid, reid and Tfid to denote the rule index, chain index, and firewall 
index of rule r in the MDD. 
Definition 9 Given an MDD Mr and a packet p, we define the history set of Mr on 
p, H(Mr,p), to be the set of rules r in the firewall such that there exists a path P = 
(eo,el,· .. ,eK+3) from the root of Mr to the terminal node MATCHES such that L(eo) = 
rrid, L(el) =reid, L(e2) = rfid, and for each edge j > 2, L(ej) = p[j- 3]. 
We can now show the equivalence of H(p) and H(Mr,P) for a given ruler. 
Theorem 6.1 For each ruler such that r E H(p), r E H(Mnp). Similarly, for each rule 
r such that r E H(Mnp), r E H(p). 
Proof: 
Step 1: Given an arbitrary packet p, let r E H(p) be any rule of the firewall policy, with 
rule index rid, chain index cid, and firewall index fid, and let 
Mr = MakeHistMDD(r,rid,cid,fid). 
Then, r E H(Mr,p). 
From the definition of H ( Mn p), we see that it is sufficient to show that there is a path 
P = (eo, e1, e2, ... , ek) from the root node of Mr to the terminal node MATCHES 
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such that L( eo) = rid, L( el) = cid, L( e2) = fid, and for each edge ej such that 
2 < j ::; K + 3, L( ej) = p[j - 3]. 
We proceed by induction on K, the number of attributes in a packet. 
Base Case Let K = 0. To see that MakeHistMdd creates a path (eo,el,e2) from 
node <3:n> to MATCHES such that L(eo) =rid, L(el) = cid, and L(e2) = fid, 
consider that line 3 creates an arc from node <1 : n> to MATCHES with label rid. 
Similarly, line 6 creates an arc from node <2: n> to <1 : n> with label cid and line 9 
creates an arc with label fid from <3:n> to <2:n>. Therefore, when K = 0, there 
is a path from <3:n>, the root node of Mr, to MATCHES such that which has the 
appropriate labels on each edge. 
Induction Hypothesis Assume that for all 0 < k < K, that is a path Q = 
(eo, e1, ... , ek+3) in Mr from node <k + 3: n> to MATCHES such that L( eo) = rid, 
L(el) = cid, L(e2) = fid, and L(ej) = p[j-3] for every edge ej such that 2 < j ~ k+3. 
Induction Step Let k = K. Consider node <K + 3: n> created at line 12 in the 
last iteration of the for loop in line 11. To see that there is a path from this node to 
MATCHES with appropriate labels, note when the inner for loop of line 13 reaches 
value p[K], the if statement in line 14 will evaluate to true, since p E M(r). Therefore, 
line 15 will create an arc to node old= <((K + 3)- 1) :n> with label p[K]. Call this 
arc enew· 
By the induction hypothesis, there is a path 
from <((k + 3)- 1) :n> toM ATCH ES such that L(eo) =rid, L(e1) = cid, 
L(e2) = fid, and L(ej) = p[j- 3] for every edge ej such that 2 < j ~ (k + 3) - 1. 
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Therefore, when k = K, there is a path 
from root node <K + 3:n> to MATCHES such that L(eo) = rid, L(e1) cid, 
L(e2) = fid, and L(ej) = p[j- 3] for each edge ej such that 2 < j < K + 3. 
Thus, by the definition of H(Mr,P), r E H(Mr,p). 
Step 2: Let Mr = M akeHistM DD(r, rid, cid, fid) for some values rid, cid, fid, and some 
ruler. Let p be a packet such that r E H(Mr,p). Then, r E H(p). 
Since r E H(Mnp), there is a path P = (eo, e1, ... , eK+3) from the root of Mr to 
MATCHES such that L(eo) =rid, L(e1) = cid, L(e2) = fid, and L(ej) = p[j- 3] 
for 2 < j :::; K + 3. 
To show that p E M(r), we must show that pr.low :::; p[k] :::; pr.high for each value 
0 :::; k :::; K. Consider that the only way M akeH istM D D can create an arc at levels 
3 through K + 3 is in line 15. But the if statement in line 14 guarantees that this 
can only happen when pr.low :::; p[k] :::; pr.high. Since we know that there is a path 
from the root of Mr to MATCHES, we know that pr.low:::; p[k]:::; pr.high for all 
0:::; k:::; K. Therefore, p E M(r). 
• 
This demonstrates that given a ruler, the history MDD, Mr, is a faithful representation 
of the history mapping for that rule. From this and from the proof of correctness of the 
MDD union and intersection operations given in chapters 2 and 3, it is trivial to show that 
the history MDD for a chain is correct and that the intersection of the fail set history MDD 
with the history MDD for a chain produces an MDD which maps packets in the fail set to 
all of the rules which they match. 
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6.8 Directed Repair and Equivalence Classes 
It is often much easier to use assertions than to perform a manual inspection of the 
policy. For one thing, the rules in a policy interact with each other in ways that can be 
confusing to the user. One rule in the policy might mask another rule or cause the rule to 
be applied only in certain, unusual, circumstances. 
Because assertions are independent of each other, writing and understanding a list of 
assertions is often easier than manually correcting the rule set. More importantly, it is 
possible to construct a partial or high-level specification of the policy using assertions. This 
partial specification can ignore many of the details of the policy, which allows it to be 
simpler than the rule set to which it is applied. 
Nevertheless, debugging the firewall using assertions has certain limitations. There is a 
tradeoff between the completeness of a specification and how easy the specification can be 
constructed. Deriving assertions that are both useful and effective can be a very challenging 
task. 
Chain FORWARD (policy DROP): 
target prot source destination Hags 
1 DROP all 192.168.1.0/24 anywhere 
2 ACCEPT all anywhere 192.186.2.0/24 tcp dpt:22 
Figure 6.13: A fault that history mapping misses 
Another limitation of the assertion approach is that certain kinds of faults cannot easily 
be identified using history maps for an assertion. The policy in figure 6.13 is supposed to pro-
teet a secure subnet 192.168.2.0/24 from intrusions on an untrusted network 192.168.1.0/24. 
ASSERT HISTORY TO 192.168.2.* AND 
FOR TCP 22 AND 
NOT FROM 192.168.1.* 
SUBSET OF ACCEPTED forward; 
Figure 6.14: Combining assertions with history 
An assertion checking that legitimate SSH traffic can reach the protected network is 
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also given in figure 6.14. A typo in rule 2 causes the assertion to fail. Unfortunately, the 
history map for the assertion will show only the default policy. None of the other rules in 
the policy match any packets in the fail set. In particular, rule 2, which contains the fault, 
does not match any packets from the 192.168.2.0/24 subnet and, therefore, is not listed. 
One way to address this problem is to create a new assertion that checks whether packets 
from 192.186.2.0/24 are accepted. The history map for such an assertion would immediately 
identify the typo in rule 2. The problem with this is that the system administrator has no 
way of knowing such an assertion is needed. It is not practical to create assertions for all of 
the possible typos in a policy, since doing so would require at least as much work as manual 
inspection of the policy. 
A better way to address the problem is to extend the technique described in the previous 
chapter to provide history information that can be used to discover faults in the policy. 
Figure 6.15 lists three classes derived from the assertion in figure 6.13. Class 2 corresponds 
to the untrusted subnet 192.168.1.0/24. Class 3 is an anomalous class of hosts caused by the 
typo in rule 2. The existence of this class is an immediate clue to the system administrator 
that the firewall policy contains a serious error. Class 1 corresponds to all other hosts on 
the network. 
QUERY HISTORY CLASSES; 
There are 3 total host classes: 
Class 1: 
<Everything not in the other classes> 
Class 2: 
192.168.1. [0-255] 
Class 3: 
192.186.2. [0-255] 
Figure 6.15: Equivalence class decomposition of a policy 
As described in the previous chapter, partitioning the hosts on a network into equivalence 
classes allows us to generate a "policy map" that shows functional groupings of the hosts on 
a network. When the policy contains a fault, it will often be manifested in the policy map 
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as a missing class or by the presence of an unexpected class of hosts. Unfortunately, while 
the policy map assists the system administrator in detecting these problems, it provides 
him with little information that can be used to identify the rules that must be changed to 
repair the issue. 
Source [ 
Address 
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.. . . 
Destination Port -
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Figure 6.16: History MDD for class three 
We can enhance the policy map by annotating each class of hosts with a list of rules 
that match packets to and from a host in the class. To do this, we extend each class MDD 
with wildcard nodes. The resulting graph is similar in structure to the history MDDs used 
to represent the fail set of an assertion, but has wildcards at every level except the source 
address levels. This MDD matches the set of all packets whose source address matches 
a host in the class. We then repeat the procedure to produce an MDD with wildcards 
everywhere except the destination address levels. We can now intersect these class MDDs 
with the history MDDs for each chain to determine which rules match these packets. This 
intersection generates a result MDD which can be translated into a human-readable history 
map. 
An MDD representing all packets with source address from class 3 is given in figure 6.16. 
The top four levels of the MDD correspond to source addresses on subnet 192.186.2.0/24. 
The remaining levels contain wildcard nodes. 
A portion of the history map for the equivalence classes of the policy in figure 6.13 
is given in figure 6.17. The existence of an anomalous class containing hosts from the 
Class 3: 
Firewall 0 Chain 1 Default Policy. 
Firewall 0 Chain 1 Rule 2: 
ACCEPT all -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 192.186.2.0/24 
tcp dpt:22 
Figure 6.17: History Map for class three 
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192.186.2.0/24 subnet immediately alerts the system administrator to a serious error. A 
quick glance at the history map for class 3 reveals that only two rules are of interest: the 
default policy and rule 2. The system administrator now takes a careful look at rule 2 and 
discovers the fault, which enables her to repair the policy. 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion and Future Work 
In this dissertation, we considered the problem of constructing a formal model of a fire-
wall policy using multi-way decision diagrams. We presented several techniques for creating 
and analyzing such a model. The most significant theoretical contributions of this disser-
tation are a quasi-reduced multi-way decision diagram representation of a firewall policy 
and an algorithm for deriving classes of equivalent hosts from the MDD representation. We 
applied these techniques to the development of tools for analyzing, testing, and repairing a 
firewall policy. 
We also demonstrated that network address translation can be incorporated into the 
MDD model by application of a special MDD operator. We show that the MDD represen-
tations of connected firewalls can be combined to allow for analysis of distributed firewalls. 
We extended this work to provide counter-examples and rule history, which enable a 
directed repair of a firewall policy. These tools enable a system administrator to trace an 
error in the policy to the particular faults that cause those errors. 
We applied these techniques to the development of ITVal, a tool for testing and repairing 
iptables firewalls. This analysis can be performed on policies that use advanced features 
such as state-based filtering and packet-mangling. The equivalence class techniques all an 
ITVal user to perform an analysis without generating a large and complicated set of test 
cases or queries. This means that, using ITVal, a Linux firewall administrator can quickly 
and easily discover errors in a firewall policy without a tedious manual inspection of the 
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rule set. 
There are several interesting areas in which both the theory and application of this 
work might be extended. One possible extension of this work is support for proxy firewalls. 
The work described in this thesis addresses packet filtering firewalls in which filtering is 
performed at the data and transport layers. Proxy firewalls operate at higher levels of the 
protocol stack and provide a system administrator with a lot more power in deciding what 
traffic should be filtered. Because the MDD model described in this paper provides a fixed 
number of levels, it is not suitable for representing application-level data in which there can 
be a varying number of fields (keywords of various sizes, for instance). A new data structure, 
based on the filtering MDD, but which allows for a flexible number of levels, could address 
these needs. Extending these techniques to application layer information would also require 
the development of new types of queries and new operations on the MDD. 
The composition operator which enables analysis of connected firewalls currently only 
supports firewalls connected in series. By using the algorithm repeatedly with different 
inputs, it is possible to perform an analysis on more general topologies, but this is awkward 
and inefficient. Extending the to more general topologies would require some innovations 
in the design of the composition operation, but would significantly improve the usability of 
the algorithm. 
Dynamic firewalls, which adapt to changes in network conditions by modifying the 
policy, are becoming increasing popular. The query and assertion language we use to analyze 
the firewall provides MDD operations for basic logic manipulations. This is suitable for 
answering basic questions about the behavior of a static firewall. Expanding the language 
and the model to allow temporal logic queries would enable our model to analyze dynamic 
firewalls. 
There are several areas in which the equivalence class generation techniques might be 
extended. For instance, packet classifiers, which organize packets into related streams for 
traffic shaping define an equivalence relation which is very similar to the host-equivalence 
relation for packet filtering. It might be possible to adapt our MDD algorithms to provide 
136 
correctness and performance analysis of packet classifiers. 
It might also be interesting to explore the use of the equivalence class technique with 
other analysis strategies. For instance, while active testing tools have many disadvantages, 
they can be used to solve problems that passive testing tools cannot, such as verifying that 
the firewall software (rather than just the policy of the firewall) is correct. We have already 
investigated the combination of equivalence class generation with passive testing tools, but 
have not yet developed techniques for using the equivalence classes with active testing tools. 
An interesting hybrid between active and passive tools is Russell's netfilter simulator [44]. 
The simulator is intended to be used for debugging kernel hooks in netfilter, and provides 
very low-level access to the internals of netfilter, so it is not by itself suitable as a query 
tool for non-developers, but could perhaps be used as the basis of a more general query 
library. Integrating the simulator with the equivalence class technique could produce a 
hybrid testing technique that combines elements of active analysis with passive analysis. 
Another area in which the work might be extended is to further develop the possibilities 
of the guided-repair techniques. For instance, it might be possible to develop, from an 
assertion's critical set, a list of candidate solutions for repairing the firewall. The user could 
then select an appropriate remedy from these choices, which could be immediately applied 
to the firewall. Providing a reasonably short list of candidate solutions would require some 
means of winnowing down the extremely large number of permutations of rules to a few 
likely solutions. This might be done by combining the equivalence class analysis with the 
counter-example generation technique. 
There are also many ways in which the development of ITVal can be extended. One area 
in which the tool could be significantly improved is visualization of query results. Queries 
often generate a significant amount of unstructured output which can ·be difficult for a 
human reader to parse. The output of the equivalence class queries is usually much more 
structured and easier to read. Developing a technique which uses the equivalence classes 
to add structure to the output of other queries could lead to significant enhancements in 
the usability of the tool. Another possible solution to this problem is the development of a 
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graphical interface. 
Currently, ITVal supports basic data/link layer filtering and network address transla-
tion. There are many other features of iptables that are potentially amenable to analysis. 
For instance, it is possible to use the netfilter framework to create rules that match against 
the MAC address, or to modify the TTL of a packet. Extending ITVal to accommodate 
more of the features of .the firewall is another potential direction for future work. 
Another way in which ITVal could be enhanced is by extending it to new types of fire-
walls on a more diverse set of platforms. Although the tool currently supports only iptables 
firewalls, a user can perform analysis on ipfwm and ipchains firewalls using scripts [49] 
which translate between the various formats. Supporting other firewalls, such as Check-
point's FW-1 firewall, or BSD's "pf" firewall, would open the tool up to a wider user base. 
One way to do that would be to convert firewall policies into a common intermediate rep-
resentation that could be easily parsed by ITVal and other firewall tools. We are currently 
developing an application which will convert iptables firewalls to an XML-based format 
used by the Redseal Security Risk Manager [40] and it should be possible to create a parser 
for their XML format which would allow ITVal to support all of the firewalls supported by 
their tool, including Cisco PIX firewalls. An alternative solution would be support for the 
MDL language used by the Firmato [5] framework. 
Appendix A 
Query Selection for Effective 
Analysis 
Designing effective queries for a passive testing tool can be challenging and error-prone. 
Queries that are too narrow can miss important anomalies in the firewall policy. Queries 
that are too broad can produce too much information to be usefully analyzed. 
In this appendix, we present some solutions for constructing a broad range of firewall 
policy tests. These paradigms are drawn from well known firewall design practices. We 
implement several of these tests as a set of generic query files that can be easily adapted to 
the needs of a particular network or system. 
A.l Using ITVal 
In this work, we will concentrate on how to use ITVal effectively, rather than on its 
implementation and design. With a little work, it should be possible to use our examples 
with other tools, such as active testing utilities. 
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A.2 Constructing Queries 
There is a fairly sizable body of work available on configuring a packet filter to avoid 
various kinds of vulnerabilities. Rather than simply repeat what is readily available, we will 
focus on how to use these sources of information to derive tests for the firewall policy. 
In order to illustrate our technique, we use the example network shown in figure A.l. 
The example network has two mail servers and a large number of client machines. The 
firewall acts as a perimeter defense separating servers and clients on the 128.40.10.0/24 
subnet from the outside world. 
Outside 
World 
128.140.10.1 
128.140.10.2 
Backup 
Mail Server 
128.140.10.0/24 
Figure A.l: A simple perimeter firewall 
Suppose that we know that the packet filter should block packets of type X given a 
certain condition Y. There are several ways to construct a query that tests whether the 
packet filter meets this criteria. One possibility is to produce a list of hosts or services 
that satisfy the criteria. A better way is to produce a list of all hosts that fail to meet the 
criteria. 
To see this, consider figure A.2. In order to prevent client machines from becoming 
spam relays, it is usually advisable to prevent outgoing SMTP traffic from any host but the 
mail server. This can be stated as: "The packet filter should always block packets of type 
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SMTP given the condition that the source address of those packets is not a mail server". 
Figure A.2 gives two possible queries for checking this property. 
QUERY DPORT FROM 128.140.10.* AND 
NOT FROM 128.140.10.2 AND 
NOT FROM 128.140.10.3 AND ACCEPTED forward; 
QUERY SADDY FROM 128.140.10.* AND 
FOR TCP 25 AND ACCEPTED forward; 
Figure A.2: Queries for finding rogue mail servers 
Both queries can be used to check whether hosts other than the mail server are allowed 
to send SMTP traffic on the network describe in figure A.l. The first query produces a list 
of allowed destination ports from hosts other than the mail server. If the SMTP port does 
not appear in this list, the firewall is correctly configured. The second query produces a 
list of hosts that are allowed to send SMTP traffic. If any host but the mail server appears 
in the output, the firewall is incorrectly configured. While either query could correctly 
determine whether a client machine is allowed to send mail, the second query generates far 
less output and identifies which hosts the firewall incorrectly allows to send mail traffic. 
A.3 A voiding pitfalls 
Although creating queries for testing best practice is usually straightforward, there are a 
few pitfalls to avoid. Consider for instance, the simple ITVal query file shown in figure A.3. 
This query set is a more general version of the queries shown above that test whether the 
example firewall contains adequate protections against internal and external spam relays. 
Line 1 defines a named group of hosts that represents the mail servers of the network. Line 2 
defines a named group of mail related services. The query in line 3 lists all services provided 
by the mail server other than mail service. Line 4 lists all hosts, other than the mail servers 
themselves, that are allowed to transmit mail related traffic that is not destined for one of 
the mail servers. 
GROUP mailservers 128.140.10.2 128.140.10.3; 
SERVICE mail TCP 25 TCP 110 TCP 993; 
QUERY DPORT TO mailservers AND 
NOT FOR mail AND ACCEPTED forward; 
QUERY SADDY FOR mail AND 
NOT FROM mailservers AND 
NOT TO mailservers AND ACCEPTED forward; 
Figure A.3: Example ITVal query 
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This query file can be easily adapted to fit almost any network by changing the addresses 
in lines 1 and 2 and will catch some interesting behaviors of a poorly configured firewall. 
For instance, it is good practice to secure important servers so that only services provided 
by that server are allowed from outside the network (see for example, [8], pp. 56, 75-76, 
and [48], pp. 183). The query on line 3 lists all services allowed to the mail server that are 
not strictly necessary for mail service. 
A well-configured packet filter can block most traffic from spam relays by only accepting 
mail traffic that originates from the mail servers. However, for the mail server to function, 
incoming traffic to the mail server must also be permitted. The query on line 4 checks 
whether the firewall meets these specifications. If mail traffic is allowed from a host not 
listed in the mailservers list, that host will appear in the query results. 
While these queries are very useful for ensuring that the firewall controls unwanted 
traffic, both of these queries have significant problems. The query on line 3 will return a 
large number of false positives on a stateful firewall. The query on line 4 ensures that the 
firewall defeats most spam relays, but doesn't check whether a host that uses spoofing can 
circumvent that protection. 
A.3.1 Accounting for State 
Many packet filters are configured to accept traffic from established or related con-
nections. Accepting established connections allows the firewall to handle incoming replies 
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caused by legitimate outgoing traffic. Accepting related connections allows protocols such 
as FTP to successfully navigate the packet filter. 
QUERY DPORT TO mailservers AND 
NOT FOR mail AND 
IN NEW AND ACCEPTED forward; 
Figure A.4: Adding state to a typical query 
Since established and related connections can potentially use any source or destination 
port, the query on line 3 of figure A.3 will list every network port even if the firewall 
is adequately protected against spam relays. To eliminate these false positives, we must 
be careful to consider only new connections. In ITVal, we can do this by adding an IN 
NEW condition as shown in figure A.4. This forces the query to match only incoming new 
connections. 
A.3.2 Accounting for Spoofing 
Because a packet filter has no way of identifying the authentic source of a packet, address 
spoofing can defeat any filtering policy. A common strategy for preventing most spoofing 
attempts is to drop packets that arrive on a network interface and have source addresses 
from the wrong side of the interface [8]. Before we test for individual vulnerabilities, we 
should check to make sure that the firewall has this kind of spoofing protection in place. 
The easiest way to test for this is to write a query for each interface. The query will list all 
hosts that can access the network from the wrong side of the interface. 
QUERY SADDY FROM 128.140.10.* AND 
INFACE ethO AND ACCEPTED forward; 
QUERY SADDY NOT FROM 128.140.10.* AND 
INFACE eth1 AND ACCEPTED forward; 
Figure A.5: Queries to check for spoofing on the example network 
Figure A.5 introduces two queries that could be used to verify that the example network 
is protected from spoofing attacks. Another well known precaution against spoofing attacks 
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is to block access from non-routable addresses and other illegal addresses such as broadcast 
addresses (see [48], pp. 186-190). These addresses are commonly used as spoofed source 
addresses by malicious programs. 
GROUP illegal *·*·*.255 10.*.*·* 
172. [16-31] ·*·* 192.168.*.* 
169.254.*.* 224.*.*·* 0.*.*·* 
[240-255] ·*·*·* 127.*.*·*i 
QUERY SADDY FROM illegal AND 
((INFACE ethO AND OUTFACE eth1) OR 
(INFACE eth1 AND OUTFACE ethO)) AND ACCEPTED forward; 
Figure A.6: Queries to check for illegal source addresses 
It is usually very simple to check that the firewall correctly restricts packets from these 
addresses. Figure A.6 illustrates how this might be done for the example network. Line 1 
creates a named group consisting of special addresses to check. Line 2 tests whether the 
firewall blocks network traffic from those addresses that crosses the network perimeter. 
A.4 Putting it All Together 
We now illustrate our technique with a sophisticated example derived from guidelines 
in "Linux Network Security" [48] and "Firewalls and Internet Security" [8]. The example 
includes the previously mentioned checks for spoofing and use of illegal addresses and also 
verifies that the firewall adequately protects three important servers. 
GROUP firewall 128.40.10.1; 
GROUP dns_server 128.40.9.101; 
GROUP mailservers 128.40.10.2 
128.40.10.3; 
GROUP webserver 128.40.10.4; 
GROUP illegal *·*·*.255 10.*.*·* 
172. [16-31].*.* 192.168.*.* 
169.254.*.* 224.*.*·* 0.*.*·* 
[240-255] ·*·*·* 127.*.*·*; 
#Check for packets that appear on the each 
#interface with the wrong addresses. 
QUERY SADDY INFACE ethO AND 
FROM 128.40.10.* AND ACCEPTED forward; 
QUERY SADDY OUTFACE ethO AND 
NOT FROM 128.40.10.* AND ACCEPTED forward; 
QUERY SADDY INFACE eth1 AND 
NOT FROM 128.40.10.* AND ACCEPTED forward; 
QUERY SADDY OUTFACE eth1 AND 
FROM 128.40.10.* AND ACCEPTED forward; 
#Check that broadcast addresses are 
#blocked. This can 
#discourage SMURF and FRAGGLE attacks. 
#Also check other non-routable and 
#illegal addresses. 
QUERY SADDY FROM illegal AND 
((INFACE ethO AND 
OUTFACE eth1) OR 
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(INFACE eth1 AND 
OUTFACE ethO)) AND ACCEPTED forward; 
#Ensure that UDP traffic to and from the 
#firewall box itself is blocked, except 
#for NTP traffic and DNS. 
QUERY SADDY (FOR UDP * AND 
NOT FOR UDP 123 AND 
NOT FOR BOTH 53) OR 
(ON UDP * AND 
NOT ON UDP 123 AND 
NOT FOR BOTH 53) AND 
IN NEW AND ACCEPTED input; 
QUERY SADDY (FOR UDP * AND 
NOT FOR UDP 123) OR 
(ON UDP * AND 
NOT ON UDP 123) AND 
IN NEW AND ACCEPTED output; 
#Check that SSH to the firewall box 
#is only allowed from internal 
#hosts. 
QUERY SADDY (FOR TCP 22 AND 
TO firewall AND 
NOT FROM ethO) 
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AND IN NEW AND ACCEPTED input; 
#Check that DNS traffic can only 
#come from the correct external 
#server. 
QUERY DADDY (FOR BOTH 53) AND 
NOT (TO dns_server OR 
FROM dns_server) AND 
IN NEW AND ACCEPTED forward; 
#Check that Only allow HTTP and 
#HTTPS traffic is allowed into 
#the webserver. 
QUERY SADDY TO webserver AND 
(NOT FOR TCP 80 AND 
NOT FOR TCP 443 AND 
NOT FOR BOTH 53) AND 
IN NEW AND ACCEPTED forward; 
#Check that only SMTP and POP 
#traffic is allowed to 
#the mailservers (and DNS replies). 
QUERY SADDY TO mailservers AND 
(NOT FOR TCP 25 AND 
NOT FOR TCP 110 
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AND NOT FOR TCP 993 
AND NOT FOR BOTH 53 
AND IN NEW AND ACCEPTED forward; 
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This example can be used as a boilerplate for creating security policy validation queries. 
It can be easily adapted to a new network simply by changing the IP addresses in the 
predefined groups. By making slight modifications to some of the queries, the syst.em 
administrator can tweak the example to account for variations in the security policy (to 
allow the web server to provide additional services, perhaps). 
A.5 Conclusion 
In addition to the sources already mentioned, there are several other places to find good 
information on locking down a firewall. Among them is a list of guidelines published by 
the CERT coordination center at http:/ /www.cert.org/tech_tipsjpacketJiltering.html and 
a list of ports that most firewalls should block at 
http:/ /www.doshelp.com/Ports/Trojan_Forts.htm. Information from these sources can be 
easily converted into firewall compliance checks. 
While these techniques can significantly reduce the risk of leaving a significant hole in 
the firewall policy, they also have some disadvantages. Traditional penetration testing tools 
can test both the firewall and the server for vulnerabilities. They can test whether buggy 
firewall software has compromised the security policy. Rigorous testing should use both 
techniques side by side to ensure that the firewall correctly applies the security policy. 
The latest version of ITVal and several more examples of how to use it for verifying 
a security policy can be obtained from http:/ /itval.sourceforge.net. The examples are de-
signed to be easily modified for use in a variety of settings and provide checks for many 
known vulnerabilities. 
Bibliography 
[1] EHAB S. AL-SHAER AND HAZEM H. HAMED. Modeling and management of firewall 
policies. Transactions on Network and Service Management, April 2004. 
[2] HARRY ANDERSON. Introduction to Nessus, October 2003. 
http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1741/. 
[3] 0SKAR ANDREASSON. iptables tutorial, 2001. 
http://iptables-tutorial.frozentux.net/iptables-tutorial.btml. 
[4] ANDREA BARISANI. Testing firewalls and IDS with ftester. In Insight, Newsletter of 
the Internet Security Conference, volume 5, 2001. 
http://www.tisc2001.com/newsletters/56.btml. 
[5] YAIR BARTAL, ALAIN MAYER, KOBBI NISSIM, AND AVISHAI WOOL. Firmato: A 
novel firewall management toolkit. ACM Trans. Comput. Syst., 22(4):381-420, 2004. 
[6] PHILIPPE BOGAERTS. HPING tutorial, August 2003. 
http://www.radarhack.com/dir/papers/hping2_v1.5.pdf. 
[7] RANDAL E. BRYANT. Graph-based algorithms for Boolean function manipulation. 
IEEE Transactions on Computers, C-35(8):677-691, August 1986. 
http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/bryant86graphbased.html. 
[8] WILLIAM R. CHESWICK AND STEVEN M. BELLOVIN. Firewalls and Internet Security: 
Repelling the Wily Hacker. Addison Wesley, 1994. 
[9] M. CHRISTIANSEN, E. FLEURY, AND D. AALBORG. An Interval Decision Diagram 
Based Firewall. Proceedings of 3rd IEEE International Conference on Networking 
{ICN04). University of Haute Alsace, Colmar, France. ISBN 0-86341-325-0, 2004. 
[10] MIKKEL CHRISTIANSEN AND EMMANUEL FLEURY. Improving firewalls using 
BRIC(K)S. BRIGS Newsletter, 11:56-59, December 2001. 
[11] MIKKEL CHRISTIANSEN AND EMMANUEL FLEURY. An MTIDD based firewall. Tele-
cummunications Systems, 27(2-4):219-319, 2004. 
[12] G. CIARDO, R. MARMORSTEIN, AND R. SIMINICEANU. Saturation unbound, 2003. 
148 
149 
[13] GIANFRANCO CIARDO, GERALD LUETTGEN, AND RADU 8IMINICEANU. Efficient sym-
bolic state-space construction for asynchronous systems. Application and Theory of 
Petri Nets, 1825:103-122, June 2000. 
http:llciteseer.ist.psu.edularticlelciardoOOefficient.html. 
[14] TOM EASTEP. Introduction to Shorewall, 2005. 
http:/lwww.shorewall.net. 
[15] DAVID EPPSTEIN AND S. MUTHUKRISHNAN. Internet packet filter management and 
rectangle geometry. In Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 827-835, 2001. 
[16] PAS! ERONEN AND JUKKA ZITTING. An expert system for analyzing firewall rules. 
Proceedings of the 6th Nordic Workshop on Secure IT Systems, 2001. 
[17] HERVE EYCHENNE. iptables man page, March 2002. 
[18] DAN FARMER AND WIETSE VENEMA. SATAN: Security Administrator's Tool for 
Analyzing Networks, 1995. 
http:llwww.fish.coml-zenlsatanl. 
[19] FYODOR. The art of port scanning. Phrack, 7(51), September 1997. 
[20] SIMSON GARFINKEL. Firewall follies. Technology Review, September 2002. 
http:/lwww.technologyreview.com. 
[21] LUIGI GENONI, SHEER EL-SHOWK, AND MICHELE BALDESSARI. knetfilter website. 
http:llvenom.oltrelinux.com. 
[22] MOHAMED G. GOUDA AND ALEX X. LIU. Firewall design: Consistency, complete-
ness, and compactness. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Distributed 
Computing Systems. IEEE Computer Society, March 2004. 
[23] ROBERT J. HALL. Specification modeling and validation applied to a family of network 
security products. In Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Conference on 
Automated Software Engineering, 2001. 
[24] ScOTT HAZELHURST. A proposal for dynamic access lists for tcpjip packet filtering. 
Technical Report TR-Wits-CS-2001-2, University of Witwatersrand, April 2001. 
[25] ScoTT HAZELHURST, ANTON FATTI, AND ANDREW HENWOOD. Binary decision 
diagram representation of firewall and router access lists. Technical Report TR-Wits-
CS-1998-3, University of Witwatersrand, October 1998. 
[26] DANIEL HOFFMAN, DURGA PRABHAKAR, AND PAUL STROOPER. Testing iptables. In 
GASCON '03: Proceedings of the 2003 conference of the Centre for Advanced Studies 
on Collaborative research, pages 80-91. IBM Press, 2003. 
[27] Internet Security Systems. Internet Scanner User Guide Version 7. 0 SP 2, 2005. 
http: I I documents. iss. netlli teratureiinternetScanner I IS_UG_7. Q_SP2. pdf. 
150 
[28] KEVIN JONAH. Multiple firewalls defend against multiplying threats. Washington 
Technology, 18(8), July 2003. 
http://www.washingtontecbnology.com. 
[29] TOMAS JUNNONEN. Firestarter Manual, January 2005. 
http://www.fs-security.com. 
[30] PADMANABHAN KRISHNAN AND DANITA HARTLEY. Using model checking to test a 
firewall: A case study. In Proceedings of the 28th Euromicro Conference (EuroMicro 
'02), 2002. 
[31] VADIM KURLAND. Firewall builder. In Proceedings of the 11th DFN-CERT Workshop, 
Hamburg, Germany, February 2004. 
[32] JOHN LAMPE. Nessus 3.0 Advanced User Guide, October 2005. 
http://www.nessus.org. 
[33] MARK LEON. Inside the firewall: Will bigger encryption keys keep your data safe from 
harm. Intelligent Enterprise, May 2005. 
http://www.intelligententerprise.com/ 
showArticle.jhtml? articleiD=159907849. 
[34] ALEX X. Lru, MOHAMED G. GOUDA, Huli3o HEIDI MA, AND ANNE H. NGU. Firewall 
queries. In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Principles of Distributed 
Systems (OPODIS-04), LNCS 3544· Springer-Verlag, December 2004. 
http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/alex/publications/ 
FirewallQueries/query.pdf. 
[35] ALEX X. LIU AND MOHAMMED G. GOUDA. Diverse firewall design. Transactions on 
Parallel and Distributed Systems: Accepted for future publication, 2007. 
[36] RoBERT MARMORSTEIN. Designing and implementing a user library for manipulation 
of multi-way decision diagrams. MS Project Report, Computer Science Department, 
The College of William and Mary, 2004. 
http://www.cs.wm.edu/-rmmarm/Pubs/710paper.pdf. 
[37] ALAIN MAYER, AVISHAI WOOL, AND ELISHA ZISKIND. Fang: A firewall analysis 
engine. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 2000. 
[38] MoNMOTHA. Man Motha Reference Guide, August 2004. 
http://www.hosef.org/wiki/MonMothaReferenceGuide. 
[39] PHILIP R. MOYER AND E. EUGENE SCHULTZ. A systematic methodology for firewall 
penetration testing. Network Security, March 1996. 
[40] REDSEAL WHITE PAPER. How to reduce your IT security exposure in three steps, 
April 2007. 
http://www.infosecurityproductsguide.com/technology/ 
2007/RedSealSystems.html. 
[41] REG QUINTON. Using Solaris ipfilters. 
http:/list.waterloo.ca/security/howto/2005-08-19/paper.pdf. 
[42] RUSTY RUSSEL AND MICHAEL NEULING. iptables source code. 
http://lxr.linux.no/source/include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h. 
151 
[43] RUSTY RusSELL. Linux 2.4 Packet Filtering HOWTO Revision 1.26, January 2002. 
http://www.netfilter.org/documentation/HOWTO/ 
packet-filtering-HOWTO.html. 
[44] RusTY RussELL AND JEREMY KERR. Netfilter Simulation Environment, 2004. 
http://ozlabs.org/-jk/projects/nfsim/howto/. 
[45] NIDHI SHARMA. Fireviz: A personal firewall visualizing tool. MS Thesis, Computer Sci-
ence and Engineering Department, The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005. 
http://groups.csail.mit.edu/uid/projects/fireviz/nidhi-thesis.pdf. 
[46] ABE SINGER. Life without firewalls. ; login:, 28(6):27-30, December 2003. 
[47] ABE SINGER. Tempting fate. ; login:, 30(1):27-30, February 2005. 
[48] PETER G. SMITH. Linux Network Security. Charles River Media, 2005. 
[49] BILL STEARNS. i2i: The firewall conversion routines, September 1999. 
http:/ jwww.stearns.org/i2i/. 
[50] BENNETT TODD. Auditing Firewalls: A Practical Guide, June 2004. 
http://www.itsecurity.com/papers/p5.html. 
[51] BOB TODD. SARA man page. 
http://www-arc.com/sara/sara8.html. 
[52] ALOK TONGAONKAR, NIRANJAN INAMDAR, AND R. SEKAR. Inferring higher level 
policies from firewall rules. In 21st Large Installations System Administration Confer-
ence, pages 17-26, 2007. 
[53] TUNG TRAN, EHAB AL-SHAER, AND RAOUF BOUTABA. Policyvis: Firewall security 
policy visualization and inspection. In 21st Large Installations System Administration 
Conference, pages 1-16, 2007. 
[54] COSTA TSAOUSIS. FireHOL Tutorial, November 2004. 
http://firehol.sourceforge.net. 
[55] ARNO VAN AMERSFOORT. Arno 's iptables firewall, 2004. 
http://rocky.eld.leidenuniv.nl. 
[56] PAVAN VERMA AND ATUL PRAKASH. Face: A firewall analysis and configuration 
engine. In SAINT '05: Proceedings of the 2005 Symposium on Applications and the 
Internet, 2005. 
[57] JACK WALSH. ICSA Labs Firewall Testing: An In Depth Analysis, June 2004. 
[58] HARALD WELTE. netfilterjiptables FAQ, 2003. 
http://www.netfilter.org/documentation/FAQ/netfilter-faq.html. 
152 
[59] AVISHAI WOOL. Architecting the Lumeta firewall analyzer. In Proceedings of the 10th 
USENIX Security Symposium, August 2001. 
[60] AVISHAI WOOL. A quantitative study of firewall configuration errors. IEEE Computer, 
37(6):62-67, June 2004. 
153 
VITA 
Robert Mathias Marmorstein 
Robert Marmorstein was born in Sacramento, California on March 6, 1979. After graduating 
from Central High School in Aberdeen, South Dakota, he enrolled at Washington and Lee 
University. In May 2000, He graduated with a Bachelor of Arts in Computer Science and 
a Bachelor of Arts in Mathematics. He completed his Master of Science at the College of 
William and Mary in the spring of 2003. 
